University of Calgary Faculty of Law ABLawg.ca logo over mountains

Category: Constitutional Page 23 of 71

The Applicability of Charter Protection to Traffic Safety Laws

By: Nicholas Konstantinov

PDF Version: The Applicability of Charter Protection to Traffic Safety Laws

Case Commented On: Sahaluk v Alberta (Transportation Safety Board), 2017 ABCA 153 (CanLII)

In Sahaluk v Alberta (Transportation Safety Board), Mr. Justice Slatter, writing for the majority (Madam Justice Bielby concurring; Madam Justice Paperny dissenting), examined the constitutionality of Alberta’s recent amendment to the Traffic Safety Act, RSA 2000, c. T-6 (the ‘Act’), specifically section 88.1. The amendment eclipsed previous provincial administrative licence suspension regimes for impaired driving in its manner and degree of punishment, raising inquiries into whether the province overstepped its legislative power and whether it complied with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Using evidence pertaining to the objectives and effects of the amended licence suspension scheme, Justice Slatter allowed the appeal of the chamber’s judge’s decision upholding the law, and declared that while section 88.1 was valid on federalism grounds, it was in violation of sections 7 and 11 of the Charter.

Can Federal Legislative Jurisdiction Support a Broad, Sustainability-Based Impact Assessment?

By: Martin Olszynski

PDF Version: Can Federal Legislative Jurisdiction Support a Broad, Sustainability-Based Impact Assessment?

Report Commented On: Expert Panel on the Review of Federal Environmental Assessment Processes, Building Common Ground: A New Vision for Impact Assessment in Canada

This is the fourth in a series of ABlawg posts to consider the report of the Expert Panel on the Review of Federal Environmental Assessment Processes. Professor Arlene Kwasniak wrote the first post, wherein she summarized the main contours of the Expert Panel’s recommendations; Professor Shaun Fluker and Drew Yewchuk (JD 2017) tackled the ever-present challenges of discretion, transparency and accountability; and Professor Sharon Mascher recently discussed the Expert Panel’s recommendations with respect to triggering. In this post, I tackle an area of lingering doubt in the Panel’s report, namely the federal government’s jurisdiction to make project-related decisions following a broad, sustainability-based impact assessment. In my view and as further set out below, this doubt is misplaced. My analysis is admittedly somewhat novel but doesn’t break entirely new ground – a similar analysis was put forward in the commentary following the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport) 1992 CanLII 110 (SCC). Fundamental to my approach is the distinction between legislating with respect to a subject on the one hand, and subsequent decision-making pursuant to such legislation on the other.

Ewanchuk Continues to Treat Habeas Corpus as an All-Purpose Remedy

By: Amy Matychuk

PDF Version: Ewanchuk Continues to Treat Habeas Corpus as an All-Purpose Remedy

Case Commented On: Ewanchuk v Canada (Parole Board), 2017 ABCA 145 (CanLII)

On May 16, 2017, the Alberta Court of Appeal (ABCA) released a decision dismissing a habeas corpus application with certiorari in aid from Stephen Brian Ewanchuk, who just this week was featured on ABlawg for being declared a vexatious litigant in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (ABQB) on a different application for habeas corpus. As Jonnette Watson Hamilton noted in that post, this is the same Ewanchuk whose sexual assault conviction was the subject of an oft-cited Supreme Court decision. He is now 68 years old and since 2007 has been serving his fifth sentence for sexual assault, this time on a minor. In the current habeas corpus application at the ABCA, he challenged the Parole Board of Canada’s April 25, 2014 decision (and the subsequent Nov 12, 2015 ABQB decision) not to provide relief on his statutory release date, but instead to require him to serve out the remainder of his sentence. He will be released on February 21, 2018.

Vexatious Habeas Corpus Applications Contribute to Delayed Access to the Courts

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Vexatious Habeas Corpus Applications Contribute to Delayed Access to the Courts

Case Commented On: Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ABQB 237 (CanLII)

This vexatious litigant case is interesting for five reasons. First, it was tied to an application for habeas corpus and in the process of the decision we learn something about the Court of Queen’s Bench’s procedure for hearing such applications. Second, there is an emphasis on vexatious litigation’s cost to other litigants. Third, Justice D.R.G. Thomas’ order explicitly followed Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 (CanLII) by making the vexatious litigant order under the court’s inherent jurisdiction, rather than under the Judicature Act. Fourth, this order also follows Hok in extending the protection of the order to the Provincial Court of Alberta but omitting the Alberta Court of Appeal from its scope. And finally, yes, the Stephen Brian Ewanchuk who is the applicant in this case is that Ewanchuk. He is the individual who was convicted of sexually assaulting a 17-year-old female by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, 1999 CanLII 711 (SCC), in a case made infamous by the exchange between Justice McClung of the Alberta Court of Appeal and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé of the Supreme Court of Canada – the “bonnet and crinolines” case. These days Ewanchuk is a prisoner at the Bowden Institution, serving a 16.5-year sentence for sexually assaulting an 8-9 year old female, his fifth conviction for sexual assault. His habeas corpus application essentially complained about the conditions of his detention at the Bowden Institution and some readers might experience schadenfreude in reading about his complaints (i.e. pleasure derived from the misfortune of others when the other person is perceived to deserve the misfortune, the misfortune is relatively minor, and we ourselves did not generate the other’s misfortune).

Majority of the Court of Appeal Confirms Chief Justice Wittmann’s Redwater Decision

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Majority of the Court of Appeal Confirms Chief Justice Wittmann’s Redwater Decision

Case Commented On: Orphan Well Association v Grant Thornton Limited, 2017 ABCA 124 (CanLII)

The background to this case is discussed in my post on Chief Justice Wittmann’s decision here. That post summarized that decision and its effect as follows:

Chief Justice Neil Wittmann has concluded that there is an operational conflict between the abandonment and reclamation provisions of the province’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c O-6 (OGCA) and Pipeline Act, RSA 2000, c P-15 and the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 (BIA). Thus, a trustee in bankruptcy is free to pick and choose from amongst the assets in the estate of the bankrupt by disclaiming unproductive oil and gas assets even where (and especially so) those assets are subject to abandonment orders from Alberta’s oil and gas energy regulator, the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER). As a result, the value of the bankrupt’s productive assets is preserved for the benefit of secured creditors. AER abandonment orders do not bind a trustee with respect to the disclaimed properties and do not constitute costs of administration of the bankrupt’s estate. Since the trustee has no responsibility for disclaimed assets, the trustee should be in a position to transfer non-disclaimed producing assets to a third party purchaser without objection from the AER on the basis of any deterioration in the liability rating associated with the unsold non-producing assets. If either the AER or the Orphan Well Association (OWA) carries out the abandonment of the disclaimed assets such costs may constitute a provable claim in bankruptcy but, as a general creditor, the AER/OWA would likely only recover cents on the dollar.

The practical effect of this decision is that the AER’s authority to enforce abandonment orders at the cost of the licensee is unenforceable at precisely the time when the AER most needs to be able to exercise that power i.e. when the licensee is insolvent. Furthermore, one of the AER’s principal mechanisms to ensure that a licensee has assets on hand to cover its liabilities (its authority to withhold consent to the transfer of assets which result in the deterioration of a licensee’s ability to discharge its obligations) is no longer available. Thus, the entire provincial scheme for protecting Albertans from the abandonment costs in relation to non-productive wells is seriously compromised, and, as a result, in the case of a bankrupt licensee the costs of abandonment will necessarily be assumed by the Orphan Well Fund or the province. If the costs are assumed by the Fund this means that the industry as a whole bears the burden; if the costs are assumed by the province (perhaps by a cash infusion into the Fund) this means that all Alberta taxpayers bear the burden of discharging these abandonment and reclamation obligations. While this result flies in the face of any conception of the polluter pays principle it is, according to Chief Justice Wittmann, the necessary result of the interpretation of the relevant statutes and the application of the constitutional doctrine of paramountcy.

Two appeals were launched, one by the OWA and one by the AER. Four intervenors lined up in support of the appellants: Alberta, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). Supporting the respondents was the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals. In reserved reasons the majority (per Justice Slatter with Justice Schutz concurring) dismissed the appeals. Justice Sheilah Martin dissented.

Page 23 of 71

Powered by WordPress & Theme by Anders Norén