Category Archives: Criminal

Throwing the Dog a Bone: A Historical and Policy Critique of the Supreme Court’s Bestiality Ruling

By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington and Evan Choate

PDF version: Throwing the Dog a Bone: A Historical and Policy Critique of the Supreme Court’s Bestiality Ruling

Case Commented On: R v DLW, 2016 SCC 22 (CanLII)

In R v DLW, 2016 SCC 22 the Supreme Court of Canada split on whether the criminal offence of bestiality requires “penetration.” The majority judgment held that bestiality requires penetration and, on that basis, held that a dog licking a vagina is not bestiality. In contrast, the dissenting judgment held that bestiality does not require penetration and, accordingly, held that a dog licking a vagina is bestiality. In this post, we first summarize the factual and legislative background in DLW and the reasons of the majority and dissenting judgments. Second, we critique the majority judgment for: (1) its unpersuasive reliance on judicial deference; and (2) its overstated claim that “buggery” (the precursor to bestiality) had a clear meaning. Lastly, we critique both the majority and dissenting judgments for their reliance on: (1) imprecise sexual terms which fail to bring clarity to bestiality law; and (2) an unimaginative privileging of cisgender, procreative heterosexuality that perpetuates harmfully conservative understandings of human sexuality. Continue reading

The Probative Value of Technological Evidence

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: The Probative Value of Technological Evidence

Case Commented On: R v Didechko, 2016 ABQB 376 (CanLII)

“After a while circumstantial evidence can be overwhelming!” remarked Mister Justice Germain in the recent Alberta Queen’s Bench decision, R v Didechko, (2016 ABQB 376, para 86). In this case, Justice Germain infers guilt on charges of failing to report an accident where death ensues pursuant to s. 252(1.3) and obstruct justice pursuant to s. 139(2) from the circumstantial technological evidence advanced by the Crown prosecutor. The use of such technological evidence, global positioning or GPS and telecommunications cell tower usage, is not unique. Rather what is singular is the evidential purpose for which it is proffered by the Crown as the only evidence available to establish the required factual connection between the accused and the crime. This case is a portent of the future as technological advancements make it possible, and necessary, to use such technological evidence for the investigation and successful prosecution of crime. Didechko is a persuasive example of a “smart” prosecution wherein the Crown utilizes all the evidentiary tools available to create a cohesive and, ultimately, unassailable prosecution. It is also a wake-up call for all those in the legal system to be mindful of the potential effects of technological advances in building a legally cogent case. Continue reading

Justice In a Timely Manner: The New Framework for Trial Within a Reasonable Time

By: Drew Yewchuk 

PDF Version: Justice In a Timely Manner: The New Framework for Trial Within a Reasonable Time

Cases Commented On: R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 (CanLII); R v Williamson, 2016 SCC 28 (CanLII)

I recently posted a comment on a Supreme Court of Canada decision, R v Vassell, 2016 SCC 26 (CanLII), involving section 11(b) of the Charter, which guarantees the right of any person charged with an offence to be tried within a reasonable time. On July 8, 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada decided two more appeals on section 11(b) of the Charter. In a five-four split in R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 (CanLII), the majority overturned the framework for calculating unreasonable delay that was established in R v Morin, [1992] 1 SCR 771 (CanLII). The new framework is simpler, and establishes presumptive ceilings for unreasonable delay (minus defence delays) between charges being laid and the end of trial. The new ceilings are 18 months for charges going to trial in provincial court, and 30 months for charges going to superior court. (Jordan, at para 49) This is a significant change to section 11(b) jurisprudence, and both the majority and concurring judgments acknowledge it as such (Jordan, majority at paras 134-137, concurring at para 302). Moreover, the concurring justices only concur as to the outcome of Jordan – they propose a less radical departure from Morin and fundamentally disagree regarding the proper framework to be applied. This post explores the reasons provided by the majority for this change, as well as the application of the majority and alternative frameworks in Jordan and the companion case of R v Williamson, 2016 SCC 28 (CanLII). Continue reading

On the DLW Decision and the Meaning of Modernity

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: On the DLW Decision and the Meaning of Modernity

Case Commented On: R v DLW, 2016 SCC 22 (CanLII)

Despite our common law system, statute law remains a key source of law in Canada. Its importance cannot be underestimated as lawmakers rely on legislation to implement policy on various social and economic issues. In many ways, legislation is reflective of who we are as a society and serves to reinforce our collective values. No other piece of legislation in Canada exemplifies this more than our Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. Contained in this piece of legislation is conduct we deem as a society to be so abhorrent, so contrary to who we are, that we will punish those who commit these prohibited acts, often through a loss of liberty. Although the concept of codification relieves us from speculating on the substance of criminal behaviour, it carries with it the mystique of interpreting or discerning Parliamentary intent in creating those crimes. As a result, statutory interpretation is often the main issue in criminal cases as judges wrestle with words, meanings, and intentions. This process is vital in criminal law, where a turn of phrase can mean the difference between guilt or innocence. The difficulty lies in dealing with crimes that carry centuries of established meaning, such as murder, assault, and theft. Yet, the crimes so interpreted must remain relevant. In this blog post, I will explore certain aspects of the DLW judgment, 2016 SCC 22, the most recent Supreme Court of Canada decision employing statutory interpretation principles, on the crime of bestiality (section 160 of the Criminal Code). Here, the Court enters into an age old process of interpretation yet does so, seemingly, in the name of modernity. This case highlights the inherent problems in discerning or interpreting value-laden legislation as it then was and then, ultimately, as it needs to be. Continue reading

Access to Justice in Criminal Law

By: Alice Woolley

PDF Version: Access to Justice in Criminal Law

Case Commented On: R. v Moodie, 2016 ONSC 3469 (CanLII)

The Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees everyone the right to retain and instruct counsel on arrest or detention. What do we mean by that? Specifically, do we mean it? Do we mean it for people other than the relatively affluent few?

Canadian governments claim that we do. The vision of Legal Aid Alberta states that it aims for “An Alberta where everyone can access justice and achieve fair and lasting resolutions to their legal issues.” Legal Aid Ontario’s website says that it “provides legal assistance for low-income people”.

Justice Ian Nordheimer isn’t buying it. In a stinging judgment issued on May 26 in R. v. Moodie 2016 ONSC 3469, he stayed charges against Tyrell Moodie pending the provision of state-funded counsel. The charges faced by Mr. Moodie were serious and raised complex legal issues. Justice Nordheimer described the Ontario legal aid guidelines as having no “reasonable relationship to what constitutes poverty in this country” (para 6). Continue reading