Category: Terrorism and Security Page 1 of 4

Legislation commented on: Order in Council 008/2025 (January 29, 2025) amending the Critical Infrastructure Defence Regulation, Alta Reg 169/2021

PDF Version: Anticipatory Obedience and Essential Infrastructure at the Alberta-US Border

The authoritarian and isolationist Trump administration has profoundly altered global relations. Democratic institutions are under attack in the United States, and it seems that the grand post-WWII global project called liberal democracy finally ran out of steam on November 5, 2024. If a new world order is emerging, Canada is on the front line. This is an uncomfortable position for us, not only because our socio-economic systems are so deeply integrated with the United States, but also because the world is watching how America’s closest ally responds to the chaos. The stakes are exceedingly high. Here in Alberta, the UCP cabinet initially responded to the Trump administration with what Timothy Synder calls ‘anticipatory obedience’ in his must-read book On Tyranny. Show a bully what they can extract from you, and they will take it. Plenty has been written about the Premier’s visit to Mar-a-Lago and Alberta’s initial reluctance to align with ‘Team Canada’, my focus here is on something that has not garnered as much attention: the Lieutenant Governor in Council designating all land within two kilometres of the US border as ‘essential infrastructure’. It is truly shocking how quickly the UCP cabinet gave away Alberta’s portion of the world’s longest undefended border, and created a quasi-military area now referred to as the red zone.

Proposed Security of Canada Information Sharing Act Amendments

By Admin

On April 23, 2018

In Terrorism and Security

By: Ben Allison, Lindsay Kvellestad, and Wajeeha Sattar

PDF Version: Proposed Security of Canada Information Sharing Act Amendments

Policy Commented On: Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters

Executive Summary

On August 1^st, 2015, the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, SC 2015, c 20 (SCISA) came into force by Bill C-51, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2015 (assented to 18 June 2015). SCISA gave Government of Canada Institutions the power to share information in their possession with listed receiving institutions. Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2017 (first reading 20 June 2017) is currently in Committee (SECU). Among a host of other national security changes, this Bill proposes to make amendments to SCISA, which will become the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA), Bill C-59, s 114. Experts in the field of national security law in Canada have pointed to weaknesses that are not being addressed in the SCISA (see Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, A report card on the national security bill). The majority of the criticisms that are associated with Bill C-59 and SCISA/SCIDA in particular are the threshold for sharing information, the overbreadth of the exception, circularity, and a lack of review. This post does not intend to canvass the issues afresh. Rather, our focus is on novel problems with the SCISA and the proposed amendments in Bill C-59 that have largely gone unaddressed. Beyond the existing critiques, the proposed amendments in Bill C-59 still do not address significant problems. We discuss some of these problems in three parts. Part I argues that treating all types of information as the same, as the SCISA does, is problematic. Part II addresses concerns related to disclosing institutions and how they function with regard to information sharing. Similar areas of concern are mentioned in Part III relating to recipient institutions. Each part of this post includes not only critiques but also proposed solutions to the various problems surveyed.

What’s In A List? Examining Canadian Terrorist Listing

By Meagan Potier

On April 20, 2018

In Terrorism and Security

By: Meagan Potier, Bassam Saifeddine, and Chad Haggerty

PDF Version: What’s In A List? Examining Canadian Terrorist Listing

Policy Commented On: Terrorist listing pursuant to section 83.05 of the Criminal Code of Canada

In 2001, Canada enshrined into law a public-facing list of terrorist entities as a part of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. In theory, this list is meant to simplify one aspect of Canada’s exceedingly complex terrorism prosecutions. In practice, the listed entities have only been relied on in Canadian criminal proceedings six times. More often than not, the listed entities are referenced during Immigration and Refugee Board decisions. This post provides a brief review of how the list is used within Canada, and then looks to Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand as case studies for best-practices of listing and delisting. Finally, we recommend that the federal government should evaluate the procedural safeguards within the listing process and the continued use of the listed entitles within the immigration context.

Private Networks, Public Importance: Reviewing the Communications Security Establishment’s Private Network Cybersecurity Regime Under Bill C-59

By Dana Hägg

On April 19, 2018

In Terrorism and Security

By: Dana Hägg, Jocelyn Gerke and Marika Cherkawsky

PDF Version: Private Networks, Public Importance: Reviewing the Communications Security Establishment’s Private Network Cybersecurity Regime Under Bill C-59

Provision Commented On: Section 22(1) of the proposed Communications Security Establishment Act under Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters, 2017

The proposed Communications Security Establishment Act (CSE Act), which would be enacted by Bill C-59, expands the Communications Security Establishment (CSE)’s mandate such that the CSE would be able to conduct cybersecurity and information assurance activities on private networks. Given the amount of critical infrastructure in the hands of the private sector, this is a much-needed enlargement of the CSE’s powers.

This new power has been described as being entirely dependent on a request for assistance by the owner of the private information infrastructure (see Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, Evidence, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Meeting 88 at 9:45 (Ms Greta Bossenmaier, Chief of the Communications Security Establishment)). However, this is not represented in the legislation. Under the proposed CSE Act, the CSE would be able to conduct a large amount of privacy-infringing cybersecurity and information assurance activity on private networks without the owner’s knowledge or consent.

National Security Law Lab Students Offer Reform Recommendations on Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters

By Michael Nesbitt

On April 19, 2018

In Terrorism and Security

By: Michael Nesbitt

PDF Version: National Security Law Lab Students Offer Reform Recommendations on Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters

Legislation Commented On: Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters, 2017; Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, SC 2015, c 20

In the Fall of 2016, students in the University of Calgary, Faculty of Law’s National Security Law Lab responded to the government’s calls for feedback on the ever-so controversial Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, SC 2015, c 20 (commonly known as Bill C-51). As with any large Bill analyzed by thoughtful law students, there was much that they liked and, in this case, much more that they did not like. The students decided that their efforts were best spent analyzing law reform proposals that both drew back aspects of Bill C-51 and added heft (and legal protections) to it, knowing that the then-new Liberal government was sure to table a responsive Bill, as was their campaign promise.