Author: Howard Kislowicz Page 1 of 2

Howard (Howie) Kislowicz joined the University of Calgary's Faculty of Law in July 2017, where he teaches Constitutional Law and Administrative Law. From 2013-2017, he was an Assistant Professor at the University of New Brunswick’s Faculty of Law. He completed his common law and civil law degrees at McGill University, and went on to serve as clerk to Justice Gilles Létourneau at the Federal Court of Appeal. After some time in private practice at a national firm in Toronto, he received his LLM and SJD at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law. He is the recipient of numerous awards, including the Alan Marks Medal for best thesis in the University of Toronto’s graduate law program, the SSHRC Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship, and the University of New Brunswick Faculty of Law Teaching Excellence Award. He has published his work in leading law journals and presented his research at national and international conferences, including the Harvard-Stanford International Junior Faculty Forum, the Osgoode Hall-University of Toronto Junior Faculty Forum, and the Berlin Roundtables on Transnationality.

By: Howard Kislowicz

Case Commented On: Wirring v Law Society of Alberta, 2023 ABKB 580 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Religious Freedom and the Oath to the Sovereign

In Wirring v Law Society of Alberta, 2023 ABKB 580 (CanLII), Justice Barbara Johnston for the Alberta Court of King’s Bench granted summary judgment in favour of His Majesty the King in Right of Alberta. The case concerns the objections of Prabjot Singh Wirring to “the portion of the oath mandated by the Legal Profession Act… as set out in the Oaths of Office Act… which includes an oath of allegiance to the sovereign” (at para 1). A person must take the oath to be admitted to the Law Society of Alberta and be entitled to practice law in Alberta. Wirring, who had “obtained a law degree from Dalhousie University and completed his articles” (at para 5) claimed that taking the oath violated his right to freedom of conscience and religion and his right to equality, as protected by ss 2(a) and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Wirring said that, as an Amritdhari Sikh, “oath of allegiance to the Queen is incompatible with the oath he has sworn to Akal Purakh, [the divine being in the Sikh tradition]” (at para 8).

Webber Academy II: Balancing Religious Discrimination and Freedom from Religion in the Provision of Educational Services

By Howard Kislowicz

On July 6, 2023

In Constitutional, Human Rights

By: Howard Kislowicz and Jennifer Koshan

Case Commented On: Webber Academy Foundation v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), 2023 ABCA 194 (CanLII) (Webber Academy II)

PDF Version: Webber Academy II: Balancing Religious Discrimination and Freedom from Religion in the Provision of Educational Services

In the 2011-12 school year, Sarmad Amir and Naman Siddique (“the Students”) were denied prayer space at Webber Academy, where they had recently enrolled as grade 9/10 students. As observant Sunni Muslims, they prayed five times a day, which included school hours at some times of the year. Staff initially allowed the Students to pray in empty offices or classrooms; however, when the head of Webber Academy, Dr. Neil Webber, became aware of the situation, he informed the Students’ parents that prayers could only be performed off campus, or on campus without bowing or kneeling. The explanation was that Webber Academy did not provide physical accommodations for students of other religions to practice their faith, and that the Academy is a non-denominational school. The Students’ parents were also advised that because they had not followed the school’s policies, the Students would not be enrolled for the following year.

The Standard of Review and the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Indigenous Peoples: What is the Impact of Vavilov? Part 2

By Howard Kislowicz

On November 24, 2020

In Aboriginal, Administrative Law

By: Howard Kislowicz and Robert Hamilton

PDF Version: The Standard of Review and the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Indigenous Peoples: What is the Impact of Vavilov? Part 2

Case Commented On: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII)

In our last post, we laid out some background on how the standard of review applies in cases involving the Crown’s constitutional duty to consult and accommodate (DTCA) Indigenous peoples. We argued that the changes brought by Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII) with respect to statutory appeals – where a statute provides that a government decision may be appealed to a court – might allow legislatures to insulate the decisions of the executive by subjecting them to a “palpable and overriding error” standard of review rather than a reasonableness standard. In this post, we look at the other, more common kind of case that arises in administrative law: judicial scrutiny of government decisions through an application for judicial review. Here, the standard of review analysis differs.

In applications for judicial review, Vavilov establishes a general presumption that the standard of review for an administrative decision will be reasonableness (at paras 23–32). However, it also carves out some exceptions to this presumption, in which the standard of review will be correctness. The relevant exception for this post is for questions regarding “the scope of Aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” (at para 55). Important ambiguities persist about what this means for the DTCA. On one hand, DTCA litigation does not determine Aboriginal rights. The DTCA was designed to apply where the Crown considered an action that could impact an Aboriginal right that had not yet been adjudicated. Though it was later extended to established rights, it remains a procedural duty on the Crown rather than an Aboriginal right per se). If this is the case, this would suggest that the correctness exception does not include DTCA issues. On the other hand, the DTCA is a constitutional obligation understood as a limit on the exercise of sovereignty; it shares much in common with the other issues to which Vavilov applies the correctness standard. We argue that the logic supporting the existence of the constitutional exception in Vavilov also supports the application of the correctness standard to a broader range of DTCA issues than is currently the practice. This post considers how Vavilov may have changed considerations of judicial reviews arising in DTCA contexts.

The Standard of Review and the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Indigenous Peoples: What is the Impact of Vavilov? Part 1

By Howard Kislowicz

On November 20, 2020

In Aboriginal, Administrative Law

By: Howard Kislowicz and Robert Hamilton

PDF Version: The Standard of Review and the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Indigenous Peoples: What is the Impact of Vavilov? Part 1

Case Commented On: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII)

This is a two-part post that examines the potential impact of Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII) on the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate (DTCA) Indigenous peoples. Part 1 deals with statutory rights of appeal. Part 2 deals with applications for judicial review. Other ABlawg contributors have touched on related questions; Nigel Bankes’ “Statutory Appeal Rights in Relation to Administrative Decision-Maker Now Attract an Appellate Standard of Review: A Possible Legislative Response” is particularly relevant, as is Shaun Fluker’s post “Vavilov on Standard of Review in Canadian Administrative Law.”

The Supreme Court’s decision in Vavilov (and the Vavilov-trilogy as a whole) was intended by the Court to provide much needed clarity to Canadian administrative law. The impact of the decision is clear: it has been cited by no fewer than 1500 lower court decisions in less than a year. Despite the Court’s attempt at comprehensive refinement of the doctrine, however, Vavilov left considerable uncertainty concerning the applicability of the new rules in the context of the Crown’s DTCA Indigenous peoples. Two things lead to this uncertainty. Vavilov changes the standard of review analysis in two kinds of cases: (1) where a court reviews an administrative decision under a statutory appeal mechanism, and (2) where a court reviews an administrative decision through an application for judicial review. The first uncertainty arises in relation to statutory appeals. Under Vavilov, the standard of review on statutory appeals follows the case law on appeals: questions of law will generally be reviewed on a correctness standard and questions of fact or mixed fact and law will be reviewed on the palpable and overriding error standard (Vavilov at para 37; Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 (CanLII)). In the context of the DTCA, uncertainty attends the application of this framework, as it appears to secure greater judicial deference to decision-makers on issues of fact and mixed fact and law. Because of this, it appears to be possible for a legislature to ensure greater judicial deference for executive action (such as ministerial decisions) where it anticipates issues with the DTCA through the inclusion of a statutory right of review. This seems contrary to Vavilov’s reasoning that statutory appeals are indications that the legislature prefers less, rather than more, deference. It is not clear that the court contemplated this possibility and, if so, whether it considered it an acceptable consequence of the doctrinal refinement.

Church of Atheism of Central Canada v MNR: Charitable Status for Atheists and the Triviality of Religious Freedom Infringements

By Howard Kislowicz

On November 3, 2020

In Constitutional, Federal Court

By: Kathryn Chan & Howard Kislowicz

PDF Version: Church of Atheism of Central Canada v MNR: Charitable Status for Atheists and the Triviality of Religious Freedom Infringements

Case Commented On: Church of Atheism of Central Canada v MNR, 2019 FCA 296 (CanLII)

On October 29, the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal in Church of Atheism of Central Canada v MNR, 2019 FCA 296 (CanLII), a charitable registration appeal that raised questions about the constitutionality of according tax privileges to a class of “religious” charities in Canada. This result is unsurprising. The decision of the Federal Court of Appeal was unanimous and the Church of Atheism was not represented by counsel. The evidentiary record was probably sparse, since the evidentiary record in charitable registration appeals is limited to the documents in the Canada Revenue Agency’s file at the time that registration is denied. Nevertheless, Church of Atheism of Central Canada v MNR raised important legal issues that affect the largest segment of Canada’s charitable sector. This post discusses several issues that are likely to re-emerge in a future case.