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Category: Criminal Page 13 of 39

All the Pieces Matter: Organized Crime, Wiretaps and Section 8 of the Charter

By: Erin Sheley

PDF Version: All the Pieces Matter: Organized Crime, Wiretaps and Section 8 of the Charter

Case Commented On: R v Amer, 2017 ABQB 481 (CanLII)

Det. Freamon: “Non-pertinent”? How do you log that non-pertinent?

Det. Pryzbylewski: No drug talk.

Det. Freamon: They use codes that hide their pager and phone numbers. And when someone does use a phone, they don’t use names. And if someone does use a name, he’s reminded not to. All of that is valuable evidence.

Det. Pryzbylewski: Of what?

Det. Freamon: Conspiracy.

Det. Pryzbylewski: Conspiracy?

Det. Freamon: We’re building something here, detective. We’re building it from scratch. All the pieces matter.

The Wire, Season One, Episode Six

This early scene in HBO’s The Wire, in which Detective Lester Freamon instructs his rookie colleague Ray Pryzbylewski on how to tag conversations they’ve overheard on their wiretap of Avon Barksdale’s Baltimore drug operation, dramatizes the strategy of long-term police investigations of organized criminal syndicates: “all the pieces matter.” Seemingly isolated conversations that, standing alone, reveal no evidence of criminal activity, become part of a general web of information which may eventually prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. But this form of long-term wiretapping—implicating, as it does, a citizen’s right to security from unreasonable searches and seizures under section 8 of the Charter—often fits uneasily within the more exacting framework of constitutional case law. In R v Amer, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench had an opportunity to revisit the current state of the law on wiretaps in the wake of a spree of shootings that occurred in Calgary in the summer of 2015.

Unpacking R v Barton

By: Lisa A. Silver

PDF Version: Unpacking R v Barton

Case Commented On: R v Barton, 2017 ABCA 216 (CanLII)

 R v Barton is a bold and intrepid decision. It is not so much a lengthy decision as it is densely packed and nuanced, examining and uncovering layers of issues. It is a case that identifies errors and then offers solutions. It is a decision that exudes the modern principled approach, now a staple in an appellate Court’s analysis of a variety of legal issues from the admission of evidence to the interpretation of statutes. Admittedly, the decision can give the reader a sense of discomfort, the kind of unsettling feeling one gets when being challenged to think differently. The kind of feeling one can have when reading something unexpected. But that does not mean the feeling is unwelcome. In this post, together we will “unpack” or identify some of the salient features of the decision. I will also try to respond to this feeling of discomfort. I caution however that the decision requires much contemplation and measured thought. What I am attempting to do here is to articulate my impressions upon reviewing the decision. I will leave to a later date in a further article an analysis of the myriad of legal issues raised in this decision through a review of precedent and legal principles.

“Beyond This Court’s Capacity”: Habeas Corpus Hearings Restricted to Liberty Remedies Only

By: Amy Matychuk

PDF Version: “Beyond This Court’s Capacity”: Habeas Corpus Hearings Restricted to Liberty Remedies Only

Case Commented On: McCargar v Canada, 2017 ABQB 416 (CanLII)

On May 5, 2017, Mr. McCargar, currently a federal prison inmate, filed a joint habeas corpus application in the Court of Queen’s Bench on behalf of himself and three other inmates. Habeas corpus is a constitutional and common law remedy for unlawful detention; however, it is usually invoked as an individual remedy because it assesses individual circumstances, so a joint application is unorthodox. Mr. McCargar also undertook to represent his fellow inmates (at their request) in court on the joint application. Justice John T. Henderson quickly disabused Mr. McCargar of the notion that he could act in the role of a lawyer, and in his judgment, described the narrow circumstances in which joint habeas corpus applications are appropriate, clarified the kinds of state treatment that merit the remedy of habeas corpus at all, declined to take jurisdiction of the application, and proposed new restrictions on habeas corpus hearings. He also ordered $1000 in costs against Mr. McCargar, found Mr. McCargar in prima facie contempt of court, and restricted his court filing activities pending a hearing on whether he should be declared a vexatious litigant.

Sexual Assault, Starting Points, and Court of Appeal Panel Composition: A Chilling Effect on Individualized Sentencing?

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: Sexual Assault, Starting Points, and Court of Appeal Panel Composition: A Chilling Effect on Individualized Sentencing?

Case Commented On: R v Gashikanyi, 2017 ABCA 194 (CanLII)

On the first day of summer, the Alberta Court of Appeal released a decision that has turned up the heat on the approach to sentencing in this province. R v Gashikanyi, 2017 ABCA 194 (CanLII), was the hottest case on CanLII this past week, the Court of Appeal Decision of the Week in Eugene Meehan’s Supreme Advocacy newsletter, and the subject of several media stories (see e.g. Alberta Court of Appeal justice issues scathing critique of his own court; Judge slams Alberta Court of Appeal for potential appearance of bias; Alberta court of appeal judge calls for random assignment of judges to panels). Gashikanyi deals with the propriety of a starting point approach to sentencing, an approach that Justice Ronald Berger has previously critiqued and further critiques here, receiving some support from Justice Brian O’Ferrall. But Justice Berger did not stop there — he called into question whether Court of Appeal justices are bound by horizontal precedent (i.e. decisions of their own court), and criticized the way that Alberta judges are assigned to appellate hearings, suggesting a possible lack of impartiality that Justice O’Ferrall and Justice Patricia Rowbotham (dissenting) clearly distanced themselves from. The fact that this discussion took place in the context of a sentence appeal for sexual interference contributes to the heat caused by this decision in light of the intense public scrutiny surrounding sexual assault law recently.

In this post, I review the Court of Appeal’s approach to sentencing starting points generally and in the area of sexual offences as background to the decision in Gashikanyi. I also explore the ramifications of Justice Berger’s statements about horizontal precedent and appellate panel assignments, bringing into the discussion the recent calls for judicial education on sexual assault law and social context.

R v Cody: The Supreme Court Stands Their Ground on Unreasonable Delay

By: Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: R v Cody: The Supreme Court Stands Their Ground on Unreasonable Delay

Case Commented On: R v Cody, 2017 SCC 31 (CanLII)

Just a little under a year after the Supreme Court released R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 (CanLII) and established a new framework for the Charter section 11(b) right to a criminal trial within a reasonable time, the Court has released a new decision on the issue. (For my earlier post on Jordan, see here, and for a post discussing interpretation of Jordan by some Alberta courts see here.) R v Cody, 2017 SCC 31 (CanLII) clarifies the Jordan framework, but more importantly it affirms the Supreme Court’s commitment to ending the “culture of complacency towards delay in the criminal justice system” (at para 1) despite the pressure Jordan has placed on Crown prosecutors.

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