University of Calgary Faculty of Law ABLawg.ca logo over mountains

Alberta Arbitration Decision Embraces Broadening Trend on Family Status Discrimination

By: Linda McKay-Panos

PDF Version: Alberta Arbitration Decision Embraces Broadening Trend on Family Status Discrimination

Case Commented On: SMS Equipment Inc v Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union, 2015 ABQB 162

The definition of discrimination on the basis of family status has recently been extended in federal and provincial human rights law to mean not only one’s relationship to another person, but also to include recognition of childcare responsibilities. The leading case, Canada v Johnstone, 2014 FCA 111, was discussed in previous ABlawg posts (see here). The decision SMS Equipment Inc v Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union, 2015 ABQB 162, demonstrates that Alberta labour arbitrators have joined the “family”.

SMS Equipment applied for judicial review of the arbitration award of Arbitrator Lyle Kanee. Arbitrator Kanee concluded that the employer, SMS, must accommodate Ms. Cahill-Saunders, a single mother of two children. She first worked as a labourer for SMS, and was required to work rotating seven night and seven day shifts, after moving from Newfoundland to Fort McMurray. Cahill-Saunders had one son when she was hired, and he remained in Newfoundland with his grandmother for the first nine months she worked in Fort McMurray, joining her later. At that time, the baby’s father lived in Fort McMurray and provided some childcare while Cahill-Saunders worked, although they did not cohabit (at para 5).

Crown Oil Sands Dispositions and the Duty to Consult

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Crown Oil Sands Dispositions and the Duty to Consult

Case Commented On: Buffalo River Dene Nation v Ministry of Energy and Resources and Scott Land and Lease Ltd, 2015 SKCA 31

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has confirmed Justice Currie’s decision (discussed here) to the effect that the grant of an oil sands exploration permit in Saskatchewan does not trigger the Crown’s duty to consult principally on the grounds that that there is no potential for conflict between the rights conferred by the permit and the First Nation’s treaty rights. This is because the permit alone gives the permittee no right to use the surface while the First Nation (at para 88) “does not advance here a treaty right or Aboriginal claim to subsurface rights or rights exercisable in relation to the subsurface of Treaty 10 lands.” Furthermore, at the time that the permit is granted there is no project on which to consult about; this will only become apparent when the permittee (if ever) develops a plan for its proposed exploration or development of the underlying minerals which requires surface access – at which time consultation will occur. And (at para 92) “It is at this point that the Crown and Buffalo River DN would have something meaningful, in the sense of quantifiable, to consult about, to reconcile.” Until then there is no project.

The Bilcon Award

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: The Bilcon Award

Award Commented On: The Claytons and Bilcon v Canada, NAFTA, UNCITRAL Rules, 17 March 2015

Once again Canada has lost an important investor/state arbitration under Chapter 11 of NAFTA (for a post on Canada’s last reversal (Mobil and Murphy), also characterized by a strong dissent, see Regulatory Concussion). The Clayton family and Bilcon Inc (US investors, the claimants) were hoping to develop a quarry in Digby Neck, Nova Scotia. The project was sent to a joint federal/provincial environmental review panel (JRP) by both levels of government. The JRP recommended rejection and both governments accepted that recommendation, and thus the project died. The claimants took the view that the JRP process was badly flawed. They were of the opinion that the panel had recommended rejection on the basis that the project would be inconsistent with “community core values” and furthermore that the panel had deliberately failed to identify any mitigation measures that might make the project acceptable. However, instead of seeking judicial review of the JRP in the Federal Court the claimants commenced this NAFTA arbitration. They have been rewarded with a majority decision in their favour. The majority (Judge Bruno Simma and Professor Bryan Schwartz) found that Canada had breached both Article 1105 (minimum standard of treatment (MST) – even as constrained by the Interpretation Note (2001) issued by NAFTA contracting parties here) and Article 1102 (national treatment standard). The matter will now go back to the tribunal for it to assess damages. Professor Donald McRae delivered a strong dissent contending that the majority had turned what was nothing more than a possible breach of domestic law into an international wrong. I have nothing to add to McRae’s excellent critique (and see also Meinhard Doelle’s post on the decision); my purpose here is to review some of the implications of the Award from a number of different perspectives.

“Do Corporations Cry Wolf? — Comparing What Companies Tell Regulators With What They Tell Investors”

By: James Coleman

PDF Version: “Do Corporations Cry Wolf? — Comparing What Companies Tell Regulators With What They Tell Investors”

Corporations regularly complain that new regulations will harm their business and the broader economy. How seriously should we take those warnings? I’ve just posted a paper that presents a way of answering this perennial question.

It’s often said that corporations, “Cry Wolf,” falsely predicting that rules will be very costly. A prime example comes from 1970 when Ford’s President, Lee Iacocca warned that the U.S. Clean Air Act “could prevent continued production of automobiles” and was “a threat to the entire American economy and to every person in America.” So when industry says that new regulations such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Clean Power Plan or Alberta’s rules for cleaning up tailings ponds will be unworkable, some suggest that regulators should just ignore those warnings.

But the problem with crying wolf is that there are wolves. That is, false alarms are dangerous because they mean we won’t respond to true threats. And from time to time, regulations really are unworkable, and industry might be the first to recognize this, which is why regulators don’t just ignore industry warnings.

Can the Homeless Find Shelter in the Courts?

By: Joshua-Sealy Harrington

PDF Version: Can the Homeless Find Shelter in the Courts?

Case Commented On: Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 852

Late in 2014, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered a Charter challenge to provincial and federal (in)activity allegedly contributing to homelessness and inadequate housing (Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 852 (“Tanudjaja CA”)). The appellants sought to overturn a motion judge’s decision striking their application at the pleadings stage (Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 5410 (“Tanudjaja SC”)). A majority of the Court of Appeal (the “Majority”) upheld the motion judge, while the dissenting judgment (the “Dissent”) would have overturned the motion judge and allowed the Charter challenge to proceed to trial. This comment analyzes both judgments and concludes that the Dissent provides a more compelling analysis of the governing legal principles and their application in this case.

Page 254 of 438

Powered by WordPress & Theme by Anders Norén