Author Archives: Dylan Finlay

About Dylan Finlay

Dylan is a Criminal Defence Lawyer in Toronto. Dylan completed his undergraduate degree at the University of Toronto in 2012 and completed his law degree at the University of Calgary in 2016. During law school, Dylan was heavily involved in Student Legal Assistance (SLA), a volunteer student-run legal clinic dedicated to providing legal services to low-income individuals. He was elected to be the SLA Trial Coordinator for 2015. Dylan also competed in the 2016 Gale Cup Moot, in which he responded to R v Nur, 2015 SCC 15. After articling at Savage Oykhman Law, a criminal defence firm in Calgary, he returned to Toronto where he practices exclusively as a Criminal Defence Lawyer for Oykhman Criminal Defence. After articling at Savage Oykhman Law, a criminal defence firm in Calgary, he returned to Toronto where he practices exclusively as a criminal defence lawyer for Oykhman Criminal Defence. His website can be viewed here.

Smoke and Mirrors? With Marihuana Legalization, Parliament Proposes to Drastically Expand Police Power

By: Dylan Finlay

PDF Version: Smoke and Mirrors? With Marihuana Legalization, Parliament Proposes to Drastically Expand Police Power

Legislation Commented On: Bill C-46, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to conveyances) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2017

Parliament is toting marihuana legalization as a necessary public safety measure. With this sentiment, Parliament is revisiting not only drug-impaired driving laws, but also alcohol-impaired driving laws. Part 2 of Bill C-46 would, if passed, allow police officers to demand that a driver provide breath samples without any suspicion that the individual had been drinking. The relevant section is reproduced below:

Mandatory alcohol screening

320.27 (2) If a peace officer has in his or her possession an approved screening device, the peace officer may, in the course of the lawful exercise of powers under an Act of Parliament or an Act of a provincial legislature or arising at common law, by demand, require the person who is operating a motor vehicle to immediately provide the samples of breath that, in the peace officer’s opinion, are necessary to enable a proper analysis to be made by means of that device and to accompany the peace officer for that purpose.

Parliament seeks the moral high ground in selling its proposed legislation to both the public and the judiciary. To the public, the Liberals hope to sway voters who find a ‘tough-on-crime’ agenda attractive – the same segment of the population that supports stiff mandatory minimum jail sentences. To be fair, as far as politics go, this strategy is sound; the segment of the population that supports legalization of marihuana because prohibition never made much sense to begin with will likely support the Bill no matter its complexities.

The judiciary will be harder to convince. Mandatory alcohol screening (as it is proposed by Bill C-46) violates ss 7 (the right to life, liberty and security of the person), 8 (the right against unreasonable search and seizure), 9 (the right not to be arbitrarily detained), and 10 (b) (the right to counsel on arrest or detention) of the Canadian Charter of the Rights and Freedoms (the Charter). Parliament must cast mandatory alcohol screening as a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society to ‘save’ it under s 1 of the Charter.

The groundwork is being laid for such an argument. On CBC’s ‘The House,’ Justice Minister Wilson-Raybould stated: “I am confident [mandatory alcohol screening] will survive a constitutional challenge. It can be justified in terms of public safety, and safety on the roads, and preventing death” (April 13, 2017).

I do not share the Justice Minister’s confidence. Mandatory alcohol screening (as it is proposed) is a flagrant affront to Charter-values and Charter jurisprudence. The Supreme Court should not find such a law constitutional.

A constitutional battle lies ahead. This post will provide a summary of police procedure and the law as it relates to alcohol screening, present arguments for and against mandatory screening’s constitutionality, and ultimately conclude that mandatory alcohol screening is unconstitutional. For the purposes of this post, the focus will be on s 10(b) of the Charter, as this is the focus of the prevailing case law on alcohol screening generally. Continue reading

The Saga of the Intoxication Defence Continues: Desjarlais and its Application to Uttering Threats

By: Dylan Finlay

PDF Version: The Saga of the Intoxication Defence Continues: Desjarlais and its Application to Uttering Threats

Case Commented On: R v Desjarlais, 2016 ABPC 182 (CanLII)

The defence of voluntary intoxication holds an awkward place in Canadian criminal law. Everyone who commits a crime must both do a guilty act (actus reus) and possess a guilty mind (mens rea) – even if that guilty mind is mere recklessness. But what if someone gets so drunk they commit a criminal act? What is the difference between someone who is sleepwalking and someone who is in a drunken stupor so severe they do not have the mental capacity comprehend their actions? Technically, neither hypothetical offender possesses a guilty mind.

True, voluntary intoxication is voluntary, sleepwalking is not. But legally, this distinction is irrelevant. The relevant mens rea is the mental state possessed at the time of the offence. Thus, public policy steps in. While sleepwalking is a defence to murder (see R v Parks, [1992] 2 SCR 871 (CanLII)), voluntary intoxication is not. However, the public policy argument against the intoxication defence does not strike such a chord if the offence becomes causing a disturbance.

Where does the law stand on the intoxication defence for uttering threats? (s. 264.1(1) of the Criminal Code). In July, Judge Allen of the Alberta Provincial Court in Edmonton produced a lengthy decision on this subject. The case is R v Desjarlais, 2016 ABPC 182 (CanLII). It involves a messy situation with multiple witnesses and plenty of credibility analysis; what is important for our purposes is that it involved a situation where the accused threatened to kill the complainant (para 88) while the accused was intoxicated to the point of being, in the words of different witnesses: “eight and one half to nine on a scale of ten,” or “temporarily insane” (para 97). Continue reading

A Case for Adopting the Lewko Approach to Refusal Law

By: Dylan Finlay

PDF Version: A Case for Adopting the Lewko Approach to Refusal Law

Case Commented On: R v Soucy, 2014 ONCJ 497

Obtaining breath samples from those suspected of driving while impaired is a necessary practicality in enforcing impaired driving law. A police officer must have a legal authority to demand that an individual supply a sample of his or her breath, and there must be legal ramifications should that individual decline. Consequently, s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 makes it an offence to fail or refuse to comply with a breath demand, without a reasonable excuse. As a criminal offence, s. 254(5)’s necessary elements include both an actus reus and a mens rea. Two deeply divided lines of authority arise from interpreting s. 254(5)’s requisite mens rea, or culpable state of mind.

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Deconstructing Investigative Detention

By: Dylan Finlay

PDF Version: Deconstructing Investigative Detention

Case Commented On: R v Rowson, 2014 ABQB 79

Crime scenes are often intense and dynamic environments. This presents a challenge to investigators who – prior to making an arrest – must collect enough evidence to satisfy the standard of ‘reasonable and probable grounds.’ The recent case of R v Rowson, 2014 ABQB 79 displays this hurdle. The scene of the alleged crime – a motor vehicle collision – was attended by paramedics, firefighters, the police, and an air ambulance helicopter. Collecting enough evidence to make an arrest was not the police’s immediate priority. To mitigate the challenge that inevitably arises in situations such as this, police are armed with the common-law power of investigative detention. This post will deconstruct this power.

The common law power of investigative detention was developed incrementally and recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Mann, 2004 SCC 52. This case involved two police officers who, while responding to a break and enter, encountered an individual who matched the description of the offender. The individual, Mr. Mann, was stopped and made subject to a pat-down search during which one of the officers felt a soft object in his pocket. Upon reaching inside the pocket, the officer found 27.55 grams of marijuana and a number of small plastic baggies. Mann was subsequently arrested; prior to this he had only been under a state of detention. At trial, Connor Prov. Ct. J. held that while the police were justified in searching Mann for security reasons, reaching into the appellant’s front pocket after feeling a soft item therein was not justified in the circumstances. The conduct thus contravened s. 8 of the Charter, the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure. On appeal, the Manitoba Court of Appeal held that it was not unreasonable for the police to continue the search inside of the pocket. This was further appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

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“Putting” Browne v Dunn into Perspective

By: Dylan Finlay

PDF Version: “Putting” Browne v Dunn into Perspective

Case commented on: R v KWG2014 ABCA 124

The century old rule in Browne v Dunn (hereinafter “the rule”) holds that if counsel intends to present evidence contradictory to a witness’s testimony as part of his or her argument, he or she must put this version of events to the witness during cross-examination.  But just how far must counsel go to satisfy this requirement? The Alberta Court of Appeal has recently shed some light on this question.

The rule is summarized in R v Pasqua, [2009] AJ No 702, 2009 ABCA 247: “there is a general duty on counsel to put a matter directly to a witness if counsel is going to later adduce evidence to impeach the witness’ credibility or present contradictory evidence.” The purpose of the rule is well-grounded; witnesses should be given an opportunity to respond to competing versions of events. Applying a rigid interpretation to R v Pasqua, it would appear as if during cross-examination, counsel would have to say the words “I put to you …” before presenting the witness with contradictory evidence. This formal and rigid interpretation of the rule has now been clarified, and a more flexible approach adopted.

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