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Category: Property Page 17 of 33

Do Covenants to Compensate for Designation as an Historical Resource Run with the Land?

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On May 15, 2013

In Municipal Law, Property

PDF version: Do Covenants to Compensate for Designation as an Historical Resource Run with the Land?

Case considered: Equitable Trust Company v Lougheed Block Inc, 2013 ABQB 209.

The foreclosure proceedings taken with respect to the historic Lougheed Building at 604 – 1 Street S.W. in Calgary have generated a number of legal controversies. I have previously blogged on interest issues in the “Perennial Problem of Section 8 of the Interest Act” and on security deposits matters in “Who Bears the Loss for Converted Security Deposits?” This latest judgment — a decision of Mr. Justice Paul R. Jeffrey — concerns compensation paid by the City of Calgary for the decrease in the value of the building when it was designated an “historical resource” under the Historical Resources Act, RSA 2000, c H-9. A Lougheed Building Rehabilitation Incentive Agreement dated September 2006 provided that total compensation would be $3,400,000 and it would be paid in fourteen annual installments of $227,000 each and a final fifteenth payment of $222,000.  The question was who was to receive the balance of the annual installments. Would it be The Lougheed Block Inc (LBI), the owner of the building who entered into the Incentives Agreement with the City and did the required rehabilitation work? Or would it be 604 – 1st Street S.W. Inc (604), the purchaser on the judicial sale after LBI defaulted on their mortgage with Equitable Trust Company and Equitable Trust foreclosed. The outcome depended on the answers to one property issue and one (far less interesting) contract issue.

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The Manitoba Métis Case and the Honour of the Crown

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On April 9, 2013

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Property

PDF version: The Manitoba Métis Case and the Honour of the Crown

Case commented on: Manitoba Métis Federation Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14

In its historic decision on the constitutional rights of the Manitoba Métis, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, in a decision rendered by the Chief Justice and Justice Karakatsanis (Rothstein and Moldaver JJ dissenting), concluded that section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 (reprinted in RSC 1985, App. II, No. 11) expresses a constitutional obligation to the Métis people of Manitoba to provide Métis children with allotments of land. The majority held that the obligation did not impose a fiduciary or trust duty on the Crown but that it did engage “the honour of the Crown.” The majority held that the Crown failed to live up to the terms of that engagement and that the Métis were accordingly entitled to a declaration to that effect. The claim for declaratory relief in relation to the honour of the Crown was not barred by the law of limitations or the equitable doctrine of laches.

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Introducing Conditional Immediate Indefeasibility: Section 170(1) of the Land Titles Act

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On March 13, 2013

In Property

PDF version: Introducing Conditional Immediate Indefeasibility: Section 170(1) of the Land Titles Act

Legislation commented on: Land Titles Act, RSA 2000, c. L-4, s 170(1), as amended by the Land Titles Amendment Act, 2008, SA 2008, c 22, s 9.

The amendments to the Land Titles Act that were introduced by the Land Titles Amendment Act, 2008 included one substantive amendment and that was an amendment to section 170, a provision about indefeasibility of title. Little attention has been paid to this amendment; although it is now four years old, the changes it effected, and the amendment’s potential consequences for real estate practice, appear to have been overlooked. On its face, the substantive amendment says that the registered title of a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee is only indefeasible if that party used all reasonable efforts to confirm that the person from whom they took their interest was not an identity thief. It appears to implement a theory of conditional immediate indefeasibility, which would be a significant change to basic principles of our Torrens-style land titles system — if it is effective. However, because the 2008 amending statute changed section 170 in isolation and left intact all of the other provisions in the Land Titles Act that confer immediate indefeasibility on purchasers and mortgagees, it is not clear that the amendment will do what it purports to do.

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Managed property, the reserve fund, ultra vires doctrine and other issues in interpreting the Condominium Property Act

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On November 28, 2012

In Condominiums, Property

PDF version: Managed property, the reserve fund, ultra vires doctrine and other issues in interpreting the Condominium Property Act

Case commented on: Maciejko v Condominium Plan No. 9821495, 2012 ABQB 607

Maciejko v Condominium Plan No. 9821495 (“Shores“) is posed to be an extremely significant case for the Condominium Property Act, RSA 2000, c C-22 the (“Act“).  The case deals with questions that go to the root of the practice area.  How should the powers of a condominium corporation be interpreted?  What is a “unit”?  What is the role of the condominium plan?  The answers to such fundamental questions have a significant impact not only for Shores itself, but also for hundreds of other condominiums in Alberta similarly set-up.  The questions also have significant importance to the entire condominium practice area and, at a more practical level, the use of the Act as a tool for the development and empowerment of condominium communities.

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Proprietary estoppel is alive and well in Alberta (at least for the over fifties)

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On November 21, 2012

In Property

PDF version: Proprietary estoppel is alive and well in Alberta (at least for the over fifties)

Case commented on: Parkdale Nifty Fifties Seniors Association v Calgary (City), 2012 ABCA 301

I confess that I don’t find the name “Nifty Fifties” especially endearing, especially when associated with the term “seniors.”  Indeed, it is disconcerting to learn from this decision that the qualifying age for entry to the plaintiff’s society is not some respectable, far-off, likely unattainable, age like 70, no, not even 65, but 50!! (the bar was apparently lowered from the 55 to 50 sometime post 1983).  Quite why any self-respecting 50 year old would voluntarily associate (self-identify) with an organization trumpeting this name is quite beyond me.  So, no sympathy with the plaintiff\respondent’s name, but lots of sympathy with the cause, and lots of interest in the idea of proprietary estoppel – indeed, notwithstanding the advancing years I still recall, without prompting, one of the leading proprietary estoppel cases I came across at law school in the UK, a case which rejoices in the name of Dillwyn v Llewelyn, [1862] 4 De GF & J 517, 45 ER 1285 (a case that doesn’t come to mind without also calling to mind Dylan Thomas’, Llareggub in Under Milk Wood – and for those not in the know, try that backwards); and yes, I digress.

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