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Order in the Court! The Use of Electronic Devices in Alberta Courts and Freedom of Expression

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On November 6, 2013

In Access to Justice, Constitutional

PDF Version: Order in the Court! The Use of Electronic Devices in Alberta Courts and Freedom of Expression

Policies commented on:  Policy on the Use of Electronic Devices in Courtrooms, Alberta Court of Appeal, October 28, 2013; Electronic and Wireless Devices Policy, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, January 2012

Last week the Alberta Court of Appeal (ABCA) issued a Notice to the Profession attaching its Policy on the Use of Electronic Devices in Courtrooms. The Policy applies to all ABCA courtrooms, and prohibits use of electronic devices in those courtrooms by members of the public. For those persons, “Electronic devices … must be turned off and kept out of sight” (section 3). Only lawyers and “accredited media members” are permitted to use such devices in ABCA courtrooms (section 4), subject to certain restrictions. Anyone who uses an electronic device contrary to the Policy may face sanctions including being required to leave the courtroom or declared in civil contempt of court (section 12). The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (ABQB) has a similar Electronic and Wireless Devices Policy, requiring that all electronic devices be turned off in its courtrooms, but exempting counsel and some members of the media from that rule. The Provincial Court of Alberta (ABPC) has adopted the ABQB Policy. This post will describe the details of these policies, and will examine whether the policies are consistent with freedom of expression as protected by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

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Client Rights and Lawyers’ Files

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On November 5, 2013

In Ethics and the Legal Profession, Property

PDF Version: Client Rights and Lawyers’ Files

Case commented on: Royal Bank of Canada v Kaddoura, 2013 ABQB 630

In a recent decision, Master Prowse held that a client who sues a lawyer may obtain production of documents from the files of other clients of the lawyer.  The production of specific documents may be resisted on the basis of solicitor-client privilege.  Master Prowse did not, however, impose any requirement that those clients be given notice of the production of documents from their files, did not consider whether the documents contain confidential (as opposed to privileged) information, whether the documents are properly considered to be in the “control” of the lawyer, or assessment of the risk of prejudice to the legal interests of those clients from disclosure.  In short, the judgment appeared to give no weight or consideration to those clients. This result is unfortunate, and inconsistent with the usual respect afforded to the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications.

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Supreme Court of Canada May Finally Clear up Issue of “Employment” in Human Rights Cases

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On November 4, 2013

In Human Rights, Labour/Employment

PDF Version: Supreme Court of Canada May Finally Clear up Issue of “Employment” in Human Rights Cases

Case commented on: Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP v British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) 2012 BCCA 313; leave to appeal granted, Michael McCormick v Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP, 2013 CanLII 11313 (SCC).

I have written a number of posts (see for example here and here) about the narrowing interpretation given to “employment” in discrimination cases under the Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000 c A-25.5. Since the Act protects individuals from discrimination in five areas (employment, notices, tenancy, services and accommodation, and trade unions), on several grounds (e.g., age, gender, race, colour, place of origin, ancestry, source of income, religious beliefs, family status, marital status, physical disability, mental disability, or sexual orientation), if the discrimination does not occur in an area defined as “employment” (or any of the other four areas) then the complainant cannot obtain a remedy under the Act. Consequently, one way that respondents seek to counter human rights complaints is by establishing that they do not fit within the current definition of “employment”, and hence the Commission does not have jurisdiction to deal with the complaint. As noted previously, the narrowing interpretation of “employment” seems to counter the overarching educational and remedial purpose of human rights law, and the “large and liberal interpretation” that is supposed to be given to provisions in the Act.

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“Wide and Deep”: Implications of the SCC’s Castonguay decision on the Interpretation of Environmental Protection Legislation, Fulfilling Reporting Requirements, Reporting Authorities’ Obligations and the Precautionary Principle

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On November 1, 2013

In Environmental

PDF Version: “Wide and Deep”: Implications of the SCC’s Castonguay decision on the Interpretation of Environmental Protection Legislation, Fulfilling Reporting Requirements, Reporting Authorities’ Obligations and the Precautionary Principle

Case commented on: Castonguay Blasting Ltd. v Ontario (Environment), 2013 SCC 52

On October 17, 2013, in Castonguay Blasting Ltd. v Ontario (Environment), 2013 SCC 52 [Castonguay] the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal of Castonguay Blasting Ltd. upholding a conviction under section 15(1) of the Ontario Environmental Protection Act, RSO 1990, c E 19 (EPA), for failing to report the discharge of a contaminant.  As Justice Abella, writing for a unanimous Court, states at the outset of her judgment, the Court was asked to engage in an interpretative exercise to determine whether, on these facts, the reporting requirement was triggered.  At the end of the day, the Supreme Court of Canada considered this a relatively straight forward exercise, in that “there is clarity both of legislative purpose and language:  the Ministry of the Environment must be notified when there has been a discharge of a contaminant out of the normal course of events without waiting for proof that the natural environment has, in fact been impaired.  In other words:  when in doubt, report.” (at para 2).

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Lawyers Who Write Bogus Demand Letters: The Freemen in Our Midst?

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On October 30, 2013

In Ethics and the Legal Profession, Vexatious Litigants

PDF Version: Lawyers Who Write Bogus Demand Letters: The Freemen in Our Midst?

The phenomenon of organized pseudo-legal commercial arguments (OPCA) being used to advance claims not recognized by law has received a great deal of attention in the past year.  From last year’s judgment of Associate Chief Justice Rooke in Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 [Meads], to the recent occupation of a Calgary apartment by a Freeman-of-the-land who claimed it as an “embassy”, OPCA litigants have disrupted the functioning of the legal system while attracting public attention and interest. In this column I argue that the defining indicia of OPCA are also present in the activities of some lawyers; specifically, in lawyers sending out demand letters based on spurious claims in the hope of extracting funds because of the fear and ignorance of those who receive them.  I will further argue that our failure to address that conduct undermines our moral authority to challenge OPCA litigants and, worse, may contribute to a cultural climate of skepticism about the law’s legitimacy and authority, which helps OPCA to flourish.

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