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Category: Family Page 16 of 18

New Rules of Court Interpreted: Rule 12.48 and Summary Judgment in Divorce Proceedings

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On February 9, 2011

In Civil Procedure: New Rules of Court, Family

Case commented on: Maykowski v. Maykowski, 2011 ABQB 31

This case is described by Justice D.C. Read as “high-conflict divorce proceedings” commenced by the husband in combination with a claim for matrimonial property division, and in which the wife counterclaimed for divorce and distribution of matrimonial property. The wife sought summary judgment based on an alleged settlement agreement between the parties concerning the divorce and matrimonial property. Justice Read held that summary judgment was not available, based on an interpretation of Rule 12.48 of the new Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 124/2010. According to Justice Read, “It is patently clear from R. 12.48 that summary judgment is not available in any action under the Divorce Act. Although summary judgment is available in proceedings under the Matrimonial Property Act, if the action was commenced as a combined proceeding with the Divorce Act, because of R. 12.48(b), a summary judgment application under the Matrimonial Property Act can be made only after that action has been severed from the Divorce Act proceedings.” (at para. 16). Because the alleged settlement agreement dealt with claims made under the Divorce Act related to child custody, child and spousal support in addition to matrimonial property claims, summary judgment was not available (at para. 19). Justice Read noted that this would also have been the outcome under the old Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 390/1968, Rule 159, but noted that the exclusion has been outlined in more detail in the New Rules (at para. 15). Justice Read ordered the parties to proceed immediately to alternative dispute resolution, and if unsuccessful there, to trial (at para. 31).

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s Marriage Commissioners Decision – What are the Implications for Alberta?

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On January 18, 2011

In Constitutional, Family

Case and Legislation Commented On: In the Matter of Marriage Commissioners Appointed under the Marriage Act, SS 1995, c M-4.1, 2011 SKCA 3; Marriage Act, RSA 2000, c M-5

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal ruled last week on the constitutionality of proposed amendments to Saskatchewan’s Marriage Act, S.S. 1995, c.M-41, which would have allowed marriage commissioners to decline to perform marriage ceremonies that were contrary to their religious beliefs. The Court found that the proposed amendments violated the equality rights of gays and lesbians under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that this violation could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter because the Saskatchewan government had not minimally impaired the rights of same sex couples in the way it had set out the proposed scheme for religious exemptions.

What are the implications of the decision in Alberta? Surprisingly, the Marriage Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-5, still defines marriage as “marriage between a man and a woman” (section 1(c); see also the preamble), even though in 2004 the Supreme Court confirmed that the power to determine whether same sex couples have the capacity to marry belongs to the federal government under section 91(26) of the Constitution Act 1867 (Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698). While the Alberta government tried to shield the law by using section 33 of the Charter, the notwithstanding clause, that clause could not have saved the invalidity of the Act on division of powers grounds, and the relevant section of the Marriage Act expired in 2005 in any event. Furthermore, Alberta marriage commissioners have been performing same sex marriages in this province since 2005 in spite of the heteronormative definition in the Marriage Act. An attempt to bring in a law similar to that ruled upon in the Saskatchewan case was defeated when Bill 208, the Protection of Fundamental Freedoms (Marriage) Statutes Amendment Act, 2006, was blocked by members of Alberta’s opposition parties. This Bill would have amended the Marriage Act and human rights legislation to protect marriage commissioners who refused to perform same sex marriages on religious or moral grounds. On the face of it then, marriage commissioners in Alberta do not have the sort of opting out protection that was considered in the Saskatchewan case.

Melissa Luhtanen of the Alberta Civil Liberties Research Centre will be providing further analysis of the Saskatchewan case and its implications in Alberta on ABlawg; readers may also be interested in this post on the case by Denise Réaume on the Women’s Court of Canada blog.

Are the Creditors Paying Attention?

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On October 15, 2010

In Family, Property

PDF version: Are the Creditors Paying Attention? 

Case considered: Seguin v Graham and 1356248 Alberta Ltd., 2010 ABQB 582

I find it odd that someone who has failed to file tax returns for the last 14 or so years and who has been pursued by Ontario’s maintenance enforcement program for failing to pay child support for at least 7 years would commence a court action that brings these facts plus details of his annual income and net worth to light in the public forum that is a courtroom. And yet that is exactly what Donald Seguin did when he sued Sandra Graham for unjust enrichment and claimed a constructive trust over her house or, alternatively, a judgment for half of the increase in value of the house over the course of their cohabitation. The subsequent publication of the decision of Mr. Justice R.A. Graesser on the Alberta Courts website and on the Canadian Legal Information Institute‘s (CanLII) website in late September puts the facts out there for anyone to read. Justice Graesser’s consideration of Mr. Seguin’s efforts to avoid the acquisition of assets and his attempts to shelter his assets from his creditors make this rather ordinary case concerning the division of assets on the breakdown of a common law relationship of interest to more than the parties themselves. One has to wonder, however, if the creditors are paying attention?

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Recognizing Foreign Divorces: The Public Policy Defence

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On August 26, 2010

In Conflict of Laws, Family

PDF version: Recognizing Foreign Divorces: The Public Policy Defence

Case considered: Zhang v. Lin, 2010 ABQB 420

Zhang v. Lin raised the question of whether a divorce granted in Texas should be recognized in Alberta. Interestingly, the court determined that it should refuse recognition of the Texas decree because it violated Canadian public policy. In the past, such a defence has been seen as more of a theoretical than a real possibility. In Zhang, however, the court came to that conclusion very readily. What concerned the Alberta court was not so much the divorce itself but the apparent lack of corollary relief by way of child and spousal support available to the respondent in Texas.

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Questions About the Role of Reasonableness and Mutual Restraining Orders in Family Violence Cases

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On May 14, 2010

In Family, State Responses to Violence

PDF version: Questions About the Role of Reasonableness and Mutual Restraining Orders in Family Violence Cases 

Cases considered: Petropoulos v. Petropoulos, 2010 ABQB 296; Andres v. Andres, 2009 ABQB 26

The Protection Against Family Violence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-27 (PAFVA) has been in force since 1999. One of the motivations behind the PAFVA was to make it easier for victims of family violence to obtain emergency protection than the previous system of civil restraining orders had allowed for. Nevertheless, the practice of issuing restraining orders in family violence cases has not disappeared. In fact, there are a number of cases where judges have issued “mutual restraining orders” when deciding whether to confirm emergency protection orders issued under the PAFVA. This comment will raise some concerns with that practice. It will also review the propriety of an objective component to proving family violence in order to obtain relief under the PAFVA. Both of these issues arise in two recent decisions of Justice Joanne Veit of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench.

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