Category: Criminal Page 15 of 39

By: Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: An Update on The Right to Trial Within a Reasonable Time

Cases Commented On: R v Lam, 2016 ABQB 489 (CanLII); R v Regan, 2016 ABQB 561 (CanLII); R v Lavoie, 2017 ABQB 66 (CanLII)

It has been about 8 months since the Supreme Court released R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 (CanLII) and overhauled how courts deal with applications under section 11(b) of the Charter, the right “to be tried within a reasonable time”. I described the new framework in an earlier post. In short, Jordan established presumptive ceilings for unreasonable delay (minus defence delays and exceptional circumstances) between charges being laid and the end of trial. The ceilings are 18 months for charges going to trial in provincial court and 30 months for charges going to superior court, subject to a flexible transitional approach for cases that were already in the system when Jordan was decided. Since the release of Jordan there have been 11 reported decisions in Alberta posted to CanLII for applications for stays under the new framework. This post discusses three of those decisions that addressed interesting aspects of the new framework.

Criminal Negligence and the Reasonable Parent

By Erin Sheley

On February 28, 2017

In Criminal

By: Erin Sheley

PDF Version: Criminal Negligence and the Reasonable Parent

Case Commented on: R v Lovett, 2017 ABQB 46 (CanLII)

In R v Lovett the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench added a new entry to the rapidly developing jurisprudence on criminal negligence. For much of the past 20 years, the SCC has grappled with articulating the appropriate mens rea standard required by Section 219 of the Criminal Code. Starting with R v Tutton, [1989] 1 SCR 1392 (CanLII), the Court has wavered a bit as to whether the Crown could prove that the accused committed an unlawful act or omission showing a “wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons” with regard to an objective standard (that of the “reasonable person”) or whether it must prove that the accused had subjective awareness of such a risk. As of 2008, with R v JF, (2008) SCC 60 (CanLII), the standard has ostensibly been settled as objective: criminal negligence requires only “a marked and substantial departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent person in circumstances in which the accused either recognized and ran an obvious and serious risk… or, alternatively, gave no thought to that risk” (JF, at para 9). Notably, this standard requires a higher deviation from the standard of care than that required in other objective fault offences: the departure must be marked and substantial as opposed to simply marked.

When the Courts Close One Door, They May Open Many More: Maintenance Logs and the Potential Implications of an Appeal in R v Vallentgoed

By Elliot Holzman

On December 22, 2016

In Criminal

By: Elliot Holzman

PDF Version: When the Courts Close One Door, They May Open Many More: Maintenance Logs and the Potential Implications of an Appeal in R v Vallentgoed

Case Commented On: R v Vallentgoed, 2016 ABCA 358 (CanLII)

Following the recent Alberta Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Vallentgoed, 2016 ABCA 358 (CanLII), it appears that Canada’s impaired driving laws may be before the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) once again – this time, only four years removed from the last major case to be decided by the SCC in this area: see R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux, 2012 SCC 57, (CanLII).

Vallentgoed featured two separate cases that were tried together as “test” cases: both Mr. Vallentgoed and Mr. Gubbins were charged with impaired driving and requested various maintenance records as part of their disclosure requests from the Crown. The question before the Court on both appeals pertained to the Crown disclosure obligations of certain maintenance records for the breathalyzer instruments (also called “approved instruments”) used every day in impaired driving investigations across the country.

In a split 2-1 decision, with Justice Rowbotham dissenting, the Court of Appeal held that while time-of-test records of the approved instruments are clearly relevant and must be disclosed to an accused person, historical maintenance records of the instruments are not subject to the same disclosure obligations. Justice Rowbotham found that an instrument’s maintenance log (which is a summary of all the work/repairs done on an instrument since it was brought into use) constitutes first party disclosure and must be disclosed as part of the standard disclosure package sent by the Crown. The majority (Justices Slatter and Berger) held it was third party disclosure, and not subject to the Crown’s Stinchcombe disclosure obligations (see R. v Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 SCR 326, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC)). As the Court of Appeal was split in its decision, there will be an appeal as of right to the SCC, should the appellant wish to exercise that right.

Anti-Terrorism Law Reform: Required Changes to the Terrorism Financing Provisions

By Hayleigh Cudmore

On December 20, 2016

In Constitutional, Criminal, Terrorism and Security

By: Hayleigh Cudmore, Elliot Holzman, Andrea Mannell, and Sarah Miller

PDF Version: Anti-Terrorism Law Reform: Required Changes to the Terrorism Financing Provisions

Provisions Commented on: Sections 83.02, 83.03 and 83.04, Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46

Editor’s Note: This is the third in a series of three posts on Reviewing Canada’s National Security Framework.

This law reform proposal is focused on the “Financing of Terrorism” provisions in the Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46. The government is currently engaged in public consultations and substantive review of the controversial aspects of Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015. The purpose of this post is to consider the structural problems within the Criminal Code and the current anti-terrorism financing regime, discuss the apparent shortcomings in bringing prosecutions under this regime and provide recommendations to improve the efficacy of these provisions.

The particular provisions of the Criminal Code which prohibit terrorism financing – sections 83.02, 83.03 and 83.04 – were neither enacted nor varied by Bill C-51. These provisions came into force as part of the Anti-terrorism Act, SC 2001, c 41, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the following UN Resolution 1373 on the financing of terrorist acts. Despite the fact that the provisions are not anchored to Bill C-51, it is still a good opportunity to revisit these provisions and restructure this part of the Code.

Acting Out of Order: The Need for Real Time Oversight of CSIS Judicial Warrants

By Navreet Bal

On December 19, 2016

In Constitutional, Criminal, Terrorism and Security

By: Navreet Bal, Tim Horon, Tiana Knight, Ryan Shudra, and Jessie Sunner

PDF Version: Acting Out of Order: The Need for Real Time Oversight of CSIS Judicial Warrants

Provisions Commented On: Sections 12 to 12.2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, RSC 1985, c C-23

Editor’s Note: This is the second in a series of three posts on Reviewing Canada’s National Security Framework.

A recent Federal Court ruling, which has been referred to in the media as the “Metadata Case”, has renewed questions about the secrecy of judicial warrants granted to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) as well as CSIS’s duty of candour to the Court (see In the Matter of an Application by [REDACTED] for Warrants Pursuant to Sections 12 and 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Act, RSC 1985, c C-23 and In the Presence of the Attorney General and Amici and In the Matter of [REDACTED] Threat-Related Activities,(2016) FC 1105). This post will discuss the specific difference between review and oversight in Canadian national security law, provide an overview of recent Federal Court decisions related to CSIS judicial warrants, and look to future options related to CSIS judicial warrants.

In this post, we suggest that a robust system of real-time operational oversight is needed throughout Canada’s national security agencies, including CSIS, in order to improve the coordination and effectiveness of these agencies and to ensure the protection of citizens’ civil liberties. Particularly, we will be focusing on the oversight needed in the CSIS judicial warrant architecture. We propose the return of the Office of the Inspector General – which was eliminated in 2012 – that would act as an active, expert, and full-time oversight body over CSIS and handle real time oversight of judicial warrants. We also suggest the introduction of a special advocate regime within the judicial warrant process to act for the targets of CSIS warrants.