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Category: Evidence Page 3 of 4

Modernizing Circumstances: Revisiting Circumstantial Evidence in R v Villaroman

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Modernizing Circumstances: Revisiting Circumstantial Evidence in R v Villaroman

Case Commented On: R v Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33 (CanLII)

My past two blog posts have a thematic connection and this post is no exception. I have modernity on the mind and so, apparently, do the courts. You may recall that theme in my discussion of the DLW decision (2016 SCC 22 (CanLII)) in which the Supreme Court of Canada, in the name of the “modern,” or the “modern approach” to be exact, entered into the time-honoured process of statutory interpretation only to come to the decision that the 2016 concept of bestiality under s 160 of the Criminal Code was no different than the common law concept of bestiality as subsumed into our codified criminal law in 1892. Justice Abella, hoping for a more modern approach, disagreed. Then, in my last blog post, I discussed the “smart” use of technological evidence to weave a persuasive narrative at trial. In the Didechko case (2016 ABQB 376 (CanLII)), the Crown relied, to great effect, on evidence emanating from the technological traces left by the accused to construct a case based on circumstantial evidence. Didechko serves as an exemplar of a thoroughly modern approach to another centuries-old process. Now, in this post, I will make another case for the modern as the Supreme Court of Canada in Villaroman (2016 SCC 33 (CanLII)) clarifies a very old rule on circumstantial evidence, one predating our Criminal Code, found in the English 1838 Hodge’s Case (168 ER 1136).

When Should Judicial Discretion Trump Expert Testimony?

By: Erin Sheley

PDF Version: When Should Judicial Discretion Trump Expert Testimony?

Case Commented On: R v Clark, 2016 ABCA 72 (CanLII)

In Regina v Clark the Alberta Court of Appeal reinforced the principle that trial courts should enjoy broad discretion in making evidentiary decisions. On the other side of the scale in this particular case was the great problem of ensuring the accuracy of witness identifications when they are the primary basis for conviction. In the United States at least, 70% of exonerations obtained through DNA evidence occurred in cases involving eyewitness misidentifications (see data collected by the Innocence Project, available here).

Clark involved a trial by judge of a bank robbery case. During the crime the suspect had partially obscured his face with a hood and a hat pulled down over most of his features (at paras 3-4). At trial, the Crown relied on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, and in particular that of one woman who had stood about 5-6 feet away from him at the bank counter and glanced at him several times during the robbery at para 54). Several other witnesses identified a photograph of the robber taken from the security camera as an individual who went by the street name “Lips,” a name by which the accused had identified himself to a police officer prior to the robbery (at para 51).

Observations on the Fact/Opinion Distinction in Expert Opinion Evidence

By: Michael Nesbitt

PDF Version: Observations on the Fact/Opinion Distinction in Expert Opinion Evidence

Case Commented On: Dow Chemical Canada ULC v Nova Chemicals Corporation, 2015 ABQB 401 (CanLII)

This decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench concerns the admissibility of evidence given by a “lay witness” at trial and whether that evidence falls within an exception to the general rule that such a witness cannot give opinion evidence.

A central issue at trial was whether Nova failed to run at maximum capacity the ethylene production facility (E3) that it jointly owned with Dow. Nova’s defence was that there was a shortage of ethane – “the feedstock for E3” (at para 3) – which in turn meant that it could not run the E3 facility at full capacity.

Nova stated that it would call employees at E3 to offer testimony both about how E3 was operated and about the mechanical and operational constraints that may have limited the ability for E3 to run a full capacity. In other words, Nova wanted the employees to testify about the constraints they faced and why these would have prevented them from failing to run at maximum capacity. The dispute relevant to this comment arises out of the questioning of the first witness, a Mr. Ron Just, who was the optimizing engineer at E3 for much of the period at issue in the trial, and whether his testimony constituted fact evidence or inadmissible opinion evidence.

Some Observations about Evidence in the Electronic Age

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: Some Observations about Evidence in the Electronic Age

Case Commented On: Kon Construction v Terranova Development, 2015 ABCA 249

This Court of Appeal decision concerns a dispute over the performance of a contract. Terranova retained Kon Construction to grade lands for residential development. The work was to be done in 2005 but was delayed into 2006 and the agreement went sour. Kon Construction filed a claim for unpaid invoices and Terranova counterclaimed that Kon Construction breached the agreement on a number of grounds thereby allowing it to retain another firm to complete the grading work. At trial Madam Justice B.A.Brown ruled that Terranova did not have grounds to terminate its contract with Kon Construction and was therefore liable for a portion of the unpaid invoices which she found had been improperly inflated (Kon Construction v Terranova Development, 2014 ABQB 256). The issues on appeal were primarily on the admissibility of certain electronic records.

Alberta’s Alcohol-Related Administrative Licence Suspension Regime: The Constitutional Challenge and the Challenge to the Evidence

PDF Version: Alberta’s Alcohol-Related Administrative Licence Suspension Regime: The Constitutional Challenge and the Challenge to the Evidence

Case commented on:  Sahaluk v Alberta (Transportation Safety Board), 2013 ABQB 683

Several applicants are challenging the constitutionality of Alberta’s Alcohol-Related Administrative Licence Suspension Regime, which requires those charged with impaired driving-related offences to surrender their drivers’ licences to police and suspends them from driving until the charges are disposed of (when a conviction may result in further driving prohibitions under the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, with no credit given for the provincial suspension). This regime is found in section 88.1 of the Traffic Safety Act, RSA 2000, c T-6, which is being challenged on the basis that it violates the applicants’ rights under sections 7, 8 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and is in pith and substance criminal law and therefore ultra vires the Province of Alberta. In this preliminary application, the Registrar of Motor Vehicle Services sought an order striking out parts of three affidavits filed on behalf of the applicants on the basis that they contained “frivolous, irrelevant or improper information” contrary to rule 3.68(4) of the Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 124/2010.

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