Category: Supreme Court of Canada Page 1 of 23

Democracy Watch and its Implications for the Practice of Channeling Limited Judicial Supervision to Appellate Courts

On August 10, 2026

In Administrative Law, Appellate Practice, Law Reform, Supreme Court of Canada

Matter Commented On: Democracy Watch v Canada (Attorney General), 2026 SCC 28 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Democracy Watch and its Implications for the Practice of Channeling Limited Judicial Supervision to Appellate Courts

This post assesses the implications of the Supreme Court’s unanimous and important decision in Democracy Watch for those many scenarios in which a provincial legislature channels some part, but only some part, of the judicial supervision of a regulatory tribunal to the province’s appellate courts. The drafting technique, at least in Alberta, is quite consistent. Step one, make provision for an appeal of a decision of a regulator to the Court of Appeal with a short limitation period; step two, confine that appeal to points of law or jurisdiction (i.e. no appeal on findings of fact or mixed findings of law and fact); step three, stipulate that the appeal is not as of right, but is subject to a leave or permission to appeal application; step four, confirm, by way of a broadly drafted privative clause, that the usual avenues for judicial review in the Court of King’s Bench are foreclosed.

Dorsey v Canada: A Rare and Necessary Advancement for Prisoners’ Rights

By Amy Matychuk

On December 2, 2025

In Access to Justice, Criminal, Human Rights, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Amy Matychuk

Case Commented On: Dorsey v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 SCC 38 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Dorsey v Canada: A Rare and Necessary Advancement for Prisoners’ Rights

The decision in Dorsey v Canada, issued by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) on November 21, 2025, represents the first major jurisprudential development in the law of habeas corpus for several years. It expands the availability of habeas corpus to inmates whose applications to transfer to a lower security level have been denied. Prior to Dorsey, habeas corpus was only available in the context of institutional transfers if an inmate’s security level had been involuntarily raised. Writing for the majority in Dorsey, Justice Mary T. Moreau found that a decision denying an inmate transfer to a lower security level qualifies as a deprivation of liberty for which habeas corpus can offer a remedy.

Teaching Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation

By Robert Hamilton

On March 13, 2025

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Statutory Interpretation, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Robert Hamilton, Jennifer Koshan, and Jonnette Watson Hamilton

Case Commented On: Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Teaching Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation

It has been a year since the Supreme Court of Canada released its landmark decision in Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10 (CanLII), and many of us are still grappling with how to include Dickson in our teaching materials. For those teaching international law, or the interplay between Canadian law, Indigenous law, and international law, this previous post might be a useful summary of Dickson’s commentary (or lack thereof) on the legal significance of Canada’s adoption and implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In this post, we deal with another important issue – whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies in the context of modern treaties, or at least in the context of the treaty and surrounding documents that governed the dispute between Cindy Dickson and the Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation (VGFN). We provide a summary and critique of the judgments of the Supreme Court on this issue, which concern the interpretation and application of section 32(1) of the Charter in light of constitutional text, history, and precedents as applied to the facts at hand. The majority judgment of Justices Nicolas Kasirer and Mahmud Jamal provide an excellent summary of previous jurisprudence on section 32(1) and could replace a swath of case law on the constitutional law syllabus. But the concurring judgment of Justices Sheilah Martin and Michelle O’Bonsawin, and the dissenting judgment of Justice Malcolm Rowe, are also worthy of discussion given their insights on the complexities of debates surrounding the issue of Charter application. We hope that this summary of the various judgments and our commentary on those judgments will be helpful for those teaching constitutional law and adjacent subjects. We also plan to write a second post focusing on the section 15(1) and section 25 Charter issues in Dickson.

Yatar v TD Insurance Meloche Monnex: Limited Statutory Rights of Appeal and The Availability of Judicial Review

By Shaun Fluker

On April 10, 2024

In Administrative Law, Appellate Practice, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Shaun Fluker, Drew Yewchuk, and Nigel Bankes

Case Commented On: Yatar v TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Yatar v TD Insurance Meloche Monnex: Limited Statutory Rights of Appeal and The Availability of Judicial Review

This post discusses the recent Supreme Court decision in Yatar v TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8 (CanLII) (Yatar). The decision addresses the availability of judicial review of administrative decisions when the legislature has established a restricted statutory right of appeal for those same decisions. This unanimous decision is an important affirmation of the continued availability of judicial review – at least for grounds of review not covered by the statutory appeal right. However, it seems likely that this decision, especially when read together with the Court’s decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII) (Vavilov) will encourage parallel or sequential filings under both the statutory appeal provisions and for judicial review.

What Did the Court Mean When It Said that UNDRIP “has been incorporated into the country’s positive law”? Appellate Guidance or Rhetorical Flourish?

By Nigel Bankes

On February 28, 2024

In Aboriginal, Indigenous, International Law, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Nigel Bankes and Robert Hamilton

Case commented on: Reference re An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 2024 SCC 5 (CanLII).

PDF Version: What Did the Court Mean When It Said that UNDRIP “has been incorporated into the country’s positive law”? Appellate Guidance or Rhetorical Flourish?

In its recent reference opinion on the validity of an Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, SC 2019, c 24 (the FNIM Act), the Supreme Court went out of its way to comment on the legal significance of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, SC 2021, c 14 (the federal UNDRIP Act). The Court did so notwithstanding that legal questions relating to the federal UNDRIP Act were not directly before it, and notwithstanding its own observations in the Reference to the effect that “[t]he task that falls to the Court in the context of a reference invites caution …” (at para 111). That it chose to comment at such length is even more remarkable when one reflects on how reticent the Court seems to have been to comment on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP or Declaration), or international human rights law more generally, in other cases over the last two decades dealing with Indigenous rights.