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Category: Privacy Page 6 of 13

R v Jarvis, A Technologically Mindful Approach to the Meaning of Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

By: Emily Laidlaw

PDF Version: R v Jarvis, A Technologically Mindful Approach to the Meaning of Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Case Commented On: R v Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10 (CanLII)

Last week the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) released its long-awaited judgment R v Jarvis 2019 SCC 10 (CanLII) (Jarvis) and it is potentially a game-changer. The case focuses on a singular issue that is the core of privacy law: the meaning of the reasonable expectation of privacy (REP). What makes this case stand out from all the others is that it deals directly with frictions that have existed for a long time in how to conceptualize REP, namely the nature and extent to which we have a REP in public, how evolving technologies factor into conceptualizing REP in public, and issues of sexual integrity and privacy.

Let’s Talk About Access to Information in Alberta: Part One

By: Shaun Fluker and Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: Let’s Talk About Access to Information in Alberta: Part One

Legislation Commented On: Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSA 2000, c F-25

The Faculty’s Public Interest Law Clinic handles a lot of inquiries from the community that engage with Alberta’s access to information legislation: the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSA 2000, c F-25 (FOIP Act). Simply put, there is a high demand for the disclosure of information collected, produced and otherwise held by state officials. The Information and Privacy Commissioner, who serves as an officer of the Legislature (FOIP Act, s 45), is responsible for overseeing the administration of the FOIP Act with the assistance of the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPC). In its 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 reports to the Legislative Assembly the OIPC indicated the access to information process in Alberta is approaching a crisis. Since commencing operations in 2015, the Public Interest Law Clinic has developed some expertise on working within the FOIP Act, and we would agree the system needs some critical attention. This post summarizes our current observations in this regard and, as the title to this post suggests, we see this as the beginning of a longer conversation. In order to illustrate the process and some of the problems within it, we refer to a request for information filed by the Clinic in July 2017, which is still ongoing, with respect to a creative environmental sentence imposed on CN Rail (see here for details on the offence and the creative sentence).

The Balance of Confidentiality

By: Anoushka Pamela Gandy

PDF Version: The Balance of Confidentiality

Case Commented On: Campbell v Alberta (Chief Electoral Officer), 2018 ABQB 248

Campbell involves an appeal from a decision of the Chief Electoral Officer of Alberta to sanction Jarrett Campbell and Jaskaran Sandhu during the provincial election held on May 5, 2015. The Chief Electoral Officer applied to the Court of Queen’s Bench for guidance regarding what should be contained in a Certified Record produced by the Electoral Officer under Alberta’s Elections Act, RSA 2000, c E-1 [Elections Act]. The main issue before the court was whether the Chief Electoral Officer was able to redact information that is confidential and irrelevant to the appeal (Campbell, at para 2).

Litigation Privilege, the Adversarial System, and the Search for Truth

By: Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: Litigation Privilege, the Adversarial System, and the Search for Truth

Case Commented On: Waissmann v Calgary (City), 2018 ABQB 131 (CanLII)

Waissmann v Calgary (City) is a decision about occurrence reports produced by a Calgary transit bus driver following an accident on July 30, 2007 in which Mr. Waissmann was injured. Mr. Waissmann is suing the city and was seeking to compel the city to produce the occurrence reports. The city asserted litigation privilege over the occurrence reports. Master Robertson agreed with the city and determined the occurrence reports were subject to privilege and need not be produced (at para 44).

A Right to be Forgotten Online: A Response to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner Draft Position

By: Emily Laidlaw

PDF Version: A Right to be Forgotten Online: A Response to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner Draft Position

Document Commented On: Draft OPC Position on Online Reputation

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) published its draft position on online reputation last week stating that the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c-5 (PIPEDA) provides a right to de-index search results (remove a link to a webpage from search results based on a keyword search) and a right to source takedown (removal of a webpage from the host site). De-indexing and source takedown are specific ways that a person might deploy a right to be forgotten, an issue hotly debated for several years, but especially since the Court of Justice of the European Union decided Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proeccion de Datos (AEPD), Marios Costeja Gonzalez, (2014) Case C-131/12 (known as Google Spain). Scholars have already responded to the OPC, such as here, here and here. I offer a different commentary, reflecting my first critical thoughts on three key issues arising from the report: (a) the public interest test suggested by the OPC to balance freedom of expression and privacy; (b) the role of private technology companies; and (c) the blurring of the line between data protection and defamation regimes. While I will discuss source takedown briefly (and for a more thorough analysis of intermediary liability and defamation law, see my work with Dr. Hilary Young here), the focus in this post will largely be on search results. 

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