Author: Jonnette Watson Hamilton Page 1 of 37

B.A. (Alta.), LL.B. (Dal.), LL.M. (Col.).
Professor Emerita.
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Legislation Commented On: Residential Tenancies Act, SA 2004, c R-17.1, Part 4

PDF Version: “Money for Nothing”: Landlords Take on Residential Tenants’ Security Deposits

Landlords must place their residential tenants’ security deposits in an interest-bearing trust account. When interest rates are low, landlords take for themselves all of the interest earned in these accounts. When interest rates are higher, landlords take at least the first three percent of the interest earned on their tenants’ money, delivering the rest to their tenants. In addition to benefiting from this “spread,” landlords’ duty to pay interest on security deposits to their tenants ends when tenants vacate the rental premises, but landlords can keep the security deposits for at least ten, if not thirty days. If landlords wrongfully withhold security deposits, they can keep both security deposits and the interest earned for weeks, months or even years of negotiation, law suits, judgment filings and service, and collections. This might seem like small change if your idea of a landlord is a couple renting out a basement suite in their home. However, landlords in Alberta these days tend to be Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS) and some of these REITS have thousands of residential tenants. If a REIT has 20,000 rental units in Alberta with an average of one $2,000 security deposit per unit, a REIT would have $40,000,000 of their tenant’s money earning the REIT at least 3% interest annually. That would be $1,200,000 per year. Money for nothing and all legal. The three percent spread and the interest-free holding after tenants vacate are enabled by Alberta’s Residential Tenancies Act, SA 2004, c R-17.1 (RTA) and its regulations. The refusal of the Residential Tenancies Dispute Resolution Service (RTDRS) to require landlords to pay interest on wrongfully withheld security deposits, or to otherwise compensate tenants, is not required, but it seems to be their policy.

Charter Sections 15 and 25: The Majority Judgment in Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation and its Application in the Federal Court

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On August 29, 2025

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Equality, Indigenous

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton, Robert Hamilton, and Jennifer Koshan

Cases Commented On: Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10 (CanLII); Houle v Swan River First Nation, 2025 FC 267 (CanLII); Donald-Potskin v Sawridge First Nation, 2025 FC 648 (CanLII); Cunningham v Sucker Creek First Nation 150A, 2025 FC 1174 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Charter Sections 15 and 25: The Majority Judgment in Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation and its Application in the Federal Court

This is the third in a series of four ABlawg posts on the Supreme Court of Canada’s complex decision in Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10 (CanLII). The first post examined the extent to which various factions of the Court referenced the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the second post analyzed their handling of whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applied in this context. In this post, we explore another issue on which there was serious disagreement amongst members of the Court. Having found that the Charter applied to the Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation’s (VGFN) residency requirement for Council elections, the majority (Justices Nicolas Kasirer and Mahmud Jamal, with Chief Justice Richard Wagner and Justice Suzanne Côté concurring) and dissenting justices (Justices Sheilah Martin and Michelle O’Bonsawin) ruled on how to approach the interplay between sections 15(1) and 25 of the Charter. We look at the majority judgment and three recent decisions applying the majority’s approach to section 25, also in cases involving First Nations elections: Houle v Swan River First Nation, 2025 FC 267 (CanLII) (Houle), Donald-Potskin v Sawridge First Nation, 2025 FC 648 (CanLII)) (Donald-Potskin), and Cunningham v Sucker Creek First Nation 150A, 2025 FC 1174 (CanLII). The fourth post in this series will focus on the dissenting judgment of Martin and O’Bonsawin JJ on the interplay between sections 15(1) and 25.

Thin Gruel: The Crisis Management Team Review

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On February 18, 2025

In Protest

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Jennifer Koshan

Document commented on: Crisis Management Team Review, University of Calgary – Response to Protest Encampment: Final Report (November 4, 2024)

PDF Version: Thin Gruel: The Crisis Management Team Review

On November 4, 2024, consulting firm MNP released their Crisis Management Team (CMT) Review (CMT Review) of the University of Calgary’s response to the May 9, 2024 pro-Palestine encampment on campus. On December 2^nd, the University’s Executive Leadership Team (ELT) added a few minor corrections to the review’s timeline and accepted all four recommendations in their Response to the CMT Review (ELT Response). On December 13^th, Mark Herman, the Chair of the University’s Board of Governors (BOG), indicated the BOG was satisfied “there are no more material facts that we need to gather, and … management exercised sound judgment in a difficult, no-win situation (Mark Herman, “Review of university response to protest encampment concludes”, UCalgary News (13 December 2024)). Whether that is the end of the matter remains to be seen as both the University’s Students’ Union and its General Faculties Council have demanded an independent review of the University’s response to the encampment. And whether the CMT Review’s thin gruel will satisfy the appetite for a substantive review seems doubtful for several reasons.

Shared Accommodation in Alberta: Law for Roommates and Those Sharing Living Space with Their Landlords

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On December 20, 2024

In Landlord/Tenant, Residential Tenancies Dispute Resolution Service

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

Case Commented On: Layeghpour v Paproski, 2024 ABCJ 140 (CanLII)

PDF Version: Shared Accommodation in Alberta: Law for Roommates and Those Sharing Living Space with Their Landlords

Shared accommodation has become increasingly common in Alberta for many reasons, including the unaffordability of both owned and rented housing. I discuss this phenomenon in Part One of this post. Shared accommodation includes roommates sharing a dwelling, individuals sharing living spaces with owner-occupiers of single-family homes, duplexes and condominiums, and – sometimes – multigenerational households. Sharing living space usually means sharing a kitchen, bathroom and/or living room. However, shared accommodation law is a grey area of the law – underdeveloped by Canadian courts, its existence is unknown to most people. Contrary to the expectations of many, Alberta’s Residential Tenancies Act, SA 2004, c R-17, does not apply to shared accommodation. That means the Residential Tenancy Dispute Resolution Service (RTDRS) is not available to resolve any disputes. The Innkeepers Act, RSA 2000, c I-2, does not apply either because “innkeeper” is defined to include only those who provide lodging to any person who presents themselves as a guest who appears to be able and willing to pay and “in a fit state to be received” (s 1(b)). It is the common law that applies to the relationship those sharing accommodation are found to have, whether that is a licence or a lease relationship. It is therefore best to prevent disputes with an agreement – preferably a signed, written agreement. The Centre for Public Legal Education Alberta has excellent resources for those planning or already in shared accommodations on their “Roommates and Shared Accommodation” website, which I describe in Part Two. In Part Three, I focus on my primary reason for writing this post, and that is the decision of Justice Sandra L. Corbett in Layeghpour v Paproski, 2024 ABCJ 140 (CanLII) in which she sets out much of the common law governing shared accommodations.

The University’s Kafkaesque Direction on Temporary Structures and Overnight Protests: “You are not supposed to see this.”

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On November 5, 2024

In Protest

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Shaun Fluker

Document Commented On: University Direction on Temporary Structures and Overnight Protests, 2024-UC-003-A, revised May 3, 2024

PDF Version: The University’s Kafkaesque Direction on Temporary Structures and Overnight Protests: “You are not supposed to see this.”

Questions about the authority exercised and the process followed by the University of Calgary when it acted on the “University Direction on Temporary Structures and Overnight Protests” (Direction) were raised in an earlier an ABlawg post on “Encampments on Campus Part 2.” As discussed in more detail in that earlier post, the Direction – identified as “2024-UC-003-A, Revised May 3, 2024” – was apparently sent to all U of C students by May 3 and handed out to pro-Palestinian protesters on campus on May 9, the same day the protesters set up their on-campus encampment and the Calgary Police Service (CPS) tore it down and forcibly removed those protesters. The Direction states that failure to follow the university’s Use of University Facilities for Non-Academic Purposes Policy (Facilities Policy) and the Direction “may constitute non-academic misconduct (students), cause for disciplinary action (staff), and/or grounds to be trespassed from the University of Calgary’s premises (all).”