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Category: Arbitration Page 4 of 6

Appealing the Remedy Granted by an Arbitration Award

PDF version: Appealing the Remedy Granted by an Arbitration Award

Case considered: Fuhr Estate v. Husky Oil Marketing Company, 2010 ABQB 495

This decision by Mr. Justice Don J. Manderscheid answers a novel question: whether section 49(7) of the Arbitration Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-43 allows an applicant to appeal the remedy awarded by an arbitrator without raising a question of law or seeking leave to appeal under section 44? Section 49(7) provides, in part, that “[i]f the award gives a remedy that the court . . . would not grant in a proceeding based on similar circumstances, the court may . . . grant a different remedy requested by the applicant. . .”. In Fuhr Estate v. Husky Oil Marketing Company, the applicant, Mrs. Fuhr, did not want the damages awarded her; she wanted specific performance. She argued she could by-pass the appeal provisions of the Arbitration Act and rely on section 49(7) alone for the remedy she wanted. It seems that section 49(7) has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny, even though an identical provision appears in the domestic arbitration legislation of Manitoba, New Brunswick, Ontario and Saskatchewan. Neither does the section appear to have been considered in the literature; the standard texts usually merely repeat what section 49(7) states. While the decision is also noteworthy because Justice Manderscheid adopts a rather unorthodox interpretation of section 44, this comment will focus on the section 49(7) issues.

Pre-emptive attack on arbitration succeeds

PDF version: Pre-emptive attack on arbitration succeeds

Case considered: Suncor Energy Products Inc. v. Howe-Baker Engineers, Ltd., 2010 ABQB 310

Instead of asserting an ordinary limitation period defence in the ordinary course of an arbitration proceeding, Suncor chose to attempt a pre-emptive attack in the Court of Queen’s Bench, asking the court to assume jurisdiction and strike the arbitration proceedings that were barely underway. The court did so, rather than dismissing Suncor’s application or requiring Suncor to respond to the request for arbitration so that the parties’ arbitrator could decide the limitation period issue. It is this aspect of the judgment -the “who decides?” aspect – that I will focus on in this comment. The court’s decision appears to undermine the legitimacy of domestic arbitration.

Much Ado about Little: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Management Corp.

PDF version: Much Ado about Little: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Management Corp.

Case considered: Yugraneft Corporation v. Rexx Management Corporation, 2010 SCC 19

An Alberta company, Rexx Management Corporation, was ordered to pay an almost $1 million US arbitration award in favour of a Russian company, Yugraneft Corporation. Yugraneft waited more than three years before applying to the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench for recognition and enforcement of that arbitration award. When Yugraneft failed to gain recognition from the Court of Queen’s Bench, it appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal and, when unsuccessful again, was granted leave to appeal and did appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Thirteen judges have now heard the case and all thirteen judges have agreed: the two-year limitation period in section 3 of Alberta’s Limitations Act applied to Yugraneft’s application for recognition and enforcement and thus Yugraneft acted too late. With that degree of unanimity, one has to wonder what all the fuss in the international commercial arbitration community has been about. The case was monitored closely as it wound its way through the courts and several arbitration institutions intervened at the Supreme Court of Canada.

In this post, after briefly setting out the facts and procedural history, I will focus on one of the issues dealt with by the Supreme Court, the threshold issue. The key decision by all the levels of court that considered the matter was the decision that domestic legislation imposing any kind of limitation period was applicable. I will then deal with the question of which limitation period: ten years, six years or two years? After this discussion of the case itself, I will comment on two matters. The first is the question of whether this case really is a case of public importance. The second is speculation about what action proponents of international commercial arbitration might take now, following their loss in the Supreme Court.

Doubts about Arbitrator Immunity

Case considered: Flock v. Beattie, 2010 ABQB 193

PDF version: Doubts about Arbitrator Immunity

Can arbitrators be sued if they perform their duties negligently? Can they be sued if they breach their contract with the disputing parties? These questions were recently asked and answered in Flock v. Beattie, heard by Justice Earl C. Wilson of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench. It is usually assumed that the law granting arbitrators’ immunity to actions in tort and contract is well settled; the case cited for that proposition is the old English case of Pappa v. Rose (1872) LR 7 C.P. 525 (Ex Ch.). Despite this complacency, Justice Wilson’s decision appears to be a rarity in Canada with its express grant of immunity to an arbitrator. In this post, I contend that the precedent-based argument in favour of extending the doctrine of judicial immunity to arbitrators is a weak one, the statutory argument against extending such immunity needs to be addressed, and the policy arguments on the no-immunity side have yet to be examined.

Arbitration for the Quick and Final Resolution of Disputes? Hardly.

Cases considered: Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 2010 ABQB 172 and Flock v. Beattie, 2010 ABQB 193

PDF version: Arbitration for the Quick and Final Resolution of Disputes? Hardly.

At first glance, these two cases have almost nothing in common. One concerns a multimillion dollar Indonesian geothermal energy project dispute. The other involves a matrimonial property dispute following a marriage breakdown in Alberta. What they have in common is that both of them are cautionary tales for arbitration – tales of slow, expensive processes that include numerous court applications. The dispute in the former case arose in 1998 and notice of arbitration was given that same year. The dispute in the latter case arose in 1999, and the parties agreed to arbitrate in 2002. Yet we have two 2010 court decisions arising out of those arbitrations. What went wrong?

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