Category: Criminal Page 36 of 39

Cases considered: R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56; R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8

PDF version: From Legare to Morelli: the prioritization of privacy

A few months ago, the Supreme Court of Canada ordered the retrial of an Alberta man acquitted on the criminal offence of luring a child contrary to s.172.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 in R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Morris Fish rejected the trial judge’s unduly restrictive construction of the offence. Instead, the offence was classified as “inchoate” (at para. 25), making it unnecessary to recast the elements into the traditional compartments of mens rea and actus reus. The Court held that the offence of luring requires proof that the accused had the subjective intention to facilitate (not to commit) a secondary offence and that intention need not be objectively capable of facilitating the offence. The judgment gave teeth to the remedial provision designed to combat the risks of sexual exploitation of children through the Internet. Engaging in two sexually explicit chats with a 12 year old girl may be enough to establish that the accused communicated by computer for the purpose of facilitating sexual touching.

Faint Hope for the Faint Hope Clause?

By Jennifer Koshan

On March 9, 2010

In Criminal, State Responses to Violence

Case considered: R. v. Ryan, 2010 ABQB 87

PDF version: Faint Hope for the Faint Hope Clause?

Parliament commenced a new session last week. When it was prorogued in December 2009, 14 bills containing amendments to the Criminal Code died on the order paper, including Bill C-36, the Serious Time for the Most Serious Crime Act. Bill C-36 would have repealed the “faint hope” clause, a provision in the Criminal Code that currently allows persons convicted of first or second degree murder to seek early release on parole after serving 15 years of their sentence. Bill C-36 had passed through three readings in the House of Commons, and was before the Liberal dominated Senate before prorogation, where the amendments to the Criminal Code were a matter of some controversy. Now, there is some indication that the government will ask the opposition to reinstate rather than reintroduce the crime bills this session. Reinstatement would require a majority vote in the House of Commons to allow the process of considering the bills to resume where it left off. The difference of course is that the Senate now has several more Conservative members, appointed during the period of prorogation. A recent Alberta case helps to illustrate the potential consequences of Bill C-36 should it become law.

A policy of delay? The cost of s.11(b) Charter violations in Alberta

By Amanda Winters

On February 8, 2010

In Constitutional, Criminal

Cases considered: R. v. Rajasansi, 2009 ABQB 674; R. v. Klein, 2009 ABPC 381; R. v. Nguyen, 2009 ABPC 384.

PDF version: A policy of delay? The cost of s.11(b) Charter violations in Alberta

Back in December, CBC News reported on the stay of proceedings in the trial against Kulwinder Singh Rajasansi and Wesley Keane Sinclair. The two men were charged with sexually assaulting a young woman in October, 2004. The reason for the stay? It took the case 35 months to get to trial – that’s one month shy of 3 years.

Prosecutorial Accountability?

By Alice Woolley

On November 12, 2009

In Criminal, Ethics and the Legal Profession, Supreme Court of Canada

Case considered: Miazga v. Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 51

PDF Version: Prosecutorial Accountability?

In its 2002 decision in Law Society of Alberta v. Krieger, 2002 SCC 65, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the ability of the Law Society of Alberta to regulate misconduct by Crown prosecutors. It held, however, that where the misconduct relates to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the Law Society’s jurisdiction is limited to circumstances where the prosecutor has acted in bad faith. The Court reiterated that, in general, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is entitled to deference, and may only be reviewed by the Court in circumstances of “flagrant impropriety” (Krieger, para. 49).

In its recent judgment in Miazga v. Kvello Estate, the Supreme Court has affirmed this highly deferential approach to prosecutorial discretion. The Court held that to establish liability for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must demonstrate a) that the defendant was responsible for the prosecution; b) that the legal proceedings ultimately resolved in favour of the plaintiff; c) that the defendant did not have reasonable and probable grounds for a prosecution, objectively speaking (that is, that the defendant’s professional judgment should have indicated that it was not possible that “proof beyond a reasonable doubt could be made out in a court of law” (para. 63); at this stage the prosecutor’s subjective belief in guilt is irrelevant); and, d) that the defendant acted for some improper purpose in bringing forward the prosecution – that the defendant “deliberately intended to subvert or abuse the office of the Attorney General or the process of Criminal Justice” (para 89).

Supreme Court of Canada undermines Trial Judges’ discretion under Charter s. 24(1)

By Anne Stalker

On September 10, 2009

In Constitutional, Criminal

Cases Considered: Bjelland v. The Queen, 2009 SCC 38

PDF Version: Supreme Court of Canada undermines Trial Judges’ discretion under Charter s. 24(1)

In Bjelland v. The Queen, 2009 SCC 38, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the question of whether faulty disclosure by the Crown could lead to the exclusion of the evidence concerned under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The majority, in a 4-3 decision, developed a test for the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(1) and applied it in a very restrictive way. This raises concerns about their respect for the discretion of trial judges as granted by s. 24(1) of the Charter.