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Author: Shaun Fluker Page 10 of 37

B.Comm. (Alberta), LL.B. (Victoria), LL.M. (Calgary).
Associate Professor.
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AER Refuses Transfer of Foothills Sour Gas Approvals from Shell Canada to Pieridae Energy

By: Shaun Fluker and Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: AER Refuses Transfer of Foothills Sour Gas Approvals from Shell Canada to Pieridae Energy

Decision Commented On: Alberta Energy Regulator Decision, Shell Canada Limited Transfer of Ownership Including the Waterton Sour Gas Plant EPEA Application No 021-258 and Jumping Pound Sour Gas Plant EPEA Application No. 015-11587, May 13, 2020

On May 13, the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) denied an application by Shell Canada to transfer regulatory approvals with respect to its foothills sour gas assets (facilities, wells, pipelines, and related infrastructure) to Pieridae Energy. The subject approvals are issued under a host of energy and environmental legislation, including the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c E-12 (EPEA). This post comments on the rationale given by the AER for this decision.

COVID-19 and the Suspension of Environmental Monitoring in the Oil Sands

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF VersionCOVID-19 and the Suspension of Environmental Monitoring in the Oil Sands

Decisions Commented On: Alberta Energy Regulator Decisions 20200505A, 20200501C, 20200501B, and 20200501A

Last week the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) issued decisions 20200429D (subsequently replaced with 20200505A), 20200501C, 20200501B, and 20200501A, which suspend environmental monitoring requirements associated with oil sands mines operated by Canadian Natural Resources Limited, Suncor Energy, Fort Hills Energy Corporation, Syncrude Canada, and Imperial Oil Resources Limited. These decisions relieve the named operators from environmental monitoring on matters such as groundwater, surface water, sulphur emissions, wildlife, and wetlands. The suspension is in place until further notice. Similar to Order 17/2020 issued by the Minister of Environment and Parks under section 52.1 of the Public Health Act, RSA 2000, c P-37, which suspended routine environmental reporting by industry, these AER decisions were made in response to COVID-19 but offer little justification for granting such extraordinary relief from regulatory requirements.

Governance and Accountability: Preconditions for Committing Public Funds to Orphan Wells and Facilities and Inactive Wells

By: Nigel Bankes, Shaun Fluker, Martin Olszynski and Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: Governance and Accountability: Preconditions for Committing Public Funds to Orphan Wells and Facilities and Inactive Wells

Announcement commented on: Department of Finance Canada, Canada’s COVID-19 Economic Response Plan: New Support to Protect Canadian Jobs, April 17, 2020

As any resident of this province knows, the Alberta oil and gas sector’s problem of underfunded environmental liabilities has been growing for decades. On April 17, 2020, in response to the impact of both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Saudi/Russian price war, the federal government announced an injection of $1.7 billion of public funds to support the ‘clean up’ of inactive and orphan wells in Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. With respect to Alberta, $200 million will go to the Orphan Well Association as a loan to deal with orphan wells (i.e. wells that have no owner) while $1 billion will go to the Government of Alberta to deal with inactive wells (i.e. wells that are not producing but have not been properly closed and remediated).

The first part of this post examines the background to the Orphan Well Association and how it has moved from being an industry funded organization to the recipient of significant public funds. We suggest that this change in the source of funding is likely permanent and thus demands a complete rewrite of the governance structure for orphan wells in the interests of transparency and accountability. The second part of this post offers comments on the proposed program for inactive wells. This part of the post is shorter and more speculative because the announcement is remarkably vague and lacking in important details on this part of the program.

COVID-19 and the Exercise of Legislative Power by the Executive

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: COVID-19 and the Exercise of Legislative Power by the Executive

Legislation Commented On: Regulations Act, RSA 2000, c R-14 and Public Health Orders issued in relation to COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has become a rare opportunity to study the widespread exercise of emergency lawmaking powers in Canada. Governments have enacted legal rules on matters such as social distancing, quarantine, economic controls, regulatory relief, employment standards, landlord-tenant, access to justice, and health care protocols. Commentators have warned that we must remain vigilant in ensuring these emergency measures do not offend the rule of law, and this message is likely to intensify as more emergency measures are used to either further the current shutdown or control our emergence from it; for example, in relation to surveillance and privacy rights as Joel Reardon, Emily Laidlaw, and Greg Hagen recently noted here. These substantive concerns are amplified by the fact that most COVID-19 emergency powers are being exercised by the executive branch of government and its delegates, using legislative power delegated to them in public health or emergency statutes. Because it is unlikely that legislatures envisioned such an extensive use of these powers for a prolonged time period, shortcomings and gaps in the lawmaking process are becoming apparent. Hallmarks such as organization, clarity, predictability, consistency, transparency, and justification – which, in normal times, provide the executive with much of its legitimacy to govern – have been impaired or are missing altogether in the exercise of legal power to contain COVID-19. This post examines how Alberta ministers and the Chief Medical Officer of Health have been exercising emergency powers so far during the pandemic, and makes some pointed observations on the hallmarks of legitimate governance and the role of the Regulations Act, RSA 2000, c R-14, in this regard.

COVID-19 and the Suspension of Energy Reporting and Well Suspension Requirements in Alberta

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: COVID-19 and the Suspension of Energy Reporting and Well Suspension Requirements in Alberta

Order Commented On: Ministerial Order 219/2020 (Energy)

Section 52.1 of the Public Health Act, RSA 2000, c P-37 provides a minister with power to suspend, modify, or effectively amend the application of legislation which they are responsible for under the Government Organization Act, RSA 2000, c G-10. Ministerial orders exercising this power are being made with increasing frequency during the COVID-19 emergency, and these orders, together with other public health orders issued by Alberta during this crisis, are published here. One should also keep an eye on the Queen’s Printer website for Orders-in-Council which enact new, or amend existing, regulations to address COVID-19. Readers may recall that I previously commented here on Ministerial Order 17/2020 (Environment and Parks) which suspends routine environmental reporting. This post looks at Ministerial Order 219/2020 issued by the Minister of Energy on April 6, 2020 which suspends some reporting and inactive well suspension requirements under energy legislation.

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