ABLawg

By: Linda McKay-Panos

PDF Version: Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Overturns Discrimination Decision on Foreign Trained Engineer

Case Commented On: Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Alberta v Mihaly, 2016 ABQB 61 (CanLII)

In an earlier post with Jason Wai, we discussed the decision of the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal (AHRT), in which Mr. Ladislav Mihaly succeeded in arguing that the Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Alberta (APEGA) discriminated against him on the grounds of place of origin, when it refused to recognize his education as the equivalent of an engineering degree from an accredited Canadian University, and by requiring him to write certain examinations to confirm his credentials. The AHRT also concluded that APEGA could not justify its registration requirements. Thus, Mihaly was successful in his claim of discrimination and was awarded $10,000 for injury to dignity. The AHRT declined to award lost wages to Mihaly.

APEGA appealed the finding of discrimination by the AHRT, and Mihaly cross-appealed, asking for $1,000,000 for lost wages and registration with APEGA, or $2,000,000 if not registered with APEGA (at para 2).

When is a Contract between Family Members Enforceable?

By Evaristus Oshionebo

On March 17, 2016

In Contracts, Corporate / Commercial

By: Evaristus Oshionebo

PDF Version: When is a Contract between Family Members Enforceable?

Case Commented On: Hole v Hole, 2016 ABCA 34

At common law a contract is not enforceable unless the parties intended the contract to create legal relations. Whether or not the parties intended to create legal relations is determined objectively by examining the circumstances existing at the time of execution of the contract. However, there is a general presumption that contracts between family members are not intended to create legal relations. This presumption “derives from experience of life and human nature which shows that in such circumstances men and women usually do not intend to create legal rights and obligations, but intend to rely solely on family ties of mutual trust and affection” (Jones v Padavatton, [1969] 2 All ER 616 at 621 (CA)). The presumption is equally based on the reality that agreements between family members are usually not bargained or negotiated. However, the presumption is rebuttable by evidence. Thus, a contract between family members is enforceable where there is evidence that the parties intended the contract to create legal relations. The presumption could be rebutted by evidence showing that, although the parties are family members, the contract was reached or executed in commercial circumstances. As Professor John McCamus puts it, “[c]ommercial arrangements between family members may obviously be intended to create enforceable agreements” (John D. McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2^nd ed at 133).

Shades of Grey in the Ride-Sharing World

By Theresa Yurkewich

On March 15, 2016

In Municipal Law

By: Theresa Yurkewich

PDF Version: Shades of Grey in the Ride-Sharing World

The past few months have seen a hubbub of debate surrounding Uber, the taxi industry, and whether ride-sharing services are presently incorporated under municipal bylaws, and if not, whether they should be (for previous posts on this subject see here, here and here).

In Alberta, and more particularly Edmonton and Calgary, it became a race to test the present regulatory framework and adapt it if necessary. In navigating around the bylaws, Uber was offering a lower cost method of transportation to the status quo taxi service. Concerns were raised on three main topics: fares, fees, and safety. Fast forward to this month, and both municipalities have an adapted framework in place, and the Government of Alberta has weighed in on insurance requirements for drivers operating for hire. In the midst of what seems like a saga of Uber battles, this post will discuss the amendments and outline what they mean for ride-sharing in Alberta.

Calculating Damages for a Trespass to Land, Actionable Per Se

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On March 14, 2016

In Property, Torts

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: Calculating Damages for a Trespass to Land, Actionable Per Se

Case Commented On: Corlis v Blue Grass Sod Farms Ltd., 2016 ABPC 55 (CanLII)

Frank Corlis, the plaintiff in this action, was awarded the precise sum of $5,500.80 in damages for Blue Grass Sod Farms’ trespass to his land. As an old-fashioned trespass to land case, this decision’s most interesting points are about the calculation of damages. Cases explaining damages for these torts that are “actionable per se” are not that common.

The facts were a little unusual. Glen Armitage owned a quarter section of land that produced sod and he sold a portion of it in 2005 to Corlis. Corlis’ land was undeveloped, except for its production of sod. Although Corlis planned to build a home on the land, he never took any steps to do so.

Blue Grass Sod Farms leased the Armitage land for $85 per acre in 2009. The company had some discussions with Corlis about looking after his land and harvesting the sod, but the two never reached an agreement then. By 2009, Corlis had stopped visiting his land very often. He did not look after it himself and he had not hired hire anyone to do so either. He apparently thought that Blue Grass was caring for his land as “the neighborly thing to do” (at para 10), but Judge James Glass, sitting in Red Deer, found that there was no agreement about harvesting sod between Blue Grass and Corlis.

When Blue Grass harvested the Armitage land in 2013, they also harvested sod from Corlis’ land, sold that sod and made a profit from that sale. When Cortis visited his land in 2013 with a prospective purchaser, he noticed that his sod was gone. When he phoned Blue Grass, he was told that if they were cutting the sod, then they were taking the sod. The company admitted that it harvested the sod from about 80,000 square feet of Corlis’ land.

Court Confirms that the AUC Can Take the Lead in Examining the Scope of the ISO’s Reporting Obligations

By Nigel Bankes

On March 11, 2016

In Energy

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Court Confirms that the AUC Can Take the Lead in Examining the Scope of the ISO’s Reporting Obligations

Case Commented On: Independent Power Producers’ Society of Alberta v Independent System Operator (Alberta Electric System Operator), 2016 ABQB 133

Alberta has a competitive electricity market which functions through the power pool coordinated by the Independent System Operator (ISO) known in Alberta as the Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO) (see the Electric Utilities Act, SA 2003, c E-5.1 ss 17 – 18 (EUA)). In simple terms power producers bid blocks of power (price/quantity pairs) into the pool at the price at which they are prepared to be dispatched (e.g. GenCo bids 10 MW at $40/MWh) on an hourly basis for the following seven days. Generators may change their offer prices closer to real time as the market unfolds: see MSA, Alberta Wholesale Electricity Market, 2010. The ISO ranks all bids in merit order (i.e. starting with the lowest bids) and moves up the ladder of bids until supply meets the load (demand). The last unit dispatched sets the system marginal price which is received by all generators which are dispatched. Thus, if the price settles at $80/MWh that is the price that GenCo will receive. If the price settles at $30/MWh GenCo will not be dispatched. See AESO, “Determining the Wholesale Market Price for Electricity”.