Category: Aboriginal Page 20 of 30

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Establishing Aboriginal Title: A Return to Delgamuukw

Case commented on: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44

The declaration of Aboriginal title by the Supreme Court of Canada on June 26, 2014 — a first in Canada — is a momentous decision that should have long-lasting significance for the Tsilhquot’in Nation, other Aboriginal groups, and the rest of Canada. The unanimous Supreme Court decision made new law in the areas of the duty to consult and accommodate, governments’ justification of infringements of Aboriginal title, and federalism — matters that my colleagues Nigel Bankes, Sharon Mascher and Jennifer Koshan will be writing about. On the law of Aboriginal title — the focus of this post — the decision is extremely important for at least two reasons. First, as part of its return to principles set out in the Court’s 1997 decision in Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, Tsilhqot’in Nation includes a return to an equal role for Aboriginal perspectives that includes Aboriginal laws, instead of the exclusive focus on Aboriginal practices that was a feature of R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43, [2005] 2 SCR 220, the Court’s second post-1982 decision on Aboriginal title. Second, Tsilhqot’in Nation clarifies an understanding of occupation that accords with a territorial approach to Aboriginal title, one that does not require and piece together intensive use of well-defined tracts of land. In doing so, the Court turned its back on the approach it took in Marshall/Bernard, an approach that was the source of the arguments made by the governments of Canada and British Columbia in Tsilhqot’in Nation and the basis of the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in this case (William v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285). The June 26 decision therefore brings increased certainty to the law of Aboriginal title by clarifying the type of occupation that will ground Aboriginal title. It also increases the likelihood of more successful Aboriginal title claims and, hopefully, more intensive and good faith negotiations in modern land claims and treaty processes.

Court of Appeal Confirms the Availability of a Disgorgement Remedy as a Possible Means of Assessing Damages for Breach of a Modern Land Claim Agreement

By Nigel Bankes

On June 5, 2014

In Aboriginal, Remedies

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version:Court of Appeal Confirms the Availability of a Disgorgement Remedy as a Possible Means of Assessing Damages for Breach of a Modern Land Claim Agreement

Case commented on: Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 NUCA 02

The Nunavut Court of Appeal has confirmed the availability of a disgorgement remedy as a possible means of assessing damages for breach of a modern land claim agreement. However, the majority of the Court (Justices Slatter and O’Brien) ruled that summary judgment was not available to the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc (NTI) in this case and that consequently damages must still be assessed following the trial. Justice Hunt (dissenting on this point) concluded that summary judgment was available. All members of the Court were agreed that nominal damages would not be appropriate in this sort of case even if NTI were unable to prove actual damages. To allow an award of nominal damages for breach of a land claim agreement would not foster the overall goal of reconciliation.

“The Feather and the Fiddle”: The Meaning of ‘Indian’ in s 91(24)

By Geoff S. Costeloe

On May 6, 2014

In Aboriginal, Constitutional

By: Geoff S. Costeloe

PDF Version: “The Feather and the Fiddle”: The Meaning of ‘Indian’ in s 91(24)

Cases commented on: Daniels v Canada, 2013 FC 6; Canada v Daniels, 2014 FCA 101.

A decision by the Federal Court of Appeal has largely upheld a trial judge’s finding on just who exactly is encompassed by the word ‘Indian’ in s 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The section gives the federal government the power to regulate

24. Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians.

The argument brought by the plaintiffs is that the word ‘Indian’ is broad enough to include both Métis individuals and non-status Indians. The trial judge found that both of these groups were ‘Indians’ under s 91(24) while the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the inclusion of Métis, but it rejected the inclusion of non-status Indians. Both of these decisions will be discussed below. The trial decision was the subject of the Alberta Court of Appeal moot this year, in which I participated as co-counsel for the plaintiffs (with Dex Zucchi, who dealt with issues on fiduciary duty that will not be addressed here).

The First Ministerial Direction to the Alberta Energy Regulator: The Aboriginal Consultation Direction

By Giorilyn Bruno

On April 24, 2014

In Aboriginal, Responsible Energy Development Act

By: Giorilyn Bruno and Nigel Bankes

Direction commented on: Ministerial Order 141/2013, The Aboriginal Consultation Direction

PDF version: The First Ministerial Direction to the Alberta Energy Regulator: The Aboriginal Consultation Direction

On November 26, 2013, the Minister of Energy issued Ministerial Order 141/2013, the Aboriginal Consultation Direction. The Direction was issued to ensure that “the AER considers and makes decisions in respect of energy applications in a manner that is consistent with the work of the Government of Alberta” (Direction at 2) in meeting its consultation obligations associated with the existing rights of Aboriginal people. The Direction gives eight specific directions to the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) and sets up a process on Aboriginal consultation that the AER must follow. This post comments on the content of the Direction, its implications, and identifies some of the issues that are unclear under the current legislation.

Crown Oil Sands Dispositions and the Duty to Consult

By Nigel Bankes

On April 22, 2014

In Aboriginal, Oil & Gas

By: Nigel Bankes

Case commented on: Buffalo River Dene Nation v. Ministry of Energy and Resources and Scott Land and Lease Ltd., 2014 SKQB 69

PDF version: Crown Oil Sands Dispositions and the Duty to Consult

In this decision Justice Currie of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench concluded that the Crown owes no duty to consult a Treaty 10 First Nation when issuing Oil Sands Special Exploratory Permits (OSSEPs) in the traditional territory of that First Nation. In reaching this conclusion Justice Currie focused on his assessment that in issuing a permit the Minister did not make a decision that could affect the use of the land. Justice Currie also distinguished the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, where that Court held that the Crown’s decision to authorize the assignment of tree farm licence could trigger the duty to consult on the basis that it was a high level strategic planning decision that could have subsequent on-the-ground effects. Justice Currie took the view in this case that there was no Crown “plan of action” and no high level strategic planning decisions and therefore no duty.