Category Archives: Supreme Court of Canada

The Fundamentals of Tribunal Standing and Bootstrapping in Judicial Review

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: The Fundamentals of Tribunal Standing and Bootstrapping in Judicial Review

Case Commented On: Ontario (Energy Board) v Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2015 SCC 44

In Ontario (Energy Board) v Ontario Power Generation Inc. the Supreme Court of Canada revisits the fundamentals of standing for a tribunal in a judicial review or statutory appeal of its impugned decision. The substance of this case involves utility regulation in Ontario, and my colleague Nigel Bankes has written on that substance here. The relevant facts for this comment are simply that the Ontario Energy Board disallowed certain labour costs submitted by Ontario Power Generation in its rate application to the Board. The Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an appeal by Ontario Power, but the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed this finding, set aside the Board’s decision, and remitted the case back to the Board for reconsideration. The Board appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. No doubt in response to what then appears to be the Board attempting to defend its impugned decision before the Supreme Court, the proper role of the Ontario Energy Board in these proceedings was raised and my comment here focuses on what the Supreme Court of Canada decides in this regard.

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Methodological Pluralism: Canadian Utility Law Does Not Prescribe any Particular Prudent Expenditure or Prudent Investment Test that a Regulator Must Apply

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Methodological Pluralism: Canadian Utility Law Does Not Prescribe any Particular Prudent Expenditure or Prudent Investment Test that a Regulator Must Apply

Case Commented On: Ontario (Energy Board) v Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2015 SCC 44, (OPG) and ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 SCC 45 (ATCO)

The last two weeks of September 2015 saw the release of three important court decisions dealing with utility regulation, two from the Supreme Court of Canada, the OPG case and the ATCO case, and one from Alberta’s Court of Appeal, the Utility Asset Disposition case (UAD): Fortis Alberta Inc v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 ABCA 295. The two Supreme Court cases (which were heard together) deal with a utility’s opportunity to recover operating costs and the application of prudency tests to those costs. Justice Rothstein is the principal author of both judgments. The ATCO case is unanimous while Justice Abella offers a dissent in the OPG Case. The UAD case deals with what I have previously referred to as the continuing fall-out from the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Stores Block (ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140).

This post summarizes the holdings in the ATCO and OPG decisions and then offers some preliminary comments on their implications. The post begins with some general observations on utility regulation statutes. I will aim to do a separate post on the UAD case.

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Chevron Corp. v Yaiguaje: Judicial Activism and Cross Border Complexity

By: Fenner L. Stewart

PDF Version: Chevron Corp. v Yaiguaje: Judicial Activism and Cross Border Complexity

Case Commented On: Chevron Corp. v Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42

In 2013, Ecuador’s highest court held that Chevron was liable to pay US$9.51 billion to forty-seven indigenous Ecuadorian villagers (the plaintiffs). Prior to this final judgment, in 2012, the plaintiffs started an action to seize Chevron Canada’s CAN$15 billion in assets to satisfy the judgment. Chevron Canada’s assets include its stakes in the Athabasca Oil Sands, the Hibernia Field, the Hibernia South Extension, the Hebron Field, the Duvernay Shale Field, and the Kitimat LNG Project.

In Chevron Corp. v Yaiguaje, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) addressed two questions. First, must there be a real and substantial connection between the defendant (or the dispute) and Ontario before an Ontario court has jurisdiction to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment? The Court answered no. Second, can an Ontario court have jurisdiction over a foreign judgment debtor’s subsidiary when the subsidiary has no connection to the foreign judgement? The Court answered yes.

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What is “Advice”? Supreme Court Exempts Policy Options from Access to Information Request

By: Sarah Burton 

PDF Version: What is “Advice”? Supreme Court Exempts Policy Options from Access to Information Request

Case commented on: John Doe v Ontario (Finance), 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII)

In this case, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether certain government documents constituted “advice” under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c F.31, thus exempting them from disclosure in an access to information request. In making this determination, the Court balanced two competing and important policy interests: the public’s interest in accessing government information, and the government’s interest of obtaining full and frank opinions from public servants. The Court claimed that its decision to protect public service candour was compelled by principles of statutory interpretation. A detailed examination of the case demonstrates that the judgment, while defensible, was actually less inevitable than the Court would like us to believe.

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Faculty Council Resolution Re: Harper, MacKay and McLachlin

Editor’s Note

On May 6, 2014, our Faculty Council passed a unanimous motion calling on Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Justice Minister Peter MacKay to apologize to Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin of the Supreme Court of Canada for impugning her integrity and that of the Court. The letter is available here: Calgary_Faculty_Council_May_2014; the text is set out below.

The Faculty of Law Council at the University of Calgary joins with the Canadian Council of Law Deans and members of the legal community across Canada in expressing its grave concern with respect to statements made by Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Minister of Justice Peter MacKay, suggesting that Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin engaged in improper conduct in the context of the appointment of Mr. Justice Marc Nadon to the Supreme Court of Canada.

On the contrary, the facts confirm that the Chief Justice’s actions were consistent with the duties of her office, responsible, and beyond criticism. To suggest that the Chief Justice in performing her administrative role was inappropriately lobbying is to endanger one of the most important aspects of Canadian constitutional democracy, that being the relationship of respect between the independent judicial and executive arms of our government.

The University of Calgary Faculty of Law Council joins in the legal community’s condemnation of the government’s declarations regarding the actions of Chief Justice McLachlin. Our shared sentiment is that this is an unprecedented, baseless attack on one of the most important institutions of Canada’s constitutional democracy.

We call on the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice to immediately and unequivocally apologize to the Chief Justice for wrongly impugning her integrity and to the Supreme Court of Canada for attempting to compromise its independence.

Unanimously approved by the University of Calgary Law Faculty Council on May 6, 2014.