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Category: Constitutional Page 24 of 72

Vexatious Habeas Corpus Applications Contribute to Delayed Access to the Courts

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Vexatious Habeas Corpus Applications Contribute to Delayed Access to the Courts

Case Commented On: Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ABQB 237 (CanLII)

This vexatious litigant case is interesting for five reasons. First, it was tied to an application for habeas corpus and in the process of the decision we learn something about the Court of Queen’s Bench’s procedure for hearing such applications. Second, there is an emphasis on vexatious litigation’s cost to other litigants. Third, Justice D.R.G. Thomas’ order explicitly followed Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 (CanLII) by making the vexatious litigant order under the court’s inherent jurisdiction, rather than under the Judicature Act. Fourth, this order also follows Hok in extending the protection of the order to the Provincial Court of Alberta but omitting the Alberta Court of Appeal from its scope. And finally, yes, the Stephen Brian Ewanchuk who is the applicant in this case is that Ewanchuk. He is the individual who was convicted of sexually assaulting a 17-year-old female by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, 1999 CanLII 711 (SCC), in a case made infamous by the exchange between Justice McClung of the Alberta Court of Appeal and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé of the Supreme Court of Canada – the “bonnet and crinolines” case. These days Ewanchuk is a prisoner at the Bowden Institution, serving a 16.5-year sentence for sexually assaulting an 8-9 year old female, his fifth conviction for sexual assault. His habeas corpus application essentially complained about the conditions of his detention at the Bowden Institution and some readers might experience schadenfreude in reading about his complaints (i.e. pleasure derived from the misfortune of others when the other person is perceived to deserve the misfortune, the misfortune is relatively minor, and we ourselves did not generate the other’s misfortune).

Majority of the Court of Appeal Confirms Chief Justice Wittmann’s Redwater Decision

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Majority of the Court of Appeal Confirms Chief Justice Wittmann’s Redwater Decision

Case Commented On: Orphan Well Association v Grant Thornton Limited, 2017 ABCA 124 (CanLII)

The background to this case is discussed in my post on Chief Justice Wittmann’s decision here. That post summarized that decision and its effect as follows:

Chief Justice Neil Wittmann has concluded that there is an operational conflict between the abandonment and reclamation provisions of the province’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c O-6 (OGCA) and Pipeline Act, RSA 2000, c P-15 and the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 (BIA). Thus, a trustee in bankruptcy is free to pick and choose from amongst the assets in the estate of the bankrupt by disclaiming unproductive oil and gas assets even where (and especially so) those assets are subject to abandonment orders from Alberta’s oil and gas energy regulator, the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER). As a result, the value of the bankrupt’s productive assets is preserved for the benefit of secured creditors. AER abandonment orders do not bind a trustee with respect to the disclaimed properties and do not constitute costs of administration of the bankrupt’s estate. Since the trustee has no responsibility for disclaimed assets, the trustee should be in a position to transfer non-disclaimed producing assets to a third party purchaser without objection from the AER on the basis of any deterioration in the liability rating associated with the unsold non-producing assets. If either the AER or the Orphan Well Association (OWA) carries out the abandonment of the disclaimed assets such costs may constitute a provable claim in bankruptcy but, as a general creditor, the AER/OWA would likely only recover cents on the dollar.

The practical effect of this decision is that the AER’s authority to enforce abandonment orders at the cost of the licensee is unenforceable at precisely the time when the AER most needs to be able to exercise that power i.e. when the licensee is insolvent. Furthermore, one of the AER’s principal mechanisms to ensure that a licensee has assets on hand to cover its liabilities (its authority to withhold consent to the transfer of assets which result in the deterioration of a licensee’s ability to discharge its obligations) is no longer available. Thus, the entire provincial scheme for protecting Albertans from the abandonment costs in relation to non-productive wells is seriously compromised, and, as a result, in the case of a bankrupt licensee the costs of abandonment will necessarily be assumed by the Orphan Well Fund or the province. If the costs are assumed by the Fund this means that the industry as a whole bears the burden; if the costs are assumed by the province (perhaps by a cash infusion into the Fund) this means that all Alberta taxpayers bear the burden of discharging these abandonment and reclamation obligations. While this result flies in the face of any conception of the polluter pays principle it is, according to Chief Justice Wittmann, the necessary result of the interpretation of the relevant statutes and the application of the constitutional doctrine of paramountcy.

Two appeals were launched, one by the OWA and one by the AER. Four intervenors lined up in support of the appellants: Alberta, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). Supporting the respondents was the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals. In reserved reasons the majority (per Justice Slatter with Justice Schutz concurring) dismissed the appeals. Justice Sheilah Martin dissented.

Smoke and Mirrors? With Marihuana Legalization, Parliament Proposes to Drastically Expand Police Power

By: Dylan Finlay

PDF Version: Smoke and Mirrors? With Marihuana Legalization, Parliament Proposes to Drastically Expand Police Power

Legislation Commented On: Bill C-46, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to conveyances) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 2017

Parliament is toting marihuana legalization as a necessary public safety measure. With this sentiment, Parliament is revisiting not only drug-impaired driving laws, but also alcohol-impaired driving laws. Part 2 of Bill C-46 would, if passed, allow police officers to demand that a driver provide breath samples without any suspicion that the individual had been drinking. The relevant section is reproduced below:

Mandatory alcohol screening

320.27 (2) If a peace officer has in his or her possession an approved screening device, the peace officer may, in the course of the lawful exercise of powers under an Act of Parliament or an Act of a provincial legislature or arising at common law, by demand, require the person who is operating a motor vehicle to immediately provide the samples of breath that, in the peace officer’s opinion, are necessary to enable a proper analysis to be made by means of that device and to accompany the peace officer for that purpose.

Parliament seeks the moral high ground in selling its proposed legislation to both the public and the judiciary. To the public, the Liberals hope to sway voters who find a ‘tough-on-crime’ agenda attractive – the same segment of the population that supports stiff mandatory minimum jail sentences. To be fair, as far as politics go, this strategy is sound; the segment of the population that supports legalization of marihuana because prohibition never made much sense to begin with will likely support the Bill no matter its complexities.

The judiciary will be harder to convince. Mandatory alcohol screening (as it is proposed by Bill C-46) violates ss 7 (the right to life, liberty and security of the person), 8 (the right against unreasonable search and seizure), 9 (the right not to be arbitrarily detained), and 10 (b) (the right to counsel on arrest or detention) of the Canadian Charter of the Rights and Freedoms (the Charter). Parliament must cast mandatory alcohol screening as a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society to ‘save’ it under s 1 of the Charter.

The groundwork is being laid for such an argument. On CBC’s ‘The House,’ Justice Minister Wilson-Raybould stated: “I am confident [mandatory alcohol screening] will survive a constitutional challenge. It can be justified in terms of public safety, and safety on the roads, and preventing death” (April 13, 2017).

I do not share the Justice Minister’s confidence. Mandatory alcohol screening (as it is proposed) is a flagrant affront to Charter-values and Charter jurisprudence. The Supreme Court should not find such a law constitutional.

A constitutional battle lies ahead. This post will provide a summary of police procedure and the law as it relates to alcohol screening, present arguments for and against mandatory screening’s constitutionality, and ultimately conclude that mandatory alcohol screening is unconstitutional. For the purposes of this post, the focus will be on s 10(b) of the Charter, as this is the focus of the prevailing case law on alcohol screening generally.

Update on the Rights of Farm and Ranch Workers in Alberta

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: Update on the Rights of Farm and Ranch Workers in Alberta

Legislation and Reports Commented on: Bill 6, The Enhanced Protection for Farm and Ranch Workers Act; Report to Ministers – Technical Working Group: Employment Standards Code; Report to Ministers – Technical Working Group: Labour Relations Code

Bill 6, The Enhanced Protection for Farm and Ranch Workers Act, made amendments removing the exclusion of farm and ranch workers from Alberta’s labour and employment legislation in January 2016, with varying timelines for implementation (for earlier posts on Bill 6 see here and here). Some of those timelines allowed for a consultation process to work through the details for including these workers in the relevant legislation. Technical working groups (TWGs) were established to make recommendations regarding the inclusion of farm and ranch workers in the Employment Standards Code, RSA 2000, c E-9, Labour Relations Code, RSA 2000, c L-1, and Occupational Health and Safety Act, RSA 2000, c O-2. Two of the TWGs have now reported, and this post will provide a brief summary of those reports, as well as the current state of inclusion / exclusion of farm and ranch workers in the legislation.

As a result of Bill 6, farm and ranch workers are now included in the Workers’ Compensation Act, RSA 2000, c W-15 (WCA), when they do paid work for farm or ranch employers. Unpaid workers, family members and children are not covered under the WCA unless their employer opts in. Recent statistics show that since Bill 6 came into force, 763 claims for workers compensation from agricultural workers have been processed, including 407 that involved a disabling injury.

An Update on The Right to Trial Within a Reasonable Time

By: Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: An Update on The Right to Trial Within a Reasonable Time

Cases Commented On: R v Lam, 2016 ABQB 489 (CanLII); R v Regan, 2016 ABQB 561 (CanLII); R v Lavoie, 2017 ABQB 66 (CanLII)

It has been about 8 months since the Supreme Court released R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 (CanLII) and overhauled how courts deal with applications under section 11(b) of the Charter, the right “to be tried within a reasonable time”. I described the new framework in an earlier post. In short, Jordan established presumptive ceilings for unreasonable delay (minus defence delays and exceptional circumstances) between charges being laid and the end of trial. The ceilings are 18 months for charges going to trial in provincial court and 30 months for charges going to superior court, subject to a flexible transitional approach for cases that were already in the system when Jordan was decided. Since the release of Jordan there have been 11 reported decisions in Alberta posted to CanLII for applications for stays under the new framework. This post discusses three of those decisions that addressed interesting aspects of the new framework.

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