Category: Constitutional Page 27 of 71

Bill S-3: A rushed response to Descheneaux

On December 1, 2016

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Human Rights

By: Elysa Hogg

PDF Version: Bill S-3: A rushed response to Descheneaux

Matters Commented On: Bill S-3 “An Act to amend the Indian Act (elimination of sex-based inequities in registration); Descheneaux c Canada (Procureur General), 2015 QCCS 3555 (CanLII)

*Note on terminology: “Indian” is used to describe a person defined as such under the Indian Act, and is not intended to carry any derogatory connotations.

In the early days after the 2015 election, Prime Minister Trudeau was honoured by the Tsuut’ina First Nation with a traditional headdress and an indigenous name which translates to “the one that keeps trying.” Trudeau and the Liberals will have to keep trying, as they made an extraordinary commitment to address First Nations issues during the campaign, and set multiple deadlines for action within the next few years. One of the first deadlines to come due is an amendment of the Indian Act, RSC, 1985 c. I-5 necessitated by a recent Quebec Superior Court ruling.

In Descheneaux c Canada (Procureur General), 2015 QCCS 3555 (CanLII) (Descheneaux) the court held that several provisions of the Indian Act surrounding who is considered a ‘Status Indian’ violated the principles of equality protected by Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

After withdrawing an appeal of the decision in February 2016, the federal government has commenced a two-stage response to this ruling. Stage one is Bill S-3 “An Act to amend the Indian Act (elimination of sex-based inequities in registration)”, while stage two is a collaborative process between the government and First Nations leadership to identify and implement further reforms.

This post will briefly summarize the issues and findings in Descheneaux, and assess how these are impacted by Bill S-3. It will also examine some of the testimony given at the Senate’s Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples meetings held last week on these issues. Finally, it will briefly look at how Deschaneaux fits into the Liberal government’s progress on implementing the many campaign promises it made to First Nations’ people.

The Constitutional Limits of the Sex Offender Registry

By Erin Sheley

On November 30, 2016

In Constitutional, Criminal

By: Erin Sheley

PDF Version: The Constitutional Limits of the Sex Offender Registry

Case Commented On: R v Ndhlovu, 2016 ABQB 595 (CanLII)

It has become conventional wisdom in public discourse that sex offenders are uniquely likely to repeat their crimes. This assumption, combined with the heinous nature of sex offences (particularly those involving child victims), has motivated law enforcement and legislators to adopt unique measures to solve and prevent sex offences. In the United States the FBI maintains a searchable sex offender database compiled from the data of the various state jurisdictions. A user may conduct a geographic search to quickly access the name, photograph, and rap sheet of any sex offender living in their neighborhood. (Eligibility for the database varies substantially by state, both in terms of seriousness of the triggering offence (in some states public urination qualifies), duration of time on the database (in many jurisdictions it is for life), and existence of judicial discretion to require registration (in most jurisdictions it is automatic upon conviction for a triggering offence)).

Canada’s approach has been somewhat more moderate.

The Application of the Charter to a Protest on the Siksika Nation

By Linda McKay-Panos

On November 22, 2016

In Aboriginal, Constitutional

By: Linda McKay-Panos

PDF Version: The Application of the Charter to a Protest on the Siksika Nation

Case Commented On: Siksika Nation v Crowchief, 2016 ABQB 596 (CanLII)

Recently there have been several cases involving the issue of whether the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) applies in a context where there is some government or public nexus but the action may be characterized as one involving private parties. See for example, my previous post on the application of the Charter to Universities.

This case presents yet another situation where the court is asked to address whether the Charter applies. Most of the decision involves whether the Court should grant an interlocutory injunction to the Siksika Nation. The Siksika Nation, represented by its Chief and Council (Applicant), filed a Statement of Claim seeking an injunction and damages against Ben Crowchief and “Unknown Defendants” (Respondents). A number of band members, including Crowchief, blockaded the reconstruction of Siksika Nation homes being built to address damages from flooding of the Bow River in 2013. The blockade was intended to protest the lack of accountability and transparency by the council and chief (at para 18).

Taking Proportionality Seriously in Charter Adjudication: R v KRJ

By Stephen Armstrong

On September 9, 2016

In Constitutional, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Stephen Armstrong

PDF Version: Taking Proportionality Seriously in Charter Adjudication: R v KRJ

Case Commented On: R v KRJ, 2016 SCC 31 (CanLII)

Introduction

The rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter are not absolute. They are “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 1). In R v Oakes, 1986 CanLII 46 (SCC), Chief Justice Brian Dickson established the legal standard by which an infringement of a Charter protected right may be justified, which has come to be known as the “Oakes test.” An infringing law must (1) pursue a pressing and substantial objective, (2) be rationally connected to that objective, (3) minimally impair the right or freedom in question, and (4) there must be a proportionality of effects between the deleterious and salutary effects of the law (Oakes at paras 69-70). It is possible to find each of these elements described in somewhat different language throughout the case law, but these four components are the essence of the Oakes test.

In R v KRJ, 2016 SCC 31 (CanLII), the Supreme Court of Canada was tasked with delicately balancing the Charter right of an offender not to be punished by the retrospective application of a punitive law, against Parliament’s objective of protecting children from sexual violence perpetrated by recidivists (KRJ at para 64). I will elaborate on the substance of the decision below, but what is of interest to me in this case is the lengthy and substantial “proportionality of effects” analyses engaged in by Justices Andromache Karakatsanis (writing for the majority), Rosalie Abella (dissenting in part), and Russell Brown (dissenting in part). The most substantial point of disagreement between the three judgements occurred at the final stage of the Oakes test.

Charter Equality Challenges to the Income Tax Act: The Unsuccessful Streak is Strong, 30 Years On

By Kyle Gardiner

On September 2, 2016

In Constitutional, Tax

By: Kyle Gardiner

PDF Version: Charter Equality Challenges to the Income Tax Act: The Unsuccessful Streak is Strong, 30 Years On

Research Commented On: Shea Nerland Law LLP Fellowship Project on Tax Law and Equality, Summer 2016

On 2 May, 2016, I began a research project with Jonnette Watson Hamilton, Jennifer Koshan and Saul Templeton examining the role section 15 of the Charter plays in tax law. Over 50 variables were recorded from each of the 134 equality challenges to tax law that we analyzed. To read my post on one of these cases, Grenon v. Canada, 2016 FCA 4 (CanLII), see here. The data promises to be a rich tool for examining equality in the realm of tax law.

When I was conducting a literature review for this project, I reviewed Kathleen Lahey’s “The Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on Income Tax Law and Policy” in David Schneiderman & Kate Sutherland, eds, Charting the Consequences: The Impact of Charter Rights on Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 109. In that study, Lahey conducted a review of 300 cases in which Charter challenges were brought to various income tax provisions between 1985 and 1995. The current research extends Lahey’s study, systematically reviewing section 15(1) Charter challenges to tax law that have been brought since the conclusion of her study in October, 1995. While many taxation provisions outside of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5^th Supp) have seen their share of section 15(1) challenges, the cases examined in our study were specifically section 15(1) equality challenges to a section or sections of the Income Tax Act. Our data awaits further statistical analysis beyond what has been done preliminarily here.