ABLawg - - Page 112

Legislation Commented On:Bill C-69, An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts

PDF Version: (Final?) Brief re: Bill C-69 to the Senate Committee on Energy, Environment and Natural Resources

The Senate Committee on Energy, Environment, and Natural Resources (the Committee) is in the final stages of its hearings into Bill C-69, which if passed will replace the current federal environmental assessment regime pursuant to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012, SC 2012 c 19 s 52 (CEAA, 2012). What follows is a slightly edited version of the brief that I submitted to the Committee last week, following my appearance before it on April 9, 2019, here in Calgary.

I am pleased to submit this brief to the Committee as part of your review of Bill C-69 – and the proposed Impact Assessment Act (IAA) in particular. Much has been said and written about Bill C-69. In addition to this brief, I myself have written or co-written the following articles/blogs since Bill C-69 was passed in the House of Commons:

My own contributions have been spurred less by a desire to defend the Bill and more to simply set the record straight. That is the spirit that animated my remarks to the Committee on April 9, 2019 and that is at the core of this brief, which is organized as follows:

Inter-Provincial Recognition of Substitute Decision-Making Documents: Personal Directives

By Katherine MacKenzie

On April 24, 2019

In Wills and Estates

By: Katherine MacKenzie

PDF Version: Inter-Provincial Recognition of Substitute Decision-Making Documents: Personal Directives

Report Commented On: Alberta Law Reform Institute, Inter-Provincial Recognition of Substitute Decision-Making Documents: Personal Directives, Final Report 113

A little over a year ago, I wrote a post about the Alberta Law Reform Institute’s (ALRI) project on the inter-provincial recognition of substitute decision-making documents. This was an implementation project, which means that it looked at whether sample, uniform legislation already researched and drafted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC) was suitable for enactment in Alberta.

At the time of that post, ALRI recommended that the ULCC’s uniform legislation should be implemented in Alberta, with some minor amendments. We also sought feedback on our preliminary recommendations for reform. Unfortunately, the consultation results did not support our preliminary recommendations and, as a result, ALRI is not in a position to make any final proposals. Instead, Final Report 113 summarizes the project’s consultation process and results, and highlights any policy alternatives or additional issues that may deserve further exploration and analysis.

Informer Privilege: A Fickle Friend?

By KMizutani

On April 16, 2019

In Criminal

By: Kenryo Mizutani

PDF Version:Informer Privilege: A Fickle Friend?

Case Commented On: R v Named Person X, 2018 ABQB 827 (CanLII)

In the series “Mission: Impossible” the protagonist Ethan Hunt knows what is at stake. Before every new assignment, a self-destructing tape informs him of his new mission. The message ends with a disclaimer: “as always, should any member of your team be caught or killed, the Secretary will disavow all knowledge of your actions.” In serving his state, he knows that the state is a fickle friend: if he is compromised, he cannot expect any assistance. At least Ethan Hunt is fully aware of this before he sets off.

The situation of Named Person X (NPX) in the recent Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench decision, R v Named Person X, 2018 ABQB 827 (CanLII) is similar to Ethan Hunt’s. NPX is allegedly a police informer, and leaked information that resulted in successful arrests of several people. However, there is a twist: NPX was among those arrested. Just like the Secretary in “Mission: Impossible”, the Crown would “neither confirm nor deny that any informer privilege exists in relation to the Accused [NPX]” (at para 16). NPX filed an application for an order directing the Crown to disclose source handler notes related to NPX’s activity as an informer, and the central issue in Named Person X was whether this application should be granted or whether the notes were protected by informer privilege.

Hearsay? Another Perspective on Farm and Ranch Work and the Alleged Flaws of Bill 6

By Jennifer Koshan

On April 9, 2019

In Labour/Employment

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: Hearsay? Another Perspective on Farm and Ranch Work and the Alleged Flaws of Bill 6

Matter Commented On: United Conservative Party Proposal to Repeal Bill 6, the Enhanced Protection for Farm and Ranch Workers Act; Hearsay Podcast of March 19, 2019

Even before the provincial election was called, the United Conservative Party (UCP) announced that it would “make good on a key promise to Alberta’s farm families and repeal Bill 6.” The announcement claims that the Alberta New Democratic Party (NDP) failed to consult farmers in enacting the Bill, resulting in a loss of “public trust with farm and ranch families.” The UCP promises to “immediately launch comprehensive consultations with farmers, ranchers, agriculture workers and others on how best to balance the unique economic pressures of farming with the need for a common sense, flexible farm safety regime.” These consultations are intended to “develop recommendations for the introduction of the Farm Freedom and Safety Act (FFSA), which will be passed into law in 2019.”

Distracted Driving and the Traffic Safety Act

By Shaun Fluker

On April 2, 2019

In Criminal, Statutory Interpretation

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: Distracted Driving and the Traffic Safety Act

Case Commented On: R v Ahmed, 2019 ABQB 13 (CanLII)

Alberta added distracted driving offences to the Traffic Safety Act, RSA 2000 c T-6 in 2011, and two of these provisions are the subject of this decision by Justice John T. Henderson. The accused was charged under section 115.1(1)(b) for operating a vehicle while looking at his mobile phone. This particular section prohibits driving while holding, viewing or manipulating a hand-held electronic device or a wireless electronic device. The facts were not in dispute at trial, but the traffic commissioner ruled that a mobile phone is not an “electronic device” and thus acquitted the accused. The Crown appealed this decision to the Court of Queen’s Bench. A literal or plain reading of section 115.1(1)(b) does lead one to question the view that a mobile device is not an electronic device, but statutory interpretation is not always a literal exercise – particularly when the provisions themselves are written in a complicated or “inelegant” manner as is noted by the court here. This case is perhaps more about distracted drafting than it is distracted driving.