Author: Jonnette Watson Hamilton Page 34 of 43

B.A. (Alta.), LL.B. (Dal.), LL.M. (Col.).
Professor Emerita.
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Case considered: Polis v. Edwards, 2009 ABQB 520

PDF version: A Custodian of a lawyer’s practice is like a . . . [what?]

There are very few written decisions on the powers, rights and duties of custodians appointed by the Court of Queen’s Bench at the request of the Law Society of Alberta (LSA) pursuant to the Legal Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L 8, section 95. Unfortunately, this decision does not add to that small body of precedents. Although the question of whether a custodian is entitled to tax the accounts of the member of the LSA whose legal business they were appointed to manage or wind up was squarely before the court, Madam Justice Jo’Anne Strekaf declined to answer the question, deciding it instead on a more factual basis. This is to be regretted, not only because there is so little law in the area, but also because, in answering these types of questions, the courts have tended to rely on interesting analogies with others in roles that require them to stand in the shoes of another person and because the answer to the question about taxation seems like an easy one.

Not Your Usual Self-Represented Litigant?

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On September 7, 2009

In Civil Procedure

Case considered: Conway v. Zinkhofer, 2009 ABQB 417

PDF version: Not Your Usual Self-Represented Litigant?

The perception within the justice system is that self-represented litigants have below average literacy and comprehension levels: see the Alberta Self-Represented Litigants Mapping Project, Final Report, January 12, 2007 at 10. However, according to recent research, members of any social group may become self-represented litigants and between 60 and 65% had at least some post secondary education. One group of self-represented litigants is the group who could access representation but prefer to self-represent (Final Report at 15). Although a small percentage of the self-represented litigants (5% or less), the group includes those often referred to as “vexatious litigants” and judges report that this group of self-represented litigants are particularly time consuming and difficult to deal with (Final Report at 16). This appears to be an apt summary of the male respondent in this case, Fred Zinkhofer.

Controlling Entry into the Marketplace in Order to Exercise of Freedom of Religion

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On August 17, 2009

In Constitutional

Cases Considered: Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37

PDF Version: Controlling Entry into the Marketplace in Order to Exercise of Freedom of Religion

In “Minority-Majority Relations and Economic Interdependence” (1960) 27(4) Phylon 367, Calvin Redekop and John A. Hostetler predicted that the Hutterian Brethren would survive because they controlled their entry into the marketplace. In this post I will briefly describe the nature of the religious beliefs of the Hutterian Brethren, but only to the extent necessary to understand the impact the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony might have. Next, I will set out the arguments of Redekop and Hostetler and then I will use their points to explain how the Supreme Court’s decision takes away this control from the more conservative colonies within the Hutterian Brethren Church and thus jeopardizes the sect’s survival.

Umpires: Qualifications, etc.

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On August 12, 2009

In Dispute Resolution, Insurance Law

Cases Considered: Matti v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2009 ABQB 451

PDF version: Umpires: Qualifications, etc.

This is a post about insurance, not baseball. Umpires decide certain types of financial disputes between property owners and insurance companies in particular circumstances. Insurance claims involve umpires when the insured and insurer disagree about the value of damaged or destroyed property or the amount of the insured’s loss. The insured and the insurer each appoint an appraiser and the appraisers appoint an umpire. If the appraisers cannot agree on how to resolve the dispute, then the two appraisers submit their arguments to the umpire. The decision of two of those three persons decides the matter, which means, in effect, that the umpire decides. If the appraisers cannot agree on an umpire, then the insured or insurer can ask the court to appoint one. What qualifications should these decision-makers have? That question has not been the subject of much judicial consideration in Canada and so this decision by Mr. Justice W.P. Sullivan is a welcome one. But it still leaves open many other questions about insurance appraisals; they are a rather ill-defined process.

More Questions about the Decision to Reinstate the Cap on Damages for Soft Tissue Injuries

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On July 8, 2009

In Constitutional, Insurance Law

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: More Questions about the Decision to Reinstate the Cap on Damages for Soft Tissue Injuries

Case Commented On: Morrow v Zhang, 2009 ABCA 215, overturning 2008 ABQB 98

In her post critiquing the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in Morrow v Zhang, Some Questions about the Decision to Reinstate the Cap on Damages for Soft Tissue Injuries, Professor Jennifer Koshan asks, “Did the Court actually apply the new approach to section 15 of the Charter?” I would like to focus on that question and raise a few additional and related matters. I agree with Professor Koshan that the Court of Appeal seems to apply the old test from Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 in its section 15(1) analysis in Morrow v Zhang. However, they do so without a focus on human dignity, which seems to result in the application of the Law test in a very formalistic way, rather than substantively. Does it matter? I think that the use of the original Law test, complete with a focus on human dignity, could have rather easily resulted in an affirmation of the trial judge’s decision. Alternatively, and perhaps more importantly, I think that an application of the test in R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, could also have resulted in an affirmation of the trial judge’s decision had that application really focused on stereotyping.