Year: 2009 Page 10 of 24

Case considered: V.A.H. v. Lynch, 2009 ABCA 221, overturning V.A.H. v. Lynch, 2008 ABQB

PDF version: When No Means Yes: Voluntary Withdrawal of Consent to Medical Treatment

The V.A.H. case draws attention to the challenge of determining what actions on the part of a patient constitute withdrawal of consent to medical treatment, specifically in situations where the patient is receiving psychiatric treatment. In Alberta, patients can be admitted to psychiatric facilities on either a voluntary or involuntary basis. Voluntary patients are considered to have the capacity to consent to treatment and are able to discharge themselves against medical advice. Involuntary patients are admitted under the Mental Health Act (MHA), R.S.A. 1980, c. M-13 and the issue of consent is more complex. This post deals only with voluntary patients.

The fat lady is singing: ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Utilities Commission)

By Alice Woolley

On July 15, 2009

In Administrative Law, Energy

Case considered: ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2009 ABCA 246

PDF version: The fat lady is singing: ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Utilities Commission)

The ongoing saga of the Alberta Utilities Commission’s treatment of the removal of utility assets from rate base continues.

In 2007 ATCO filed a general rate application with the then Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (“EUB”) for approval of rates for the 2008 and 2009 test years. It advised the EUB that it was excluding the “Salt Cavern” assets from its applied-for rate base. Its justification for doing so was that while those assets had historically been included, they were no longer being used for transmission service, and would not be used in the foreseeable future. The Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC) advised ATCO that ATCO could not exclude the assets from the application absent an application by ATCO (and AUC approval) under s. 26 of the Gas Utilities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. G-5. Section 26 requires a gas utility to obtain permission prior to the sale, lease, mortgage, disposal or encumbrance of property. ATCO argued that since it was not selling the property or otherwise disposing of it, but was simply moving it out of rate base, approval under s. 26 should not be required. The AUC took the position that a unilateral withdrawal from rate base was equivalent to a disposition. ATCO appealed that decision to the Court of Appeal.

Another Take on Equality Rights by the Court of Appeal

By Jennifer Koshan

On July 13, 2009

In Aboriginal, Constitutional

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: Another Take on Equality Rights by the Court of Appeal

Case Commented On: Cunningham v Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2009 ABCA 239

In my recent post on Morrow v Zhang, 2009 ABCA 215, Some Questions about the Decision to Reinstate the Cap on Damages for Soft Tissue Injuries, I noted that this case was the first opportunity for the Court of Appeal to apply section 15 of the Charter (the equality rights provision) since the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41. Only a couple of weeks later, a differently constituted Court of Appeal panel decided another section 15 case, and the analysis and outcome of the two cases are quite different. While I have a few quibbles with the Court’s decision in Cunningham v Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), I believe it is a much better example of how section 15 of the Charter should be applied than is Morrow v Zhang.

More Questions about the Decision to Reinstate the Cap on Damages for Soft Tissue Injuries

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On July 8, 2009

In Constitutional, Insurance Law

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: More Questions about the Decision to Reinstate the Cap on Damages for Soft Tissue Injuries

Case Commented On: Morrow v Zhang, 2009 ABCA 215, overturning 2008 ABQB 98

In her post critiquing the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in Morrow v Zhang, Some Questions about the Decision to Reinstate the Cap on Damages for Soft Tissue Injuries, Professor Jennifer Koshan asks, “Did the Court actually apply the new approach to section 15 of the Charter?” I would like to focus on that question and raise a few additional and related matters. I agree with Professor Koshan that the Court of Appeal seems to apply the old test from Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 in its section 15(1) analysis in Morrow v Zhang. However, they do so without a focus on human dignity, which seems to result in the application of the Law test in a very formalistic way, rather than substantively. Does it matter? I think that the use of the original Law test, complete with a focus on human dignity, could have rather easily resulted in an affirmation of the trial judge’s decision. Alternatively, and perhaps more importantly, I think that an application of the test in R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, could also have resulted in an affirmation of the trial judge’s decision had that application really focused on stereotyping.

Court of Appeal Agrees that Severing a Joint Tenancy Requires More than Intention

By Nickie Nikolaou

On July 6, 2009

In Property, Wills and Estates

Case considered: Felske Estate v. Donszelmann, 2009 ABCA 209

PDF version: Court of Appeal Agrees that Severing a Joint Tenancy Requires More than Intention

In a previous post, I concluded that the Court of Queen’s Bench correctly dismissed an application brought by a neighbor of Mrs. Felske for a declaration that he was entitled to half of her farm upon her death. The Court of Appeal has agreed and has dismissed the neighbor’s appeal.