Category: Terrorism and Security Page 3 of 4

By: Michael Nesbitt

PDF Version: Reviewing Canada’s National Security Framework

This term, the University of Calgary, Faculty of Law offered for the first time a new Criminal Law & Policy Lab: Terrorism Law & Reform. The idea behind the course was, in part, to follow along with the Government of Canada’s “National Security Framework” public consultations and consider the legal, political and social issues that arose in real-time. (For more background on the Government’s public consultations and its relationship to the course, see my earlier ABlawg post).

Students were split into three groups and asked to negotiate, amongst themselves, three different areas that they thought were of the most importance to Canada’s national security framework review. Put another way, the students chose the three topics that they agreed were most ripe for review and consideration by the government. (For an overview of the course and its broader purpose, see here).

By the end of term, students were asked to produce ABlawg posts on their findings and recommendations on these three topics. The students also submitted research memoranda to the government as part of its public consultations. Today, we release the first of these three posts, Curtailing Free Expression: A Barbaric Cultural Practice? A Critical Comment on Section 83.221 of the Criminal Code.

Public Consultations, Anti-Terrorism Law, & Canada’s National Security Framework

By Michael Nesbitt

On November 14, 2016

In Terrorism and Security

By: Michael Nesbitt

PDF Version: Public Consultations, Anti-Terrorism Law, & Canada’s National Security Framework

Legislation Commented On: The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015 SC 2015, c. 20

Report Commented On: The Government of Canada’s Our Rights, Our Security: National Security Green Paper, 2016

Sitting in opposition during 2014 through the beginning half of 2015, the Liberal Party of Canada chose to support the Conservative Government’s controversial Bill C-51, which became the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015 on 18 June 2015 (SC 2015, c. 20). While the New Democratic Party voted against the Bill, the Liberals promised to pass, then revisit the Bill should they win the 2015 Federal Election. The Liberals did (win), and they have (begun to revisit Bill C-51).

The first step in this review has been the issuance of a “Green Paper” on Canada’s “National Security Framework” followed by a multi-pronged approach to public consultations on national security law and policy in Canada. There are a plethora of legal and policy considerations that deserve close governmental and public scrutiny during this process. However, this post focuses on the need to consult with and take seriously the views of Canada’s younger generations, including but not limited to law students, in deciding how best to balance Canadian’s rights with our security interests. In an effort to ensure these voices are heard, the Faculty of Law’s Terrorism Law & Reform lab will be posting on ABlawg in December a series of self-generated, student-authored legal and policy recommendations on three of the more controversial aspects of Canada’s national security framework. As a primer to this initiative, this post offers background on the Government’s consultative process as well as my remarks as prepared as testimony for the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. These comments focus briefly on national security oversight and review and then in a little more detail on CSIS’s new “disruptive” powers as authorized by Bill C-51.

Terrorism and Entrapment in the Era of Increased Scrutiny of Police

By Elliot Holzman

On August 18, 2016

In Criminal, Terrorism and Security

By: Elliot Holzman

PDF Version: Terrorism and Entrapment in the Era of Increased Scrutiny of Police

Case Commented On: R v Nuttall, 2016 BCSC 1404 (CanLII)

On July 1, 2013, John Nuttall and Amanda Korody placed three pressure cooker bombs in the bushes next to the British Columbia Parliament Buildings (“the Legislature”) in Victoria, B.C. The contents of the explosive devices included nuts, bolts, nails, washers and other materials intended to kill or maim people. Luckily, the bombs never detonated. It became public knowledge immediately after the incident that the devices were inert and were manipulated by the RCMP before Nuttall and Korody got their hands on them. The RCMP clarified that while the threat was real the public was never at risk as the threat was detected early and disrupted.

The initial reports indicated that Nuttall and Korody were a couple living in Surrey in the Lower Mainland and were converts to Islam who were self-radicalized. Over the following weeks, more details began to emerge about an elaborate RCMP and CSIS led investigation – Project Souvenir – that had been involved with Nuttall and Korody in the months, weeks, days, and hours leading up to the bombs being planted.

On June 2, 2015, Nuttall and Korody were convicted by a jury of a number of terrorism offences, but their convictions were not entered as they immediately applied for a stay of proceedings based on the conduct of the RCMP during its undercover investigation. This is known as entrapment. As I will describe below, entrapment occurs when someone is induced to commit a criminal offence as a result of unfair law enforcement practices such as trickery, persuasion or fraud.

Canada-Iran Relations: Sanctions, Diplomatic Relations, Booby-Traps and the Law

By Michael Nesbitt

On January 22, 2016

In International Law, Terrorism and Security

By: Michael Nesbitt

PDF Version: Canada-Iran Relations: Sanctions, Diplomatic Relations, Booby-Traps and the Law

This week, it was reported that Canada’s Foreign Minister Stephane Dion and the Liberal government were considering lifting sanctions on Iran and re-establishing diplomatic relations between the two nations. The quandary here – to lift or not to lift, to engage or not to engage – has been foreseeable for some time: I wrote an op-ed in the Globe & Mail back in July warning the next government that they would have to be prepared to act, and act quickly, once the US lifted its sanctions on Iran (see here).

The repercussions of Canada’s delay for Canadian business are immense: Our companies do not want to be left behind as Iran’s enormous emerging market – 80 million people with a dilapidated infrastructure and close connection to a large Diaspora in Canada – begins to open up to the rest of the world. There is no such thing as a second-movers advantage.

But Canada’s business interests are not the only consideration here, even in our struggling economy; Canada’s national security regime is also implicated and the situation is both complicated and controversial.

Let’s start with a reminder of why Iran sanctions are now in the news before getting into the commentaries that have recently set off a debate in Canada.

Bill C-24: Strengthening Canadian Citizenship – Weakening Global Security

By Hannah Buckley

On July 30, 2015

In Terrorism and Security

By: Hannah Buckley

PDF Version: Bill C-24: Strengthening Canadian Citizenship – Weakening Global Security

Statute Commented On: Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, SC 2014 c 22

On June 11, 2015 the final host of amendments created under the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act (Bill C-24) came into force. Among those were amendments to section 10 of the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985 c C-29 greatly expanding the government’s ability to revoke Canadian citizenship. The amendments apply to naturalized Canadians, dual citizens and Canadian-born citizens who are eligible to obtain dual citizenship. Prior to Bill C-24, only naturalized citizenship could be revoked, and revocation was limited to cases where citizenship was obtained by means of fraud or false pretenses (See Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Legislative Summary of Bill C-24: An Act to amend the Citizenship Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts by Julie Béchard, Penny Becklumb, & Sandra Elgersma (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2014) available here). Now treason, terrorism, aiding the enemy, espionage, and communicating safeguarded or operational information have been added to the list of exile-worthy offences.