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Author: Kent McNeil

Kent McNeil is a Distinguished Research Professor (Emeritus) at Osgoode Hall Law School and an honorary member of the Indigenous Bar Association.

Tikanga Maori: The Application of Maori Law and Custom in Aotearoa/New Zealand

By: Kent McNeil

Matter Commented On: Ellis v The King, [2022] NZSC 114 (7 October 2022)

PDF Version: Tikanga Maori: The Application of Maori Law and Custom in Aotearoa/New Zealand

Editor’s Note: Please note that WordPress does not support the inclusion of accents on the Maori words in this post, but they appear in the official PDF version.

In October, New Zealand’s highest court released a landmark decision on the relationship between tikanga Maori (Maori law and practice) and the common law (for English translation of Maori terms, I rely on the Glossary in Carwyn Jones, New Treaty, New Tradition: Reconciling New Zealand and Maori Law (Victoria University Press, 2016) at xv-xvii). This decision has particular relevance for Canada because the place of Indigenous law in this nation is an emerging issue (Sébastien Grammond, “Recognizing Indigenous Law: A Conceptual Framework” (2022) 100:1 Can Bar Rev 1). In Reference to the Court of Appeal of Quebec in relation with the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 2022 QCCA 185 (CanLII), the Quebec Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the validity (with a couple of exceptions not relevant to our discussion) of federal legislation that acknowledged inherent Indigenous jurisdiction to make laws that would be enforceable in Canadian courts (for a series of ABlawg posts on this reference, see here). As this decision is currently under appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, it is especially pertinent to consider how the New Zealand Supreme Court has dealt with the application of tikanga Maori.

The Inherent Indigenous Right of Self-Government

By: Kent McNeil

Matter Commented On:  Reference to the Court of Appeal of Quebec in relation with the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 2022 QCCA 185 (CanLII) [Quebec Reference, quotations from the unofficial English translation]

PDF Version: The Inherent Indigenous Right of Self-Government

In this Quebec Reference, the Attorney General of Quebec challenged the constitutional validity of the federal Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, SC 2019, c24. This statute acknowledges that the Indigenous peoples of Canada have an inherent right of self-government, which includes jurisdiction over child and family services and is recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Quebec Court of Appeal (CA) rejected Quebec’s contention that this statute is beyond the jurisdiction of Parliament. The Act’s pith and substance, the CA said, is to ensure the well-being of Indigenous children, and this is clearly within Parliament’s jurisdiction over “Indians” in section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The CA also decided that the Act does not amend the Constitution by acknowledging the inherent right of self-government because this right is already an Aboriginal right within section 35(1). The constitutional validity of the Act was therefore upheld, with the exception of two provisions that would have given some Indigenous laws relating to family matters absolute paramountcy over provincial laws. This decision is now on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

This comment focuses on the CA’s decision on the existence and nature of the inherent right of self-government. It addresses the question of whether this aspect of the decision is consistent with Supreme Court case law, especially R v Pamajewon, 1996 CanLII 161 (SCC), [1996] 2 SCR 821, the only case in which the Court has addressed the issue of Indigenous self-government directly.

Indigenous Rights and Private Party Liability

By: Kent McNeil

PDF Version: Indigenous Rights and Private Party Liability

Matter Commented On: Thomas and Saik’uz First Nation v Rio Tinto Alcan Inc, 2022 BCSC 15 (CanLII)

To what extent can private parties be held liable in tort law, specifically nuisance, for damage done to Indigenous rights? This was the issue in Thomas and Saik’uz First Nation v Rio Tinto Alcan Inc, 2022 BCSC 15 (CanLII) [Thomas]. In 1952, the Aluminum Company of Canada (now Rio Tinto Alcan Inc., or RTA) completed construction of a dam on the Nechako River in west-central British Columbia to generate electricity for its aluminum smelting operations. Construction of the dam had been authorized by agreements with and a licence from British Columbia pursuant to a provincial statute, the Industrial Development Act, SBC 1949, c 31, which had been enacted to facilitate construction of the hydroelectric dam (Thomas, paras 66-69). The company has abided by all the conditions of the agreements and the licence.

Indigenous Law, the Common Law, and Pipelines

By: Kent McNeil

PDF Version:  Indigenous Law, the Common Law, and Pipelines 

Matter Commented On: Coastal GasLink Pipeline Ltd. v Huson, 2019 BCSC 2264 (CanLII)

The extent to which Indigenous law is part of Canadian law along with the common law and civil law has become a major issue over the past two decades. Judges have been reluctantly wading into the matter, expressing somewhat inconsistent opinions. A recent example is in Coastal GasLink Pipeline Ltd. v Huson, 2019 BCSC 2264 (CanLII), involving an application by a pipeline company for an interlocutory injunction.

Members of the Wet’suwet’en Nation in British Columbia oppose construction through their territory of a natural gas pipeline that would terminate at Kitimat on the West Coast (Shiri Pasternak, “No, those who defend Wet’suwet’en territory are not criminals”, The Globe and Mail (12 February 2020)).  They set up blockades on service roads to prevent the project from proceeding, leading to the injunction application, which Justice Marguerite Church of the BC Supreme Court granted.

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