Protection for the Rights of Farm Workers Finally Proposed in Alberta

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: Protection for the Rights of Farm Workers Finally Proposed in Alberta

Legislation Commented On: Bill 6, Enhanced Protection for Farm and Ranch Workers Act

On November 17, 2015 the Minister of Jobs, Skills, Training and Labour Lori Sigurdson introduced Bill 6 in the Alberta Legislature. She described the Enhanced Protection for Farm and Ranch Workers Act as an omnibus bill that:

proposes to amend workplace legislation so Alberta’s farm and ranch workers will enjoy the same basic rights and protections as workers in other industries. Proposed changes would remove the exemption of the farm and ranch industry from occupational health and safety, employment standards, and labour relations legislation. Bill 6 also proposes to make workers’ compensation insurance mandatory for all farm and ranch workers. If passed, Alberta would join every other jurisdiction in Canada in applying workplace legislation to Alberta’s farms and ranches. This is a historic day for Alberta (Hansard, November 17, 2015).

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Is there Space for the Homeless in our City’s Parks? A Summary and Brief Commentary of Abbotsford (City) v Shantz

By: Ola Malik and Megan Van Huizen

PDF Version: Is there Space for the Homeless in our City’s Parks? A Summary and Brief Commentary of Abbotsford (City) v Shantz

Case Commented On: Abbotsford (City) v Shantz, 2015 BCSC 1909

The recent B.C. decision of Abbotsford (City) v Shantz) highlights the central issue which seems to arise whenever there is a conflict over the management of public city space – who does this space “belong” to, and who gets to use it? When we answer that question, many of us would agree that this space belongs to those who live in our communities — parents with strollers, families on an outing, people walking their dogs or playing with their kids. When we think about who belongs in our community, how many of us include the homeless?

The homeless are often excluded from our conception of community. It is easy to ignore the issue of homelessness when it is hidden from view. But as soon as the homeless become visible in our parks and neighbourhoods they are seen as a nuisance requiring a solution. The well-known phrase, “you don’t have to go home, but you can’t stay here” aptly captures the dilemma the homeless face — and when you have no place to call home – where do you go?

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Impaired Driving and Approved Screening Devices

By: Shaun Fluker, Elliot Holzman, and Ian Pillai

PDF Version: Impaired Driving and Approved Screening Devices

Case Commented On: Goodwin v British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 46; Wilson v British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 47

In October the Supreme Court of Canada issued two companion judgments concerning the constitutionality and meaning of the Automatic Roadside Prohibition (ARP) provisions set out in the Motor Vehicle Act, RSBC 1996, c 318. In Goodwin v British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) the Supreme Court upheld British Columbia’s ARP scheme as valid provincial law that does not unlawfully invade federal criminal law power or contravene section 11 of the Charter, but the Court also ruled that the seizure of a breath sample using an approved screening device (ASD) under the scheme as previously administered was an unreasonable seizure under section 8 of the Charter. In ruling as such, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Chambers Justice who heard the matters back in 2010. Subsequent to that initial ruling the Province of British Columbia amended the ARP scheme in an attempt to remedy the unreasonable seizure, and the Supreme Court’s companion judgment in Wilson v British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) concerns the interpretation of these new provisions employing principles of statutory interpretation. In this comment we provide an overview of the ARP scheme and the issues raised by the use of ASDs in impaired driving cases, and bring this matter into an Alberta context. We also examine the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis in Goodwin and its application of the principles of statutory interpretation in Wilson.

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Court of Appeal Affords Deference to Alberta Securities Commission in Platinum Equities Case

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: Court of Appeal Affords Deference to Alberta Securities Commission in Platinum Equities Case

Case Commented On: Alberta (Securities Commission) v Chandran, 2015 ABCA 323

In February 2014 the Alberta Securities Commission found that Shariff Chandran was the governing mind of an elaborate scheme of capital market misconduct under the general umbrella of Platinum Equities and ruled that Chandran and others were guilty of contravening various provisions of the Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4 concerning the illegal distribution of approximately $58 million in securities to the public, misrepresentations, fraud, and conduct contrary to the public interest (See Re Platinum Equities Inc, 2014 ABASC 71). In addition to these administrative proceedings before the Commission, there are civil and criminal proceedings underway concerning Platinum Equities. In September 2014 the Commission issued its sanctions order 2014 ABASC 376 against Chandran and others for their misconduct under the Securities Act. Chandran asked the Court of Appeal to set aside a portion of these sanctions ordered by the Commission, and in Alberta (Securities Commission) v Chandran the panel of Justices Martin, O’Ferrall, and Shutz dismisses his appeal. The Court’s decision is a good example of how deference should work in substantive judicial review.

Section 38 of the Securities Act provides for a right of appeal to the Court by a person who is directly affected by a Commission decision. Notably section 38 does not limit this right of appeal to questions of law and neither does it require leave of the Court. Moreover, section 38 expressly states the Court may confirm, vary or reject the Commission decision, direct the Commission to re-hear the matter, or even decide the matter itself and substitute its decision for that of the Commission. In short, section 38 is a very generous and potentially intrusive statutory appeal provision.

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When Judicial Decisions Go from Wrong to Wrongful – How Should the Legal System Respond?

By: Alice Woolley

PDF Version: When Judicial Decisions Go from Wrong to Wrongful – How Should the Legal System Respond?

Case Commented On: R v Wagar, 2015 ABCA 327 (CanLII)

Introduction

Judges make wrong decisions. As I discussed in a recent ABlawg post, errors in judicial decisions are to be expected given the human frailty of participants in the judicial system – the judges, the lawyers and the parties. But at some point can the quality of an error in a legal judgment change – can it go from wrong to wrongful? That is, at some point does the error go from being a product of the judge’s humanity to being a product of a moral or ethical failure?  And if a judicial decision crosses that line, how ought the legal system to respond? In particular, how can it respond so as to respect judicial independence while also ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice?

In this blog I explore these questions through Judge Robin Camp’s decision and conduct in R v Wagar, a decision overturned by the Court of Appeal (R v Wagar 2015 ABCA 327 (Canlii) and summarized and commented on by my colleague Jennifer Koshan here. I argue that legal decisions go from being wrong to wrongful when they demonstrate both disrespect for the law and a failure of empathy in regards to the persons who appeared before the court.   In my opinion, Judge Camp’s decision falls within this category; it demonstrates both disrespect for the law governing sexual assault and a pervasive inability to understand or even account for the perspective of the complainant.

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