ABLawg - - Page 112

Case Commented On: R v Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10 (CanLII)

Last week the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) released its long-awaited judgment R v Jarvis 2019 SCC 10 (CanLII) (Jarvis) and it is potentially a game-changer. The case focuses on a singular issue that is the core of privacy law: the meaning of the reasonable expectation of privacy (REP). What makes this case stand out from all the others is that it deals directly with frictions that have existed for a long time in how to conceptualize REP, namely the nature and extent to which we have a REP in public, how evolving technologies factor into conceptualizing REP in public, and issues of sexual integrity and privacy.

A Stressful Legal System Creates Vexatious Self-Reps

By Drew Yewchuk

On February 21, 2019

In Access to Justice, Human Rights, Vexatious Litigants

By: Drew Yewchuk & Christine Laing

PDF Version: A Stressful Legal System Creates Vexatious Self-Reps

Case Commented On: Davis v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), 2019 ABQB 6 (CanLII)

Davis v Alberta (Human Rights Commission) is a judicial review of a decision by the Acting Chief of the Alberta Human Rights Commission (AHRC) to dismiss three complaints filed by Ms. Davis with the AHRC. There are no significant developments in human rights law in this decision, but it offers a good opportunity to consider the impact of administrative delays in dispute resolution mechanisms on individuals, especially self-represented ones. Davis also offers an example where the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench was invited to find a self-represented litigant vexatious for the purposes of a costs decision.

What is the Concern with Recognizing GHGs as a Matter of National Concern?

By Martin Olszynski

On February 13, 2019

In Constitutional, Environmental

By: Martin Olszynski

PDF Version: What is the Concern with Recognizing GHGs as a Matter of National Concern?

Matter Commented On: Reference re: Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act

All eyes are on Saskatchewan this week, as the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal prepares to hear arguments in the federal greenhouse gas pricing reference. To most observers, this reference may appear to be simply about the constitutionality – or not – of the federal government’s greenhouse gas (GHG) pricing regime set out in the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, SC 2018, c 12, s 186 (GGPPA). As further set out in this post, however, for constitutional and environmental lawyers and scholars, this reference is less about whether the federal government can regulate GHGs but rather the basis upon which it can do so.

Leave to Appeal Denied on the AUC’s Jurisdiction to Create an Effective Remedy in the Line-Loss Saga

By Nigel Bankes

On February 11, 2019

In Utility Regulation

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Leave to Appeal Denied on the AUC’s Jurisdiction to Create an Effective Remedy in the Line-Loss Saga

Case Commented On: Capital Power Corporation v Alberta Utilities Commission, 2018 ABCA 437 (CanLII)

There are previous posts on ABlawg dealing with the line-loss issue including a post on the Alberta Utilities Commission’s (AUC) 2015 decision at issue in this case. In that decision, the AUC concluded that it had jurisdiction to order an effective remedy to deal with the fact that the Alberta Electric System Operator’s (AESO) line-loss rule in effect between 2005 and 2012 was unlawful and invalid, and that it could do so even though the result would be retrospective rate making. Some generators would receive rebates and some would receive invoices for past transmission losses.

Why Reconsider W(D)?

By Lisa Silver

On February 7, 2019

In Criminal, Evidence

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Why Reconsider W(D)?

Case Commented On: R v Ryon, 2019 ABCA 36 CanLII

I have written at great length on the W(D) decision, R v W(D), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), and the extraordinary impact that case has on our justice system. In my recent article on the issue, aptly entitled The W(D) Revolution, (2018) 41:4 Man LJ 307, I posit that the decision reflects a watershed moment in the assessment of credibility in criminal cases. The case decision, outlining the analytical approach to be taken in assessing credibility when there are “two diametrically opposed versions” of events, revolutionized such assessments by providing a template for integrating factual determinations within the burden and standard of proof (see e.g. R v Avetysan, 2000 SCC 56 (CanLII) at para 28). The W(D) state of mind was one that ensured that the principles of fundamental justice as distilled through the special criminal burden and standard of proof, would remain front and centre in the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence of an accused. This is not to say that the path towards enlightenment has not been strewn with difficulties. To the contrary, to recognize the imperfections of the decision and to experience the twists and turns of W(D) as pronounced upon in future SCC decisions, is to appreciate the W(D) ethos even more. W(D) has needed reinterpretation and reaffirmation throughout the decades since its release, but the question of whether it needed a reconsideration was at issue in the recent decision from the Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Ryon, 2019 ABCA 36 (CanLII).

R v Jarvis, A Technologically Mindful Approach to the Meaning of Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

A Stressful Legal System Creates Vexatious Self-Reps

What is the Concern with Recognizing GHGs as a Matter of National Concern?

Leave to Appeal Denied on the AUC’s Jurisdiction to Create an Effective Remedy in the Line-Loss Saga

Why Reconsider W(D)?