The Right to Support for Adult Children with Disabilities

By: Jennifer Koshan and Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: The Right to Support for Adult Children with Disabilities

Case and Bill Commented On: Ryan v Pitchers, 2019 ABQB 19 (CanLII); Bill 28, the Family Statutes Amendment Act 2018

 As Laura Buckingham noted in an ABlawg post in December 2018, Alberta’s Bill 28, the Family Statutes Amendment Act 2018, made three key amendments:

  • creating legislated rules for property division for separating common-law couples;
  • closing a gap in child support legislation for adult children with disabilities; and
  • repealing the Married Women’s Act, RSA 2000, c M-6.

The second of these amendments was recently considered in Ryan v Pitchers, 2019 ABQB 19 (CanLII). In this case, a mother brought a constitutional challenge to the pre-amendment version of the Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5 (FLA), which did not allow disabled children of unmarried parents to obtain child support once they turned 18 and were not attending school full-time. The mother’s argument was that the definition of child in the FLA violated the equality guarantee in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The government did not defend the case given the pending legislative amendment in Bill 28, and although the father raised constitutional counter-arguments, the mother’s claim was successful.

Although the decision may seem like a foregone conclusion, the section 15 analysis of Madam Justice Carolyn Phillips has some interesting features that we will comment on in this post.

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A Stressful Legal System Creates Vexatious Self-Reps

By: Drew Yewchuk & Christine Laing

PDF Version: A Stressful Legal System Creates Vexatious Self-Reps

Case Commented On: Davis v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), 2019 ABQB 6 (CanLII)

Davis v Alberta (Human Rights Commission) is a judicial review of a decision by the Acting Chief of the Alberta Human Rights Commission (AHRC) to dismiss three complaints filed by Ms. Davis with the AHRC. There are no significant developments in human rights law in this decision, but it offers a good opportunity to consider the impact of administrative delays in dispute resolution mechanisms on individuals, especially self-represented ones. Davis also offers an example where the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench was invited to find a self-represented litigant vexatious for the purposes of a costs decision.

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What is the Concern with Recognizing GHGs as a Matter of National Concern?

By: Martin Olszynski

PDF Version: What is the Concern with Recognizing GHGs as a Matter of National Concern?

Matter Commented On: Reference re: Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act 

All eyes are on Saskatchewan this week, as the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal prepares to hear arguments in the federal greenhouse gas pricing reference. To most observers, this reference may appear to be simply about the constitutionality – or not – of the federal government’s greenhouse gas (GHG) pricing regime set out in the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, SC 2018, c 12, s 186 (GGPPA). As further set out in this post, however, for constitutional and environmental lawyers and scholars, this reference is less about whether the federal government can regulate GHGs but rather the basis upon which it can do so.

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Leave to Appeal Denied on the AUC’s Jurisdiction to Create an Effective Remedy in the Line-Loss Saga

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Leave to Appeal Denied on the AUC’s Jurisdiction to Create an Effective Remedy in the Line-Loss Saga

Case Commented On: Capital Power Corporation v Alberta Utilities Commission, 2018 ABCA 437 (CanLII)

There are previous posts on ABlawg dealing with the line-loss issue including a post on the Alberta Utilities Commission’s (AUC) 2015 decision  at issue in this case. In that decision, the AUC concluded that it had jurisdiction to order an effective remedy to deal with the fact that the Alberta Electric System Operator’s (AESO) line-loss rule in effect between 2005 and 2012 was unlawful and invalid, and that it could do so even though the result would be retrospective rate making. Some generators would receive rebates and some would receive invoices for past transmission losses.

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Why Reconsider W(D)?

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Why Reconsider W(D)?

Case Commented On: R v Ryon, 2019 ABCA 36 CanLII

I have written at great length on the W(D) decision, R v W(D), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), and the extraordinary impact that case has on our justice system. In my recent article on the issue, aptly entitled The W(D) Revolution, (2018) 41:4 Man LJ 307, I posit that the decision reflects a watershed moment in the assessment of credibility in criminal cases. The case decision, outlining the analytical approach to be taken in assessing credibility when there are “two diametrically opposed versions” of events, revolutionized such assessments by providing a template for integrating factual determinations within the burden and standard of proof (see e.g. R v Avetysan, 2000 SCC 56 (CanLII) at para 28). The W(D) state of mind was one that ensured that the principles of fundamental justice as distilled through the special criminal burden and standard of proof, would remain front and centre in the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence of an accused. This is not to say that the path towards enlightenment has not been strewn with difficulties. To the contrary, to recognize the imperfections of the decision and to experience the twists and turns of W(D) as pronounced upon in future SCC decisions, is to appreciate the W(D) ethos even more. W(D) has needed reinterpretation and reaffirmation throughout the decades since its release, but the question of whether it needed a reconsideration was at issue in the recent decision from the Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Ryon, 2019 ABCA 36 (CanLII).

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