Category: Statutory Interpretation Page 1 of 4

Matter Commented On: Building Canada Act, SC 2025, c 2, s 4

PDF Version: Major Projects and the Building Canada Act: New list of PONIs or PHONIs?

This week, Prime Minister Carney announced a second tranche of major projects for fast-tracking consideration under the new Building Canada Act, SC 2025, c 2, s 4 (BCA). This short post provides an update on the context and then presents a draft glossary that tries to make sense of the unusual terminology and various types of projects and concepts falling within the increasingly broad mandate of the new Major Projects Office (MPO).

Back to School Notwithstanding the Charter

By Shaun Fluker

On October 30, 2025

In Constitutional, Education, Labour/Employment, Rule of Law, Statutory Interpretation

By: Shaun Fluker and JD students registered in the Public Interest Law Clinic

Legislation Commented On: Back to School Act, SA 2025 (full citation unavailable at publication time)

PDF Version: Back to School Notwithstanding the Charter

On Monday October 27, 2025, the Minister of Finance Nate Horner tabled Bill 2, Back to School Act, in the second session of the current Legislature, and the UCP government subsequently pushed it through all three readings of the legislative process, effectively passing it on the same day it was introduced. The Back to School Act came into force on royal assent on October 28, 2025. The Act legislates the end of the Alberta Teachers Association (ATA) strike and imposes labour terms between the Province of Alberta and the ATA for 4 years. While this alone warrants significant scrutiny, section 3 of the Act goes further and pre-emptively invokes the Charter’s notwithstanding clause (section 33), immunizing the Act from being struck because it unlawfully infringes sections 2 and 7 to 15 of the Charter. This post explains why the Back to School Act remains justiciable, which is to say, a law still amenable to judicial scrutiny.

Teaching Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation

By Robert Hamilton

On March 13, 2025

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Statutory Interpretation, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Robert Hamilton, Jennifer Koshan, and Jonnette Watson Hamilton

Case Commented On: Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Teaching Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation

It has been a year since the Supreme Court of Canada released its landmark decision in Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10 (CanLII), and many of us are still grappling with how to include Dickson in our teaching materials. For those teaching international law, or the interplay between Canadian law, Indigenous law, and international law, this previous post might be a useful summary of Dickson’s commentary (or lack thereof) on the legal significance of Canada’s adoption and implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In this post, we deal with another important issue – whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies in the context of modern treaties, or at least in the context of the treaty and surrounding documents that governed the dispute between Cindy Dickson and the Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation (VGFN). We provide a summary and critique of the judgments of the Supreme Court on this issue, which concern the interpretation and application of section 32(1) of the Charter in light of constitutional text, history, and precedents as applied to the facts at hand. The majority judgment of Justices Nicolas Kasirer and Mahmud Jamal provide an excellent summary of previous jurisprudence on section 32(1) and could replace a swath of case law on the constitutional law syllabus. But the concurring judgment of Justices Sheilah Martin and Michelle O’Bonsawin, and the dissenting judgment of Justice Malcolm Rowe, are also worthy of discussion given their insights on the complexities of debates surrounding the issue of Charter application. We hope that this summary of the various judgments and our commentary on those judgments will be helpful for those teaching constitutional law and adjacent subjects. We also plan to write a second post focusing on the section 15(1) and section 25 Charter issues in Dickson.

Two Decades of Nunavut Fisheries Litigation and the Meaning of “Special Consideration”

By Nigel Bankes

On May 16, 2024

In Administrative Law, Fisheries Regulation, Statutory Interpretation

By: Nigel Bankes

Case Commented On: Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2024 FC 649 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Two Decades of Nunavut Fisheries Litigation and the Meaning of “Special Consideration”

Ever since the ratification of the Nunavut Agreement (Agreement) in 1993, Inuit of Nunavut and especially Inuit of the Qikiqtani region of Nunavut have been attempting to use the Agreement, as well as other levers, to obtain an increased share of fisheries quota, principally for Greenland halibut (turbot) and Northern shrimp, for the waters offshore of Baffin Island. One can think of this as a process of recapturing or repatriating a resource to Nunavut and Nunavummiut that was largely appropriated by fishery interests based in the Atlantic provinces. I first wrote about this process twenty years ago: “Implementing the Fisheries Provisions of the Nunavut Claim: Re-capturing the Resource?” (2003) 12 J Environmental L & Policy 141-204. This most recent decision finally puts some teeth into the “special consideration” language of s 15.3.7 of the Agreement.

The Next Chapter in the Role of Alberta’s Chief Medical Officer of Health

By Lorian Hardcastle

On October 17, 2023

In COVID-19, Statutory Interpretation

By: Lorian Hardcastle

Legislation and Cases Commented on: Public Health Act, RSA 2000, c P-37; CM v Alberta, 2022 ABKB 716 (CanLII); Ingram v Alberta (Chief Medical Officer of Health), 2023 ABKB 453 (CanLII)

PDF Version: The Next Chapter in the Role of Alberta’s Chief Medical Officer of Health

At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, provincial public health officials were thrust into the spotlight as trusted figures who would guide the public through the unknowns of a novel virus. However, as the pandemic raged on and tensions emerged regarding the appropriate restrictiveness of public health measures, cracks formed in the relationships between the public, politicians, and public health officials. At times, Alberta’s then Premier Jason Kenney and then Minister of Health Tyler Shandro seemed content to take credit for effectively balancing “lives and livelihoods”. However, when things were not going well, they would credit then Chief Medical Officer of Health (CMOH) Deena Hinshaw. For example, when the government’s disastrous “Open for Summer” plan contributed to severe hospital capacity problems and prompted discussions of sending people out of province for care and rationing essential health services, Shandro was quick to note that the plan “came from Dr. Hinshaw” and that he was “deferential to [her] independence.”

Category: Statutory Interpretation Page 1 of 4

Major Projects and the Building Canada Act: New list of PONIs or PHONIs?

Back to School Notwithstanding the Charter

Teaching Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation

Two Decades of Nunavut Fisheries Litigation and the Meaning of “Special Consideration”

The Next Chapter in the Role of Alberta’s Chief Medical Officer of Health