Category: Youth and the Law Page 2 of 4

An Open Letter to Premier Danielle Smith Re: “Preserving choice for children and youth” Announcement

On February 15, 2024

In Constitutional, Equality, Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion, Youth and the Law

Matter Commented On: Government of Alberta, News Release, “Preserving choice for children and youth” (1 February 2024)

PDF Version: An Open Letter to Premier Danielle Smith Re: “Preserving choice for children and youth” Announcement

Editor’s Note:

This post is a reproduction of a letter sent by faculty members, legal researchers, and staff at the University of Alberta and University of Calgary Faculties of Law to the Premier of Alberta regarding the government’s announcement of restrictions targeting transgender youth.

Premier Danielle Smith
Office of the Premier
307 Legislature Building
10800 – 97 Avenue
Edmonton, Alberta
T5K 2B6

By email: premier@gov.ab.ca

12 February 2024

Dear Premier Smith:

Re: “Preserving choice for children and youth” announcement

We are faculty members, legal researchers, and staff at the University of Alberta and University of Calgary Faculties of Law. We have come together to express our deep concerns with the government’s announcement of restrictions targeting transgender youth. These restrictions will harm Two-Spirit, trans, and gender diverse children and youth by undermining their education, restricting their access to healthcare, and narrowing their sport and recreation opportunities. We believe these restrictions violate their rights, as enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”).

R v Theriault: A Case of Epistemic Injustice

By Brynne Harding

On October 20, 2020

In Access to Justice, Criminal, Equality, Youth and the Law

By: Brynne Harding

PDF Version: R v Theriault: A Case of Epistemic Injustice

Case Commented On: R v Theriault, 2020 ONSC 3317 (CanLII)

On the morning of Friday, June 26, 2020 – among more than 20,000 other people – I tuned into the YouTube live stream on which Ontario Superior Court Justice Joseph DiLuca gave his judgment in the criminal trials of Michael and Christian Theriault (R v Theriault, 2020 ONSC 3317 (CanLII)). The brothers, one of whom is a Toronto police officer, stood accused of assault and aggravated assault on Dafonte Miller, a young Black man, who lost his eye in their clash.

Const. Michael Theriault was acquitted of aggravated assault and attempting to obstruct justice in the case, and was convicted only of the lesser charge of simple assault. His brother Christian Theriault was acquitted of all charges. On August 6, 2020, it was announced that the Crown has appealed the acquittals.

The Theriault acquittals unsettled me – persistently, in the weeks to follow. The accused were acquitted of aggravated assault, despite strong Crown evidence, and fact findings of the court, that the two grown white men had gratuitously and violently beaten Miller, a Black teenager. Nearly as unsettling was the fact that the trial judge had insisted, capably, and with sophistication, that he understood what he called the “racialized context” of the encounter (at para 11). The objective of this post is to explore the apparent contradiction in Theriault between the verdicts, on one hand, and Justice DiLuca’s claim that he considered the racialized context, on the other. This post does not purport to be an appellate brief for the Crown, although some argument relates to potential legal and factual errors in Theriault.

Missing Ceilings for Trial Within a Reasonable Time in the Youth Justice Context

By Drew Yewchuk

On October 12, 2018

In Youth and the Law

By: Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: Missing Ceilings for Trial Within a Reasonable Time in the Youth Justice Context

Case Commented On: R v KJM, 2018 ABCA 278

R v KJM is yet another case addressing the changes to the Charter section 11 right to trial within a reasonable time set out in R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27. The question in KJM is how the Jordan framework applies in the youth justice context. The Court of Appeal was split three ways. Justices Wakeling and O’Ferrall concurred that KJM’s right to trial within a reasonable time was not violated, and that charges should not be stayed, but their reasons for why are fairly different. Justice Veldhuis found that the delay did violate KJM’s Charter right to trial within a reasonable time and would have stayed the charges.

So Help Me God: ALRI Recommends Changes to Make the Alberta Evidence Act More Inclusive

By Laura Buckingham

On February 8, 2018

In Evidence, Youth and the Law

By: Laura Buckingham

PDF Version: So Help Me God: ALRI Recommends Changes to Make the Alberta Evidence Act More Inclusive

Report Commented On: Alberta Law Reform Institute, Competence and Communication in the Alberta Evidence Act, Final Report 111

It might not be surprising that the first version of the Alberta Evidence Act, adopted in 1910, required judges to investigate the religious beliefs of certain witnesses. What is surprising is that more than a century later, these requirements are still in force in Alberta. Under Alberta law, children, adults with cognitive impairment, and anyone who wishes to make an affirmation instead of swearing an oath may be questioned about their religious beliefs before they are allowed to give evidence.

Alberta Agrees to Amend Human Rights Legislation to Expand Prohibitions Against Age Discrimination

By Jennifer Koshan

On February 7, 2017

In Constitutional, Human Rights, Youth and the Law

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: Alberta Agrees to Amend Human Rights Legislation to Expand Prohibitions Against Age Discrimination

Case Commented On: Ruth Maria Adria v Attorney General of Alberta, Court File No 1603 05013, Consent Order filed 13 January 2017

Human rights legislation exists in every province and territory in Canada, and at the federal level, but protection against discrimination varies amongst jurisdictions with respect to what grounds and areas are protected. Until recently, the Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5, only protected against age discrimination in the areas of publications and notices (section 3), employment practices and advertisements (sections 7 and 8), and membership in a trade union, employers’ organization or occupational association (section 9). Age was not a protected ground in relation to the provision of goods, services, accommodation or facilities customarily available to the public (section 4), or in relation to tenancies (section 5).

In January 2017, the Alberta government agreed to expand the Alberta Human Rights Act to include age as a protected ground under sections 4 and 5. This development was prompted by an application brought in March 2016 by Ruth Maria Adria under section 15 of the Charter, the constitutional equality rights guarantee, to have the omission of age declared unconstitutional and to have age read in to these sections.