LL.M. (Yale), LL.B. (Toronto), B.A. (Toronto)
Assistant Professor, University of Calgary, Faculty of Law
Member of the Alberta Bar
Professor Woolley joined the University of Calgary Faculty of Law on July 1, 2004. Prior to joining the Faculty she practiced law in Calgary, specializing in energy regulation, judicial review and civil litigation. In 1995-1996 Professor Woolley was a law clerk to the then Chief Justice of Canada, the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer. In 1994 Professor Woolley received both the Gold Medal and the Dean’s Key from the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto.
Professor Woolley’s research and teaching interests are in the areas of legal ethics, the legal profession, energy regulation and administrative law.
That a “lawyer must not represent opposing parties to a dispute” (Alberta Code of Professional Conduct, Ch. 6, Rule 1) may be the most obvious, best understood and least frequently violated rule on conflicts of interest. Sometimes lawyers have problems when a joint representation properly undertaken with consent, develops unanticipatedly into a dispute. One cannot readily imagine, however, circumstances in which a lawyer would file a statement of claim that seeks relief for a party, and from a party, both at the same time.
In R. v. B.P., 2010 ABQB 204, Madam Justice Strekaf denied intervenor status to the former lawyer for the appellant accused. The accused had entered a plea to a charge of possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose. He sought to have the plea set aside on the basis of ineffective assistance by his trial lawyer, Mr. McAviney. Mr. McAviney sought intervenor status in the appeal on the basis that the argument for ineffective assistance of counsel gave him a “direct interest in the outcome of the case” (B.P. at para. 8). He suggested that the “real lis” of the appeal was between Mr. McAviney and the accused, rather than between the accused and the Crown.
On March 31, 2010 the Alberta government issued a draft regulation pursuant to the Alberta Utilities Commission Act, S.A. 2007, c. A-37.2 (”AUCA”), the Disposition of Regulated Property Regulation (Draft) (”Draft Regulation”). The power to enact regulations is contained in s. 75 of the AUCA, which gives the Lieutenant-Governor in Council the power to make regulations “adding to, clarifying, limiting or restricting” any of the powers granted pursuant to the AUCA. In this case the Draft Regulation is stated expressly to operate as “an addition to” powers granted to the AUC under the Gas Utilities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. G-5 and the Public Utilities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-5. (Draft Regulation, s. 2(1)).
In its March 26, 2010 decision in R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the position of the Yukon Territory Court of Appeal that courts have no jurisdiction to prevent counsel from withdrawing from a scheduled criminal proceeding, even if the withdrawal is only for non-payment of fees (Cunningham v. Lilles, 2008 YKCA 7). The Supreme Court affirmed the position taken by most other provincial courts of appeal, that both superior and statutory courts may require that counsel apply for leave when seeking to withdraw from scheduled criminal proceedings, and that in exceptional circumstances the application to withdraw may be denied (See R. v. C (D.D.) (1996), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 323 (ABCA); R. v. Deschamps, 2003 MBCA 116); Bernier v. 9007-1474 Québec Inc., [2001] J.Q. No. 2631 (Que. CA); Mireau v. Canada (1995), 128 Sask. R. 142 (C.A.); R. v. Brundia, 2007 ONCA 725; Contra see Re Leask and Cronin (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 315 (BCSC)).
Those who follow sports know that some of the most fun you can have with your clothes on is debating the criteria for selecting the league MVP. Is it the best player, considered apart from the success (or ineptitude) of his team? Is it the player who contributed the most to the accomplishments of a successful team effort? Is it a particular type of contribution that matters - e.g., exceptional individual skill or above average skills combined with exceptional leadership? Or is it some more holistic determination, considering a variety of factors in a balance which is incapable of articulation beyond “I know it when I see it?”
Alberta courts have consistently held that misconduct by counsel in the course of litigation will not normally be the basis for liability to the opposing party in that litigation. While sometimes duties to opposing parties exist - as, for example, in the tort of malicious prosecution - the Alberta Court of Appeal in German v. Major (1985), 62 A.R. 2 (C.A.) made it clear that the duties of the lawyer to the court and to the public do not automatically translate into duties to opposing parties.
In its 2002 decision in Law Society of Alberta v. Krieger, 2002 SCC 65, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the ability of the Law Society of Alberta to regulate misconduct by Crown prosecutors. It held, however, that where the misconduct relates to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the Law Society’s jurisdiction is limited to circumstances where the prosecutor has acted in bad faith. The Court reiterated that, in general, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is entitled to deference, and may only be reviewed by the Court in circumstances of “flagrant impropriety” (Krieger, para. 49).
In its recent judgment in Miazga v. Kvello Estate, the Supreme Court has affirmed this highly deferential approach to prosecutorial discretion. The Court held that to establish liability for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must demonstrate a) that the defendant was responsible for the prosecution; b) that the legal proceedings ultimately resolved in favour of the plaintiff; c) that the defendant did not have reasonable and probable grounds for a prosecution, objectively speaking (that is, that the defendant’s professional judgment should have indicated that it was not possible that “proof beyond a reasonable doubt could be made out in a court of law” (para. 63); at this stage the prosecutor’s subjective belief in guilt is irrelevant); and, d) that the defendant acted for some improper purpose in bringing forward the prosecution - that the defendant “deliberately intended to subvert or abuse the office of the Attorney General or the process of Criminal Justice” (para 89).
Moose Mountain Buffalo Ranch and Greene Farms Drilling Ltd. entered into a contractual agreement pursuant to which Greene Farms undertook to service a deep water well and drill for water on lands owned by Moose Mountain. The lands are in Saskatchewan, and Greene Farms operates in Saskatchewan, but Greene Farms is extra-provincially registered in Alberta.
Last week the Federation of Law Societies issued the “Final Report” of its Task Force on the Canadian Common Law Degree. The Final Report is the third document issued by the Task Force, the first being an initial Consultation Paper in September 2008, the second being its Interim Report issued in March 2009.
On November 17, 2009 the Supreme Court of Canada will hear argument in R. v. Cunningham, an appeal of a judgment by the Yukon Territory Court of Appeal released June 25, 2008. If the Court upholds the YKCA decision in Cunningham it would change the law in many other Canadian provinces, including Alberta (R. v. D.D.C., (1996) 43 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), generally referred to as Ferguson), Saskatchewan (Mireau v. Canada et al., (1995) 128 Sask. R. 142 (C.A.)), Manitoba (R. v. M.B.D., 2003 MBCA 116) and Ontario (R. v. Chatwell, (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 32 (C.A.)).
