Regulating Covid-19 From the Criminal Law Perspective

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The focus of this post is criminal law. This is a bold statement considering we are, with this COVID-19 crisis, currently deeply within the regulatory world. There is so much to unpack in the area of regulation and COVID-19 that to focus on one area is dissatisfying. There are, however, many of my colleagues both here in Alberta and across the country discussing various aspects of the regulatory “new normal”. Specifically, I suggest a look at ABlawg where there are a number of COVID-19 related posts from colleagues writing in their areas of expertise such as statutory interpretation and law-making, health, human rights, environmental and energy law. Many of these areas overlap with the criminal law perspective but I will try to keep this post anchored in more classical criminal law concerns. This will require a discussion of regulatory offences, specifically those arising in the time of COVID-19, which enforce a regulatory scheme through the criminal sanction. By using criminal law concepts to enforce the regulatory scheme, these regulatory offences are subject to those criminal law legal principles which describe, define and confine offences. In this discussion, I will look at the general precepts of regulatory offences, how this form of liability connects to traditional criminal law concepts and then apply our knowledge to a COVID-19 measure involving social or physical distancing. This application will be done through a survey of that measure across Canada to identify the ways in which we are responding in the context of regulation. This survey will provide the basis for some preliminary recommendations based on lessons learned through the review of these regulatory, and in some instances, non-regulatory measures. Continue reading →

The AER Must Consider the Honour of the Crown

By: Nigel Bankes

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Decision Commented On: Fort McKay First Nation v Prosper Petroleum Ltd, 2020 ABCA 163

In this important decision, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeal concluded that the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) has an obligation to take into account the honour of the Crown when deciding whether to recommend approval of a new oil sands project under s 10 of the Oil Sands Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c O-7 (OSCA). The AER had not done so in this case. Accordingly, the Court vacated the AER’s approval of Prosper’s Rigel project and referred the matter back to the AER. The decision is an important decision on the implications of the honour of the Crown in the context of a regulatory tribunal, but it is also an important decision on cumulative impacts and the limits that cumulative impacts may impose on the Crown’s power to take up lands under the numbered treaties. Previous posts on ABlawg have emphasized the importance of this point for the prairie provinces and other provinces with numbered treaties within their boundaries: see here, here, here and here. Continue reading →

What is Non-Adversarial Advocacy?

By: Deanne Sowter

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There is no provision in the Federation of Law Societies Model Code that specifically regulates non-adversarial advocacy. The Code has an Advocacy section (R 5.1) and it distinguishes advocacy in an adversarial process, but it does not have a corresponding section for advocacy in a non-adversarial process. There is no universal definition of non-adversarial advocacy. In 2016, I conducted empirical research on advocacy in the family law context, and drawing from that I argued that the Code needs to be updated to include non-adversarial advocacy. (See here.) In that study, I talked to collaborative lawyers and family lawyers who have a settlement-oriented practice. Those processes inform the type of advocacy expected and required. However, not all dispute resolution processes can be neatly packed into one category or the other, nor do all disputes involve sides that subscribe to the same approach to advocacy. In this post, I question whether it is the process that distinguishes adversarialness. Continue reading →

Governance and Accountability: Preconditions for Committing Public Funds to Orphan Wells and Facilities and Inactive Wells

By: Nigel Bankes, Shaun Fluker, Martin Olszynski and Drew Yewchuk

PDF Version: Governance and Accountability: Preconditions for Committing Public Funds to Orphan Wells and Facilities and Inactive Wells

Announcement commented on: Department of Finance Canada, Canada’s COVID-19 Economic Response Plan: New Support to Protect Canadian Jobs, April 17, 2020

As any resident of this province knows, the Alberta oil and gas sector’s problem of underfunded environmental liabilities has been growing for decades. On April 17, 2020, in response to the impact of both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Saudi/Russian price war, the federal government announced an injection of $1.7 billion of public funds to support the ‘clean up’ of inactive and orphan wells in Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. With respect to Alberta, $200 million will go to the Orphan Well Association as a loan to deal with orphan wells (i.e. wells that have no owner) while $1 billion will go to the Government of Alberta to deal with inactive wells (i.e. wells that are not producing but have not been properly closed and remediated).

The first part of this post examines the background to the Orphan Well Association and how it has moved from being an industry funded organization to the recipient of significant public funds. We suggest that this change in the source of funding is likely permanent and thus demands a complete rewrite of the governance structure for orphan wells in the interests of transparency and accountability. The second part of this post offers comments on the proposed program for inactive wells. This part of the post is shorter and more speculative because the announcement is remarkably vague and lacking in important details on this part of the program. Continue reading →

COVID-19 and the Exercise of Legislative Power by the Executive

By: Shaun Fluker

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Legislation Commented On: Regulations Act, RSA 2000, c R-14 and Public Health Orders issued in relation to COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has become a rare opportunity to study the widespread exercise of emergency lawmaking powers in Canada. Governments have enacted legal rules on matters such as social distancing, quarantine, economic controls, regulatory relief, employment standards, landlord-tenant, access to justice, and health care protocols. Commentators have warned that we must remain vigilant in ensuring these emergency measures do not offend the rule of law, and this message is likely to intensify as more emergency measures are used to either further the current shutdown or control our emergence from it; for example, in relation to surveillance and privacy rights as Joel Reardon, Emily Laidlaw, and Greg Hagen recently noted here. These substantive concerns are amplified by the fact that most COVID-19 emergency powers are being exercised by the executive branch of government and its delegates, using legislative power delegated to them in public health or emergency statutes. Because it is unlikely that legislatures envisioned such an extensive use of these powers for a prolonged time period, shortcomings and gaps in the lawmaking process are becoming apparent. Hallmarks such as organization, clarity, predictability, consistency, transparency, and justification – which, in normal times, provide the executive with much of its legitimacy to govern – have been impaired or are missing altogether in the exercise of legal power to contain COVID-19. This post examines how Alberta ministers and the Chief Medical Officer of Health have been exercising emergency powers so far during the pandemic, and makes some pointed observations on the hallmarks of legitimate governance and the role of the Regulations Act, RSA 2000, c R-14, in this regard. Continue reading →