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Category: Natural Resources Page 2 of 21

Taking Stock of the Grassy Mountain Project and Other Coal Matters: Update 4, October 2025

By: Nigel Bankes & Drew Yewchuk

Cases and Decisions Commented On: Northback Holdings Corporation v. Alberta Energy and Joint Review Panel For the Grassy Mountain Coal Project acting in its capacity as the Alberta Energy Regulator, 2025 CanLII 99179 (SCC) and Northback Holdings Corporation v. Canada (Environment and Climate Change), 2025 FCA 31 (CanLII).

PDF Version: Taking Stock of the Grassy Mountain Project and Other Coal Matters: Update 4, October 2025

In addition to ABlawg’s coal law and policy series and the Coal Law and Policy ebook, we have provided occasional posts updating readers on the status of the Grassy Mountain Coal project and the related litigation. As the title of the post suggests, this is the fourth update following earlier updates in February 2024, August 2024, and June 2025.

Benga, now known as Northback, first applied for permits for the Grassy Mountain Coal Project in May 2015 (GM.1).  A Joint Review Panel (JRP) consisting of federal and provincial regulators held a hearing from October 2020 to January 2021. The JRP report in June 2021 denied provincial permits for the project and in August 2021, the Minister of Environment and Climate Change denied federal permits for the project. Recognizing that the project requires both federal and provincial permits, Northback brought litigation relating to the provincial permits in Alberta courts and litigation relating to the federal permits in federal courts in its efforts to get the project approved. In order to revisit the JRP report and decision and revive GM.1, Northback needed to succeed with its litigation in both the Alberta courts and the federal courts. The most recent developments confirm that all of Northback’s attacks on the provincial decision-making have failed and GM.1 is dead and buried. While there is some outstanding litigation in the federal courts relating to GM.1, even if Northback or the First Nation applicants are successful, the remaining litigation cannot obtain the permits necessary for GM.1 to proceed.

Unlawful Production and Restitutionary Damages

By: Nigel Bankes

Case Commented On: Signalta Resources Limited v Canadian Natural Resources Limited, 2025 ABCA 306 (CanLII) and Signalta Resources Limited v Canadian Natural Resources Limited, 2023 ABKB 108 (CanLII).

PDF Version: Unlawful Production and Restitutionary Damages

There are two principal substantive issues in this important unanimous decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal (referred to as ABCA decision). The first issue relates to the rules pertaining to the right of a Crown oil sands lessee (Canadian Natural Resources Limited (CNRL)) to produce gas cap (or non-solution) gas in the course of producing oil sands (or bitumen) when the Crown has leased the natural gas rights in the same location (and indeed the same formation) to another party (Signalta). The second substantive issue relates to the legal consequences of the unlawful production of somebody else’s natural gas, specifically the assessment of damages for such unlawful production.

The 2025 Mine Financial Security Program Update: Security Collected for Aging Syncrude Mine Offers a First Estimate of Mine Closure Costs

By: Drew Yewchuk and Martin Olszynski 

Documents Commented On: Annual Mine Financial Security Program Submissions 2025 Submissions for 2024 Reporting Year; Mine Financial Security Program – Security and Liability, September 29, 2025.

PDF Version: The 2025 Mine Financial Security Program Update: Security Collected for Aging Syncrude Mine Offers a First Estimate of Mine Closure Costs

This is our annual update post in response to submissions for the Mine Financial Security Program (MFSP) being posted to the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) website. See last year’s post here. The MFSP is Alberta’s troubled system for obtaining financial security to ensure the closure (decommissioning, remediation, and reclamation) of oilsands and coal mines when they stop operating. For a detailed assessment of the weaknesses in the MFSP, see our 2023 paper coauthored with Andrew Leach, “Not Fit for Purpose: Oil Sands Mines and Alberta’s Mine Financial Security Program”. The government conducted a review of the MFSP from 2021-2024 that concluded in February 2025 with minor changes that do not repair fundamental problems with the MFSP – see our post here.

The Government of Alberta’s Commitment to Protect Alberta’s Water from Selenium Pollution

By: Nigel Bankes, David Luff, and Neil Kathol

Matters Commented On: (1) Press Conference on the Coal Industry Modernization Initiative, December 20, 2024, (2) Bringing Alberta Coal Mining into the 21st Century, and (3) Your Province, Your Premier, January 25, 2025.

PDF Version: The Government of Alberta’s Commitment to Protect Alberta’s Water from Selenium Pollution

Over the course of the past ten months the Government of Alberta, through statements made by Premier Smith and Ministers Jean and Schulz, has committed to ensure that, going forward, the end of pipe discharge standard for selenium for all coal mines in the province will be 0 micrograms per litre (the zero-discharge standard) i.e., no new mines may operate or obtain permits to operate if there is any chance they could discharge any amount of additional selenium into surface or groundwater, or by windblown particulates.

The Mature Asset Strategy for Alberta’s Oil and Gas Closure Liability Crisis: Where there is Smoke [and Mirrors], there is Fire

By: Martin Olszynski, Drew Yewchuk, and Shaun Fluker

Matter Commented On: Alberta’s Mature Asset Strategy: What we Heard and Recommendations Report, April 3, 2025

PDF Version: The Mature Asset Strategy for Alberta’s Oil and Gas Closure Liability Crisis: Where there is Smoke [and Mirrors], there is Fire

The Alberta government is poised yet again to change its policy direction for addressing the crisis of unfunded closure liabilities in the conventional oil and gas sector. The current yet-to-be-fully-implemented Liability Management Framework (LMF) was announced – to considerable fanfare – just five years ago, in what seemed like an exchange for $1 billion in federal COVID funding to be applied towards closure work on inactive and orphaned facilities. Now that this federal money has been spent (although $137 million was curiously not spent and had to be returned), and Alberta’s inactive well inventory appears to once again be growing, it is apparently time to abandon the LMF for a ‘new’ policy direction that, if nothing else, will once again delay actually dealing with the problem: enter the Mature Asset Strategy (MAS).

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