ABLawg

Cases Considered: Darren E. Lund v. Stephen Boissoin and the Concerned Christian Coalition Inc. (May 30, 2008 Lori G. Andreachuck, Q.C. Panel Chair)

PDF Version: Remedy Decision Released in the Lund v. Boissoin Case

In an earlier decision released on November 30, 2007, which dealt with a complaint about a hateful message against the gay community published in a letter to the editor of the Red Deer Advocate, online, the Alberta Human Rights Panel (“Panel”) found that Stephen Boissoin and The Concerned Christian Coalition Inc. had contravened s. 3 of the Alberta Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act (“HRCMA“), R.S.A. 2000, c. H-14. The Panel released its decision on the remedy on May 30, 2008. The original case, together with a few recent cases involving similar provisions in other provinces’ and the federal government’s human rights legislation, has spawned outcry across Canada about limiting the powers of human rights commissions or even doing away with commissions altogether. The remedy ordered in this case has also sparked renewed criticism of the HRCMA (see for example: “Keep Your Promise, Premier: Stand up for freedom of speech” Calgary Herald 06 June 2008 online).

Bill C-61 Locks Out User Rights

By Greg Hagen

On June 17, 2008

In Intellectual Property

Cases, Legislation and Proposed Legislation Considered: Bill C-61, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, WIPO Copyright Treaty; Performances and Phonograms Treaty; Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34 ; CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13.

PDF Version: Bill C-61 Locks Out User Rights

Bill C-61, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, tabled in the House of Commons by Alberta MP Jim Prentice on June 12^th, 2008, contains proposed amendments to the Copyright Act designed to allow Canada to implement and ratify the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“Internet Treaties”). The centerpiece of the Bill is s. 41, which generally prohibits the circumvention of technological measures; that is, apart from a few narrow exceptions, it prohibits the unlocking of digital locks on content such as software, digitized music, digitized books and other protected subject matter, even for the purpose of exercising user rights recognized in the Copyright Act, such as fair dealing, and for some rights explicitly recognized in Bill C-61 (e.g. for time shifting or device shifting). Bill C-61 goes further still, generally prohibiting unlocking services and dealing in keys to allow the unlocking of digital locks on content. Unfortunately, such provisions are at odds with the idea that owners’ rights in protected subject matter should be balanced with users’ rights in that subject matter.

The Legal Implications of Failing to Continue a Crown Oil and Gas Lease: The Duty of the Operator to its Joint Operators and to the Holder of a Royalty Interest

By Nigel Bankes

On June 16, 2008

In Natural Resources, Oil & Gas

Cases Considered: Adeco Exploration Company Ltd. v. Hunt Oil Company of Canada Inc. 2008 ABCA 214, varying unreported oral reasons for judgement of May 3, 2007.

PDF Version: The legal implications of failing to continue a Crown oil and gas lease: the duty of the operator to its joint operators and to the holder of a royalty interest

One of the most important events in the life of a Crown oil and gas lease or licence in Alberta is the point of continuation at the end of the primary term (a lease) or at the end of the intermediate term (a licence). It is important because a lease or licence lapses at the end of its primary or intermediate term except to the extent that it is continued (Mines and Minerals Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-17, s.82(1)). And when a lease lapses as to some or all of the leased area so too will any royalty interests with respect to that area of the lease.

Back on track to socio-ecological ruin: Kearl oil sands project re-authorized

By Shaun Fluker

On June 16, 2008

In Administrative Law, Environmental, Natural Resources

Cases Considered: Imperial Oil Resources Ventures Limited v. Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development et al, 2008 FC 598, Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 302,

PDF Version: Back on track to socio-ecological ruin: Kearl oil sands project re-authorized

My initial post on the Kearl project (see Just a Bump on the Road to Socio-Ecological Ruin) was accurate after all. Madame Justice Tremblay-Lamer’s decision in Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 302, that held the Kearl joint panel breached section 34 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, was simply a brief foray into environmental bliss. On June 6, 2008, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans re-issued the requisite authorization under the Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, to Imperial Oil, reportedly on identical terms and conditions as set out in the original authorization (see my previous post Federal Court upholds nullification of Kearl oil sands authorization for more discussion on the nullification of the initial authorization).

Money attracts procedural fairness: The case of the overbilling doctor

By Shaun Fluker

On June 13, 2008

In Administrative Law

Cases Considered: Searles v. Alberta (Health and Wellness), 2008 ABQB 307

PDF Version: Money attracts procedural fairness: The case of the overbilling doctor

Government compensation payable to physicians in Alberta is differentiated under the Alberta Health Care Insurance Plan based upon the type of service provided: in short, some service categories pay better than others for physicians. In 2002 Dr. Gordon Searles received notice from Alberta Health and Wellness that his billings to the Alberta Health Care Insurance Plan were being reviewed. This review led to a reassessment under section 18 of the Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-20, which provides the Minister of Health and Wellness with authority to reassess physicians’ billings on select grounds including where the Minister is of the opinion that “the total amount of benefits paid for service was, in the circumstances, greater compensation to the practitioner for that service than it should have been.” In this case, the Minister’s reassessment (via her delegate) required Dr. Searles to repay $985,777.09 having concluded upon review of his billings that he was overcompensated. The reassessment was based upon the Minister’s conclusion that between April 2000 and February 2004 Dr. Searles’ billing submissions were calculated on the provision of a service category with a higher billing rate than the actual service Dr. Searles had administered to his clients. Dr. Searles subsequently applied to the Court of Queen’s Bench to have the Minister’s reassessment quashed on judicial review for procedural unfairness.