Category: Evidence Page 1 of 4

By: Lisa Silver

Case Commented On: R v Schneider, 2022 SCC 34 (CanLII)

PDF Version: What Did You Say? Making Sense of the Admissibility of Evidence in R v Schneider

The law of evidence gets a bad rap. Too often, I hear lawyers muse that the rules of evidence are to be learned by rote and applied strictly. Evidence, if you know the rules, is simply a matter of application. There’s no magic, so the naysayers say, when it comes to evidence; it is what is, or it isn’t. The rules cannot change facts, nor can they create them. As a teacher and connoisseur of the law of evidence, I disagree. Evidentiary principles are built on legal and factual relationships that can be complex and intriguing. There is a hidden joy to those rules and principles. Yet, at the same time, evidentiary rules can revel in incongruities and blurry lines. This is why when the Supreme Court of Canada releases a decision on the law of evidence, we rule-lovers (or rule-breakers – perspective is everything when it comes to evidence) sit up and take notice. The most recent evidence decision in R v Schneider, 2022 SCC 34 (CanLII), is one such case offering clarity and opaqueness, laying down principles and applications, creating agreement and dissent, and all in all a package reminiscent of an old-fashioned “whodunnit”. In short, by trying to make sense of those rules, we find them to be much more nuanced, engaging, and personal than we expected. In this blog post, we will take out the old magnifying glass to analyze the Schneider decision to see where the drama lies when the Supreme Court of Canada tries to make sense of the rules surrounding the admissibility of evidence. In doing so, I will be laying down some “rules” or propositions of my own.

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By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Why Reconsider W(D)?

Case Commented On: R v Ryon, 2019 ABCA 36 CanLII

I have written at great length on the W(D) decision, R v W(D), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), and the extraordinary impact that case has on our justice system. In my recent article on the issue, aptly entitled The W(D) Revolution, (2018) 41:4 Man LJ 307, I posit that the decision reflects a watershed moment in the assessment of credibility in criminal cases. The case decision, outlining the analytical approach to be taken in assessing credibility when there are “two diametrically opposed versions” of events, revolutionized such assessments by providing a template for integrating factual determinations within the burden and standard of proof (see e.g. R v Avetysan, 2000 SCC 56 (CanLII) at para 28). The W(D) state of mind was one that ensured that the principles of fundamental justice as distilled through the special criminal burden and standard of proof, would remain front and centre in the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence of an accused. This is not to say that the path towards enlightenment has not been strewn with difficulties. To the contrary, to recognize the imperfections of the decision and to experience the twists and turns of W(D) as pronounced upon in future SCC decisions, is to appreciate the W(D) ethos even more. W(D) has needed reinterpretation and reaffirmation throughout the decades since its release, but the question of whether it needed a reconsideration was at issue in the recent decision from the Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Ryon, 2019 ABCA 36 (CanLII).

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