Author: Alice Woolley Page 16 of 20

LL.M. (Yale), LL.B. (Toronto), B.A. (Toronto).
Professor. Member of the Alberta Bar.
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Disposition of Regulated Property Regulation (Draft) AR 4570 Draft DRReg 2010 03 31 (available by Email request)

PDF version: Filling the Gap: The Proposed “Disposition of Regulated Property Regulation”

On March 31, 2010 the Alberta government issued a draft regulation pursuant to the Alberta Utilities Commission Act, S.A. 2007, c. A-37.2 (“AUCA”), the Disposition of Regulated Property Regulation (Draft) (“Draft Regulation”). The power to enact regulations is contained in s. 75 of the AUCA, which gives the Lieutenant-Governor in Council the power to make regulations “adding to, clarifying, limiting or restricting” any of the powers granted pursuant to the AUCA. In this case the Draft Regulation is stated expressly to operate as “an addition to” powers granted to the AUC under the Gas Utilities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. G-5 and the Public Utilities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-5. (Draft Regulation, s. 2(1)).

Reflecting on the Supreme Court’s Reassertion of Judicial Control Over Lawyer Withdrawal and Its (Non) Impact on the “Perjury Trilemma”

By Alice Woolley

On April 1, 2010

In Ethics and the Legal Profession, Supreme Court of Canada

Cases Considered: R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10; R. v. White, 2010 ABCA 66

PDF version: Reflecting on the Supreme Court’s Reassertion of Judicial Control Over Lawyer Withdrawal and Its (Non) Impact on the “Perjury Trilemma”

In its March 26, 2010 decision in R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the position of the Yukon Territory Court of Appeal that courts have no jurisdiction to prevent counsel from withdrawing from a scheduled criminal proceeding, even if the withdrawal is only for non-payment of fees (Cunningham v. Lilles, 2008 YKCA 7). The Supreme Court affirmed the position taken by most other provincial courts of appeal, that both superior and statutory courts may require that counsel apply for leave when seeking to withdraw from scheduled criminal proceedings, and that in exceptional circumstances the application to withdraw may be denied (See R. v. C (D.D.) (1996), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 323 (ABCA); R. v. Deschamps, 2003 MBCA 116); Bernier v. 9007-1474 Québec Inc., [2001] J.Q. No. 2631 (Que. CA); Mireau v. Canada (1995), 128 Sask. R. 142 (C.A.); R. v. Brundia, 2007 ONCA 725; Contra see Re Leask and Cronin (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 315 (BCSC)).

The Italics that Rocked the Decade (for Canadian Lawyers)

By Alice Woolley

On February 1, 2010

In Ethics and the Legal Profession, Supreme Court of Canada

Cases considered: R. v. Neil, 2002 SCC 70; [2002] 3 S.C.R. 631; Strother v. 3464920 Canada Inc. 2007 SCC 24;[2007] 2 S.C.R. 177.

PDF version: The Italics that Rocked the Decade (for Canadian Lawyers)

Those who follow sports know that some of the most fun you can have with your clothes on is debating the criteria for selecting the league MVP. Is it the best player, considered apart from the success (or ineptitude) of his team? Is it the player who contributed the most to the accomplishments of a successful team effort? Is it a particular type of contribution that matters – e.g., exceptional individual skill or above average skills combined with exceptional leadership? Or is it some more holistic determination, considering a variety of factors in a balance which is incapable of articulation beyond “I know it when I see it?”

The public and private duties of opposing counsel

By Alice Woolley

On November 25, 2009

In Ethics and the Legal Profession

Case considered: F.N. v. McGechie, 2009 ABQB 625

PDF version: The public and private duties of opposing counsel

Alberta courts have consistently held that misconduct by counsel in the course of litigation will not normally be the basis for liability to the opposing party in that litigation. While sometimes duties to opposing parties exist – as, for example, in the tort of malicious prosecution – the Alberta Court of Appeal in German v. Major (1985), 62 A.R. 2 (C.A.) made it clear that the duties of the lawyer to the court and to the public do not automatically translate into duties to opposing parties.

Prosecutorial Accountability?

By Alice Woolley

On November 12, 2009

In Criminal, Ethics and the Legal Profession, Supreme Court of Canada

Case considered: Miazga v. Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 51

PDF Version: Prosecutorial Accountability?

In its 2002 decision in Law Society of Alberta v. Krieger, 2002 SCC 65, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the ability of the Law Society of Alberta to regulate misconduct by Crown prosecutors. It held, however, that where the misconduct relates to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the Law Society’s jurisdiction is limited to circumstances where the prosecutor has acted in bad faith. The Court reiterated that, in general, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is entitled to deference, and may only be reviewed by the Court in circumstances of “flagrant impropriety” (Krieger, para. 49).

In its recent judgment in Miazga v. Kvello Estate, the Supreme Court has affirmed this highly deferential approach to prosecutorial discretion. The Court held that to establish liability for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must demonstrate a) that the defendant was responsible for the prosecution; b) that the legal proceedings ultimately resolved in favour of the plaintiff; c) that the defendant did not have reasonable and probable grounds for a prosecution, objectively speaking (that is, that the defendant’s professional judgment should have indicated that it was not possible that “proof beyond a reasonable doubt could be made out in a court of law” (para. 63); at this stage the prosecutor’s subjective belief in guilt is irrelevant); and, d) that the defendant acted for some improper purpose in bringing forward the prosecution – that the defendant “deliberately intended to subvert or abuse the office of the Attorney General or the process of Criminal Justice” (para 89).