PDF version: Of Killer Whales, Sage-grouse and the Battle Against (Madisonian) Tyranny
Cases commented on: Alberta Wilderness Association v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FCA 190, Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, Canada (Fisheries and Oceans) v David Suzuki Foundation, 2012 FCA 40.
“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
James Madison, Federalist Papers No. 47
It is commonly understood that Canada’s Parliamentary system of democratic governance is an example of a “weak” separation of powers. In contrast to the United States, where generally speaking the Legislature (i.e. Congress) is responsible for passing laws, the Executive (i.e. the President) for implementing them and the Judiciary for interpreting them, in Canada — at least in “majority” situations — the Legislature (i.e. Parliament) is effectively (if not theoretically) controlled by the Executive (i.e. the Prime Minister and his Cabinet). The fairly predictable result is that laws passed by Parliament tend to give statutory delegates considerable discretion, which in turn allows them to implement government policy on a case-by-case basis without much restraint. In the environmental and natural resources context, most commentators regard this as a bad thing because it tends to favor short term economic and/or political gain over long term economic and environmental sustainability. But there is an emerging threat to the already weak separation of powers in Canada that should be of concern to all lawyers and academics, if not all Canadians. I refer to the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) current approach to judicial review, and the standard of review in particular.