Author: Jonnette Watson Hamilton Page 13 of 43

B.A. (Alta.), LL.B. (Dal.), LL.M. (Col.).
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By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Interim Measures in a Classic Church Property Dispute

Case Commented On: Bruderheim Community Church v Moravian Church in America (Canadian District), 2017 ABQB 355 (CanLII)

In this brief judgment, Justice Brian Burrows granted an interim injunction restraining the Board of Elders of the Moravian Church in America from interfering with the use of church land and buildings located in Bruderheim, Alberta by the local congregation, formerly known as the Bruderheim Moravian Church and now known as the Bruderheim Community Church. The application of the standard three-part test for an interim injunction is of interest for the “serious issue to be tried” that it discloses, as well as for the understanding of “irreparable harm” applied in the situation of a local congregation being evicted from its place of worship. In addition, this particular dispute appears to have all the elements of a classic church property dispute brought to the civil courts as a last resort as a result of an irreparable rift within a church over a matter of doctrine. The reason for the Bruderheim congregation’s disassociation was a decision by the Moravian Church, Northern Province that individuals were eligible to be clergy regardless of their sexual orientation or marital status.

“Abandoned Goods” Require Abandoned Premises or Expired/Terminated Tenancies Plus Vacated Premises

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On May 26, 2017

In Landlord/Tenant

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: “Abandoned Goods” Require Abandoned Premises or Expired/Terminated Tenancies Plus Vacated Premises

Cases Commented On: Wilderdijk-Streutker v Zhao, 2017 ABPC 24 (CanLII) and Shearer v Shields, 2017 ABPC 108 (CanLII)

A landlord can dispose of the belongings that a residential tenant has left behind at the rented premises if those belongings meet the definition of “abandoned goods” in section 31(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, SA 2004, c R-17.1. That section says “abandoned goods” are goods left at residential premises by a tenant who has either abandoned the premises or has vacated the premises after their tenancy has expired or been terminated. Two recent Provincial Court judgments discuss whether a tenant’s belongings were “abandoned goods” or not. In both judgments, the landlords were found to have acted rashly and the tenants were found to have not abandoned their belongings. However, only one of the judgments considers whether the belongings were “abandoned goods” by paying attention to the definition in section 31(1) of the Act. That definition requires that the focus be on the premises and the tenant’s legal relationship to those premises, and not on the belongings themselves.

For Golfers: A Classic Bailment Case with an Exclusion Clause Issue

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On May 18, 2017

In Contracts, Property, Provincial Court

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: For Golfers: A Classic Bailment Case with an Exclusion Clause Issue

Case Commented On: Bloomer v Connaught Golf Club, 2017 ABPC 105 (CanLII)

Bailment is an interesting legal concept because it is ubiquitous and because it is at the overlap of contract, property and tort law and yet is its own distinct area of law. However, because the issue in Bloomer v Connaught Golf Club involved an exclusion clause, the exclusive focus of Judge Derek G. Redman’s decision was on contract law (rather than the far more fascinating property law). This case is also factually simple, but those facts might disturb some readers. The Connaught Golf Club — which Mr. Bloomer was a member of — had agreed to store Mr. Bloomer’s golf clubs for him but was unable to find his golf clubs when he came in to play his daily golf game with his wife on June 24, 2016. In other words, the case is about a pro shop in Medicine Hat that lost a club member’s golf bag and its contents.

Vexatious Habeas Corpus Applications Contribute to Delayed Access to the Courts

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On May 16, 2017

In Constitutional, Vexatious Litigants

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Vexatious Habeas Corpus Applications Contribute to Delayed Access to the Courts

Case Commented On: Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ABQB 237 (CanLII)

This vexatious litigant case is interesting for five reasons. First, it was tied to an application for habeas corpus and in the process of the decision we learn something about the Court of Queen’s Bench’s procedure for hearing such applications. Second, there is an emphasis on vexatious litigation’s cost to other litigants. Third, Justice D.R.G. Thomas’ order explicitly followed Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 (CanLII) by making the vexatious litigant order under the court’s inherent jurisdiction, rather than under the Judicature Act. Fourth, this order also follows Hok in extending the protection of the order to the Provincial Court of Alberta but omitting the Alberta Court of Appeal from its scope. And finally, yes, the Stephen Brian Ewanchuk who is the applicant in this case is that Ewanchuk. He is the individual who was convicted of sexually assaulting a 17-year-old female by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, 1999 CanLII 711 (SCC), in a case made infamous by the exchange between Justice McClung of the Alberta Court of Appeal and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé of the Supreme Court of Canada – the “bonnet and crinolines” case. These days Ewanchuk is a prisoner at the Bowden Institution, serving a 16.5-year sentence for sexually assaulting an 8-9 year old female, his fifth conviction for sexual assault. His habeas corpus application essentially complained about the conditions of his detention at the Bowden Institution and some readers might experience schadenfreude in reading about his complaints (i.e. pleasure derived from the misfortune of others when the other person is perceived to deserve the misfortune, the misfortune is relatively minor, and we ourselves did not generate the other’s misfortune).

Capacity to Make and Revoke an Enduring Power of Attorney

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On May 12, 2017

In Family, Wills and Estates

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Capacity to Make and Revoke an Enduring Power of Attorney

Case Commented On: Pirie v Pirie, 2017 ABQB 104 (CanLII)

The issue in this case was whether the applicant had the mental capacity in July 2016 to revoke his 2008 Enduring Power of Attorney and to create a new Enduring Power of Attorney. His 2008 Enduring Power of Attorney appointed his three children and his wife jointly as his attorneys and became effective if and when he became mentally incapable of understanding the nature and effect of that instrument. His 2016 Enduring Power of Attorney appointed his brother, and in the alternative, his long-term assistant, and in the further alternative, his sister-in-law, immediately upon its execution.

In some ways, this was an easy decision for Justice Robert Hall. If the applicant lacked the mental capacity to revoke the 2008 instrument, then three children who owed the applicant money and his now-estranged wife would be his attorneys. If the applicant had the mental capacity to revoke the 2008 instrument and create the 2016 instrument, then his businessman brother would be looking out for his financial interests, no doubt under the watchful eye of the three children and the now-estranged wife. Nevertheless, the case is noteworthy because it involved a challenge to the widely-accepted test for assessing mental capacity to create and revoke a power of attorney. That challenge argued for the inclusion of an evaluation of the rationality and reasonableness of the applicant’s reasons for making the changes. Although Justice Hall stated he did not accept the challenge to the existing test, he did assess the applicant’s reasons and found that the applicant had ample reason to make the changes. By doing so, he might have introduced some uncertainty into this area of the law.