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Author: Lisa Silver Page 2 of 10

Lisa Silver is a proud Calgarian, lawyer, educator, and avid blogger. She holds a B.A. in Economics (UWO, 1984), LL.B. (Osgoode, 1987), and LL.M. (Calgary, 2001). She is a member of the Bars of Ontario (1989) and Alberta (1998). As a criminal lawyer, Lisa has appeared before all levels of Court, including the Supreme Court of Canada. Presently, she is an Assistant Professor at the University of Calgary, Faculty of Law, where she teaches criminal law, evidence and advocacy. Lisa also maintains her own law blog at www.ideablawg.ca where she does a podcast series on the Criminal Code. Her blog was recognized with a 2017 Clawbie – Canadian Law Blog Award in the Law Professor/Law School category. Lisa also sits on various Boards and committees. She has presented at many conferences and workshops.

Frost on the Constitutional Windshield: Challenge to Critical Infrastructure Defence Act Struck by Alberta Court of Appeal

By: Jennifer Koshan, Lisa Silver and Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Frost on the Constitutional Windshield: Challenge to Critical Infrastructure Defence Act Struck by Alberta Court of Appeal

Case Commented On: Alberta Union of Public Employees v Her Majesty the Queen (Alberta), 2021 ABCA 416 (CanLII) (AUPE (ABCA))

The Critical Infrastructure Defence Act, SA 2020, c C-32.7 (CIDA) has been in the news recently, with the truckers’ blockade at Coutts, Alberta causing some to question the lack of enforcement of available legal sanctions. CIDA prohibits entering on to, damaging, or obstructing essential infrastructure in the province, amongst other activities. Essential infrastructure is broadly defined and includes highways and – as of October 2021– health care facilities (Critical Infrastructure Defence Regulation, Alta Reg 169/2021; for a discussion of that addition see here). However, it appears that no charges have been laid under CIDA to date despite several disruptive COVID-19 related protests on and blockades of essential infrastructure.

Who is Responsible for Extreme Intoxication?

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Who is Responsible for Extreme Intoxication? 

Case Commented On: R v Brown, 2021 ABCA 273 (CanLII) (Supreme Court of Canada Appeal Hearing Scheduled for November 9, 2021)

What you are about to read is not the usual case commentary. I will not summarize, analyze, or otherwise slice and dice the decision from the Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Brown, 2021 ABCA 273 (CanLII), a case upholding the constitutionality of s 33.1 of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. Rather, I will provide context for the case, setting out the underlying principles at stake and the controversies underpinning the conflicting legal perspectives. Section 33.1 was a response by our lawmakers to the Supreme Court of Canada’s ultimate decision in R v Daviault, 1994 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 63, which found the rule against using intoxication as a defence for general intent offences unconstitutional under s 7 of the Charter (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11), where the accused was in a state of extreme intoxication. Section 33.1 promptly foreclosed this limited defence where the accused person used violence against or interfered with the bodily integrity of any person. Although the section was added to the Criminal Code in 1995, a mere one year after the release of Daviault, it is only recently that appellate courts have weighed in on the constitutionality of that section.

Taking the Police Act Seriously

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Taking the Police Act Seriously

Case Commented On: Conlin v Edmonton (City) Police Service, 2021 ABCA 287 (CanLII)

In Conlin v Edmonton (City) Police Service, 2021 ABCA 287 (CanLII) [Conlin], a 5-panel court of appeal refines the threshold standard by which public complaints against the police are assessed by the Chief under s 45(3) of the Police Act, RSA 2000, c P-17. In doing so, the court clarifies past appellate decisions but stops short of fully expressing the Chief’s authority to send an allegation to a disciplinary hearing under the Act. As part of this power, the Chief exercises a screening function under s 45(3). If the Chief is of the “opinion” that the complaint constitutes a contravention, the allegation is then subject to a disciplinary hearing. Even when an allegation passes this threshold bar, s 45(4) allows the Chief to dismiss an allegation of misconduct when it is “not of a serious nature.”

Critical Infrastructure Defence Act Charter Challenge Survives Alberta Government’s Motion to Strike

By: Jennifer Koshan, Lisa Silver and Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Critical Infrastructure Defence Act Charter Challenge Survives Alberta Government’s Motion to Strike

Case Commented On: Alberta Union of Public Employees v Her Majesty the Queen (Alberta), 2021 ABQB 371 (CanLII)

Last summer we posted a critical analysis of Alberta’s Bill 1, the Critical Infrastructure Defence Act, SA 2020, c C-32.7 (CIDA). We argued that CIDA, which prohibits unlawfully entering onto, damaging, or obstructing any “essential infrastructure” in the province, violates several sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including freedom of expression (s 2(b)), freedom of peaceful assembly (s 2(c)), freedom of association (s 2(d)), the right to liberty (s 7) and the right to equality (s 15). Shortly after CIDA took effect on June 7, 2020, the Alberta Union of Provincial Employees (AUPE) and three individual plaintiffs brought a constitutional challenge against the law, arguing that it violates those Charter rights and freedoms (with the exception of s 15, which was not raised), as well as sections 1(a), (c), and (d) of the Alberta Bill of Rights, RSA 2000, c A-14 (which protect similar rights as well as the right to enjoyment of property). The plaintiffs also contended that CIDA encroaches on federal jurisdiction under The Constitution Act, 1867, namely, s 91(27) (federal jurisdiction over criminal law) and s 92(10)(a) (federal jurisdiction over interprovincial works and undertakings). In a decision released in June, Justice Shaina Leonard of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench dismissed the government’s motion to strike the challenge.

Harnessing the Power of AI Technology; A Commentary on the Law Commission of Ontario Report on AI and the Criminal Justice System

By: Lisa Silver and Gideon Christian

PDF Version: Harnessing the Power of AI Technology; A Commentary on the Law Commission of Ontario Report on AI and the Criminal Justice System

Report Commented On: Law Commission of Ontario, The Rise and Fall of AI and Algorithms In American Criminal Justice: Lessons for Canada, (Toronto: October 2020).

The Law Commission of Ontario (LCO) recently released its Report on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and algorithms in the Canadian criminal justice system. The Report, which is the first of three papers on the issue, is one of the most comprehensive discussions of the use of AI and algorithmic technologies in the criminal justice system to date. In Canada, AI use in the criminal justice system is limited and not easily subject to in-depth review. In the United States, however, AI and algorithms are used extensively throughout the justice system, particularly in pre-trial release decision-making. Not surprisingly, then, the Report draws from this American experience to arrive at a number of recommendations for application to the Canadian context. Based on those lessons learned, the LCO Report warns of “the risk of adopting unproven and under-evaluated technologies too quickly to address long-standing, complex and structural problems in the justice system” (at 7).  Yet, in the midst of this cautionary tone, the Report also recognizes that AI use in the criminal justice system will likely increase in the future. The Report proactively outlines a framework for such use by urging AI regulation, the application of legal protections to AI, and community involvement in developing AI best practices. All of these warnings and recommendations are extremely useful but the Report begs the basic question of whether the justice system should be using machine intelligence, with its embedded biases, in matters that can profoundly change people’s lives. Ultimately, the Report should stand as a timely reminder of the unharnessed power of technology and the realistic potential for injustice when it is used without restraint.

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