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Author: Alice Woolley Page 1 of 20

LL.M. (Yale), LL.B. (Toronto), B.A. (Toronto).
Professor. Member of the Alberta Bar.
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Protecting the Public Interest: Law Society Decision-Making After Trinity Western University

By: Alice Woolley and Amy Salyzyn

PDF Version: Protecting the Public Interest: Law Society Decision-Making After Trinity Western University

Cases Commented On: Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 (CanLII); Trinity Western University v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33 (CanLII).

Introduction

Canadian law societies strive to regulate lawyers and legal services in the public interest. Courts emphasize the law societies’ broad discretion to determine what the public interest requires in governing the profession and, accordingly, defer to the law societies’ exercise of that discretion (See Malcolm Mercer’s analysis of this on slaw.ca).

Courts defer to law societies because they accept the underlying rationale for law societies’ power and responsibility. Courts recognize the importance of the independence of the bar, and view self-regulation (of lawyers by lawyers) as an appropriate mechanism for ensuring that independence (This view is problematic but widely accepted – see, e.g., Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University 2018 SCC 32 (“LSBC v TWU”) at para. 37).  Courts view serving the public interest as something law societies must pursue in exchange for the privilege of self-regulation  (LSBC v TWU at para 32) but simultaneously identify self-regulation as likely to ensure protection of the public interest given law societies’ “particular expertise and sensitivity to the conditions of practice” (LSBC v TWU at para. 37).  Briefly (albeit circularly), courts assert that they defer to law societies because independence of the bar requires self-regulation; self-regulation requires law societies to act in the public interest; and self-regulation effectively protects the public interest because of law societies’ institutional expertise.

This blog post raises questions about whether current law society policy-making structures can effectively consider and advance the public interest. In particular, and in light of the saga of Canadian law societies’ consideration of TWU’s attempt to open a law school, it considers whether law societies can fulfill their mandate to regulate in the public interest when benchers make policy decisions in hard cases.

Regulating Lawyer-Client Sex

By: Alice Woolley

PDF Version: Regulating Lawyer-Client Sex

In Canada we allow lawyers to have sex with their clients.  Or, to be precise: we do not prohibit lawyers from having sex with their clients.

Canadian law societies do regulate lawyer-client sex in a limited way.  Almost all law societies prohibit sexual harassment. And most law societies also identify lawyer-client sex as potentially creating conflicts of interest.  They identify sexual relationships with clients as the sort of thing that may “conflict with the lawyer’s duty to provide objective, disinterested professional advice to the client” and which may “permit exploitation of the client” (FLS Model Code Rule 3.4-1, Commentary 11(d), adopted in BC, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, PEI and the territories).  Ontario has not adopted the FLS Commentary.  The Commentary in Ontario says instead “the judgment of a lawyer who has a close personal relationship, sexual or otherwise, with a client who is in a family law dispute is likely to be compromised” (Rule 3.4-1, Commentary 4).  Alberta has also not adopted the FLS Commentary.  Alberta’s Code does not reference sexual relationships anywhere in its conflicts rules.  Indeed, apart from its harassment rules, Alberta’s Code does not mention sex at all.

Law Schools’ Dirty Little Secret

By: Alice Woolley

PDF Version: Law Schools’ Dirty Little Secret

Left-leaning social justice warriors have captured Canadian law schools. So goes recent commentary in the National Post (see, e.g. recent columns by Barbara Kay, Bruce Pardy and Christie Blatchford). Law profs “espouse and impose a particular set of values or opinions and a way of thinking” (Blatchford, emphasis added).

An Ethical Jury? Reflections on the Acquittal of Gerald Stanley for the Murder/Manslaughter of Colten Boushie

By: Alice Woolley

PDF Version: An Ethical Jury? Reflections on the Acquittal of Gerald Stanley for the Murder/Manslaughter of Colten Boushie

We understand the ethical duties of lawyers and judges in a criminal trial – what they ought to do, what their office requires of them. Sure, we argue about the details (e.g., me on prosecutors), but in general we know what defence lawyers, prosecutors and judges ought to do. Yet as shown by Gerald Stanley’s acquittal by a jury on charges of murder and manslaughter after his admitted killing of Colten Boushie, lawyers and judges are not the only people relevant to the functioning of a criminal trial. Juries also hear evidence and decide outcomes.

The Morality of #metoo

By: Alice Woolley

PDF Version: The Morality of #metoo

The forced resignation of Patrick Brown as leader of the Ontario Conservatives raises concerns of fairness and due process – for him and for the women accusing him. Christie Blatchford has castigated the party and other public officials for abandoning the “presumption of innocence”, and has highlighted the wrong of ruining a man’s reputation based on anonymous allegations. Others agree. Conversely, the Prime Minister reportedly said that women who made allegations of misconduct “must be believed” and Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne has said “I believe victims when they come forward”.

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