ABLawg

Cases Considered: Lutz v Lutz, 2012 ABQB 300; Lemoine v Smashnuk, 2008 ABQB 193

On a statutory application to terminate co-ownership under Part 3 of the Law of Property Act, RSA 2000, c L-7, can a court conclude that there was no co-ownership?

Lucas Lutz wanted to buy a house but did not qualify for a mortgage. Lucas’ brother, Eric, agreed to help. The deal was structured so that title to the house was transferred to Lucas Lutz and Eric Lutz as joint tenants. Two mortgages used in financing the purchase were granted by both Lucas and Eric; one was paid off but the other still secured an outstanding balance of approximately $90,000. Lucas made all of the subsequent mortgage payments. Lucas and Eric both lived in the house and paid utilities, but Eric moved out after 7 years, in 2006. Up until 2006, Eric also made payments to Lucas that Lucas characterized as rent and Eric characterized as contributions to the mortgage payments. There was no written agreement between Lucas and Eric.

Alberta Court of Appeal Addresses Constitutionality of Personal Information Protection Act

By Linda McKay-Panos

On June 5, 2012

In Constitutional, Labour/Employment, Property

PDF version: Alberta Court of Appeal Addresses Constitutionality of Personal Information Protection Act

Decision considered: Union Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v Alberta, 2012 ABCA 130

This is an appeal of a privacy case that was the subject of an earlier blog: See here. The employees of Palace Casino in West Edmonton Mall were on strike and both the United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 (“Union”), and the employer photographed and videotaped the picket line. People who crossed the picket line and those who walked in and out of the casino were also photographed or taped. The Union posted a sign stating: “by crossing the picket line you are providing your consent for your image to be posted at www.CasinoScabs.ca.” The employer’s Vice-President complained to the Privacy Commissioner that his photo was displayed on a poster at the picket site. Two other complainants who crossed the picket line said that they had been photographed or videotaped, although they never saw any images. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner’s (“OIPC”) Adjudicator accepted that it was a long-standing historical practice for Unions and employers to photograph and videotape at picket line sites.

Mandatory Minimums and Lawyers’ Ethics

By Alice Woolley

On May 31, 2012

In Criminal, Ethics and the Legal Profession

PDF version: Mandatory Minimums and Lawyers’ Ethics

Statute commented on: Safe Streets and Communities Act, Bill C-10, 60-61 Elizabeth II, Assented to March 13, 2012

Introduction

This week the New York Times had an article highlighting two recent federal court decisions criticizing the effect of mandatory minimums on criminal justice. One, a sentencing memorandum by a District Court judge in U.S.A. v Gurley, USDC, Mass., May 17, 2012, criticized the diminution of the role of the jury in the criminal trial that results from plea bargaining . The judge held that jury leniency must be taken into account in determining the range of minimum sentences to be applied, but noted that the increased place of plea bargaining in the American system had rendered the role of the jury functionally irrelevant, and the judge largely so. “Prosecutors run our federal criminal justice system today. Judges play a subordinate role – necessary yes, but subordinate nonetheless. Defense counsel take what they can get” (p. 50). The other, also a sentencing memorandum but this time from the District Court of New York, USA v Dossie, USDC, NY, March 30, 2012, was even harsher in its indictment. The accused in that case was a drug user who engaged in a minor way in the sale of drugs. As summarized by Judge Gleeson, “His sole function was to ferry money to the supplier and crack to the informant on four occasions for a total gain to himself of $140” (p. 8). Unfortunately, however, Dossie’s four transactions involved quantities of crack cocaine in excess of 28 grams. As a consequence, he fell within the mandatory minimum sentence for such offences of 5 years. The prosecutor sought that sentence, and Judge Gleeson had no choice but to impose it, even though in his view “It was not a just sentence” (p. 19). Judge Gleeson noted that this result was a product of a misapplication of the original intention of the mandatory minimum sentencing laws – in which quantities of drugs sold was intended to be a proxy for individuals who were managers or leaders in the drug trade – and of excessive prosecutor zeal.

University Campus is not Charter-Free

By Linda McKay-Panos

On May 28, 2012

In Constitutional

PDF version: University Campus is not Charter-Free

Case considered: R v Whatcott, 2012 ABQB 231

Yet another case has arisen that raises the issues of whether and when the Charter might apply on a university campus. William Whatcott (Whatcott), an anti-abortion and anti-gay activist, is not merely before the Supreme Court of Canada for a human rights matter involving anti-gay leaflets (see: Appeal heard on October 12, 2011); he has also engaged the Alberta courts and the University of Calgary. In 2005, Whatcott was prohibited from campus under the Alberta Trespass to Premises Act, RSA 2000, c T-7 (TPA). On July 25, 2008, Whatcott was arrested by campus security for trespassing, when he was posting anti-gay literature on campus. Calgary Police then charged Whatcott with an offence under the TPA. After a trial, the Provincial Court of Alberta decided that Whatcott’s Charter right to freedom of expression (under section 2(b)) had been violated. The Trial Judge (Judge Bascom) then stayed the proceedings (see 2011 ABPC 336). The Crown appealed that decision to the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench.

No (Soup) Practice For You!

By Alice Woolley

On May 22, 2012

In Access to Justice

PDF version: No (Soup) Practice For You!

Case considered: Lameman v Alberta, 2012 ABCA 59

Introduction

On March 1, 2012 the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of Justice Yamauchi dismissing the application of the Beaver Lake Cree Nation to have English lawyers appear on their behalf. In a blog on Justice Yamauchi’s decision, I suggested that the decision was legally sound but raised questions of public policy in relation to whether the practice of law should be so rigorously constrained. Specifically, I questioned whether “there [could] not be a more nuanced or careful approach to the provision of legal services, in which consumer and public interests are protected, but the availability of competent and helpful legal advice is not irrationally restricted.” (Unauthorized Practice and Access to Justice).

When is a registered joint tenancy not a joint tenancy and not even co-ownership?

Alberta Court of Appeal Addresses Constitutionality of Personal Information Protection Act

Mandatory Minimums and Lawyers’ Ethics

University Campus is not Charter-Free

No (Soup) Practice For You!