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Further Thoughts on The Law and Practice of Grandparenting

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Further Thoughts on The Law and Practice of Grandparenting

Decision Commented On: AUC Decision 22942-D02-2019, Alberta Electric System Operator, 2018 Independent System Operator Tariff, September 22, 2019.

The term “grandparenting” refers to the decision of a legislator, regulator or utility service provider to exempt existing operations from new terms of service or from new regulatory requirements. The decision to grandparent or not, and the extent of any grandparenting (i.e. the cutoff point), is frequently very contentious. Although we see grandparenting issues in many different areas of the law, including environmental law, land use planning, tax law, royalties (see my earlier post on royalties and grandparenting here), and the criminal law (restricted weapons), this post focuses on grandparenting issues in energy and utility law. In particular, this post examines decisions of the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC) on grandparenting (or grandfathering as the term is usually written). The impetus to examine this issue arises from the AUC’s recent decision on the tariff application of the Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO) (the AESO 2018 Tariff Decision). In that decision, the AUC made two rulings in favour of applying grandparenting. In my view, neither ruling is very well or completely reasoned. That led me to look at the AUC’s record to see how it had dealt with this issue in the past. My basic position is that one should always be at least suspicious of grandparenting. It is, on its face, discriminatory and those who favour a grandparenting arrangement in a regulatory context bear the onus of justifying that arrangement. It also may mean that parties do not compete on a level playing field and to that extent is inconsistent with a free, open and competitive market thus requiring further justification.

Public Interest in the Transfer of Licenses from Shell Canada to Pieridae Energy?

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: Public Interest in the Transfer of Licenses from Shell Canada to Pieridae Energy?

Matters commented on: AER Public Notice of Applications 1925399, 1925400, 1925403, 1925404, 1925405, and 1925406

On November 5 the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) posted notice of six applications made by Shell Canada to transfer well, pipeline and facility licenses to Pieridae Alberta Production Ltd. While it is hard to discern from the AER information portal what is actually proposed, it would appear these license transfers relate to the disposition by Shell of its foothills sour gas assets to Pieridae Energy. These assets include wells, pipelines, and associated facilities in the Waterton, Jumpingpound and Caroline gas fields west and southwest of Calgary.

This brief comment asks (1) whether the AER should conduct a public interest hearing to assess what measures should be imposed by the AER to eliminate the risk of unfunded liabilities associated with the abandonment and reclamation of these aging sour gas facilities, and (2) should the Attorney General exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction in this case.

Procedural Fairness and the Alberta Inquiry into Anti-Alberta Energy Campaigns

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: Procedural Fairness and the Alberta Inquiry into Anti-Alberta Energy Campaigns

Order Commented On: Order in Council, O.C. 125/2019 (July 4, 2019)

In early July the Lieutenant Governor in Council commissioned an inquiry under power granted by section 2 of the Public Inquiries Act, RSA 2000, c P-39 (the ‘Inquiry’) to investigate and report on any anti-Alberta energy campaigns that are supported, in whole or in part, by foreign organizations. This comment focuses on the threshold question of whether the doctrine of procedural fairness applies to this Inquiry, and examines the potential legal sources of a fairness obligation. I am not digging into the specific allegations of unfairness already directed at the Inquiry (see here and here), but rather my question is more generally whether those persons who are investigated by the Inquiry have a legal right to know and meet the case being compiled against them. This question arises because, on the one hand, an inquiry such as this could be seen as merely a fact-finding mission with no mandate to decide anything or impose liability on anyone, and historically the common law neither imposed fairness obligations on such investigations nor provided remedies in these cases. On the other hand, the Terms of Reference for the Inquiry attached to Order in Council, O.C. 125/2019 suggest a somewhat close relationship between this investigation and decisions with potential adverse consequences for certain groups. As well, the overtly partisan basis for the Inquiry means it is likely that any findings or recommendations made by the commissioner have the potential to damage the reputation of persons named in his report, even if no further actions are taken by the Minister of Energy or the Lieutenant Governor in Council.

Federal Court of Appeal Rejects Another Attempted Appeal of the TMX Leave Decision

By: David V. Wright, Martin Olszynski, and Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Federal Court of Appeal Rejects Another Attempted Appeal of the TMX Leave Decision

Case Commented On: Raincoast Conservation Foundation v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 259

The FCA has released another ruling in relation to its earlier leave decision on the consolidated TMX legal challenges (Raincoast Conservation Foundation v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 224 (Can LII); for our post on that decision see here). In this latest ruling the panel (including Justice David Stratas – who had authored the original decision) dismissed an attempted appeal (at para 4) brought by two NGOs. The panel reiterated Justice Stratas’ previous conclusion in Ignace v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 239 (for our post on that decision see here) that “appeals cannot be brought from this Court to this Court” and again pointing to the lack of any statutory basis for the FCA to hear such an appeal (at paras 7-9).

Everything You Wish You Didn’t Need to Know About the Alberta Inquiry into Anti-Alberta Energy Campaigns

By: Martin Olszynski

PDF Version: Everything You Wish You Didn’t Need to Know About the Alberta Inquiry into Anti-Alberta Energy Campaigns

Matter Commented On: The Alberta Inquiry, OC 125/2019

“Good faith” in this context…means carrying out the statute according to its intent and for its purpose; it means good faith in acting with a rational appreciation of that intent and purpose and not with an improper intent and for an alien purpose; it does not mean for the purposes of punishing a person for exercising an unchal­lengeable right; it does not mean arbitrarily and illegally attempting to divest a citizen of an incident of his civil status.

Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 1959 CanLII 50 (SCC) at 143 (per Rand J)

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