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Author: Lisa Silver Page 3 of 9

Lisa Silver is a proud Calgarian, lawyer, educator, and avid blogger. She holds a B.A. in Economics (UWO, 1984), LL.B. (Osgoode, 1987), and LL.M. (Calgary, 2001). She is a member of the Bars of Ontario (1989) and Alberta (1998). As a criminal lawyer, Lisa has appeared before all levels of Court, including the Supreme Court of Canada. Presently, she is an Assistant Professor at the University of Calgary, Faculty of Law, where she teaches criminal law, evidence and advocacy. Lisa also maintains her own law blog at www.ideablawg.ca where she does a podcast series on the Criminal Code. Her blog was recognized with a 2017 Clawbie – Canadian Law Blog Award in the Law Professor/Law School category. Lisa also sits on various Boards and committees. She has presented at many conferences and workshops.

Adding Zora to the 1L Crime Syllabus

By: Lisa Silver

 PDF Version: Adding Zora to the 1L Crime Syllabus

Case Commented On: R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 (CanLII)

It is never too soon to start thinking about the fall semester – in fact, I keep a running list of changes to make to my syllabus throughout the year. But this year, it seems that the newest Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 (CanLII), is going to be added to my syllabus in more places than one. Zora is a rare decision in which the Court does much with so little. I do not say this flippantly but seriously. On the surface, the issue of whether the offence of failure to comply with a release order under section 145(3) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, requires objective or subjective mens rea seems trite. In fact, any 1L student might be asked to do such an analysis on a law school exam. Yet, Zora soars as Justice Sheilah Martin expertly analyzes the issue holistically, humanely and firmly anchored in the Charter. In doing so, Justice Martin, on behalf of the entire Court, is weaving together a narrative based on the histories of all those accused who have carried their bail conditions like dead weight, from the moment of arrest and right up to the courtroom doors. In this post, I will share 5 reasons why I am adding Zora to my 1L Crime syllabus.

Extraditing the Individual in the Meng Wanzhou Decision

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Extraditing the Individual in the Meng Wanzhou Decision

Case Commented On: United States v Meng, 2020 BCSC 785 (CanLII)

The arrest and extradition of Meng Wanzhou is extraordinary. The case has attracted global interest and has highlighted the fragility of our diplomatic networks. It has the workings of a suspense novel with its political intrigue, double-entendres and power struggles. It brings into question our global alliances and lays bare our international aspirations. But this is not a le Carré novel nor is it a strategic game of Risk. The case, at its heart, is not dissimilar to most extradition hearings in Canada. In all such cases, the stakes are high, international relations are engaged, and the rule of law is tested in both the surrendering state and the requesting one. Moreover, in all extradition cases there is an individual, a person who must either stay or go. To keep extradition at the level of the individual is hard, but it is critical to do so for both legal reasons and human ones.

This post keeps that individual, Meng Wanzhou, in mind. For it is Meng Wanzhou who faces serious criminal charges and for whom this extradition decision will have direct and serious consequences. That is why I am looking for the individual in this recent extradition decision rendered by Associate Chief Justice Heather Holmes on the “double criminality” requirement, in which a person is extradited only when the conduct amounting to the criminal offence in the requesting state is also conduct amounting to a criminal offence in Canada. I am doing so because people matter, and because the law requires it.

Regulating Covid-19 From the Criminal Law Perspective

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Regulating Covid-19 From the Criminal Law Perspective

The focus of this post is criminal law. This is a bold statement considering we are, with this COVID-19 crisis, currently deeply within the regulatory world. There is so much to unpack in the area of regulation and COVID-19 that to focus on one area is dissatisfying. There are, however, many of my colleagues both here in Alberta and across the country discussing various aspects of the regulatory “new normal”. Specifically, I suggest a look at ABlawg where there are a number of COVID-19 related posts from colleagues writing in their areas of expertise such as statutory interpretation and law-making, health, human rights, environmental and energy law. Many of these areas overlap with the criminal law perspective but I will try to keep this post anchored in more classical criminal law concerns. This will require a discussion of regulatory offences, specifically those arising in the time of COVID-19, which enforce a regulatory scheme through the criminal sanction. By using criminal law concepts to enforce the regulatory scheme, these regulatory offences are subject to those criminal law legal principles which describe, define and confine offences. In this discussion, I will look at the general precepts of regulatory offences, how this form of liability connects to traditional criminal law concepts and then apply our knowledge to a COVID-19 measure involving social or physical distancing. This application will be done through a survey of that measure across Canada to identify the ways in which we are responding in the context of regulation. This survey will provide the basis for some preliminary recommendations based on lessons learned through the review of these regulatory, and in some instances, non-regulatory measures.

Being in the Moment: An Analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in R v Chung

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Being in the Moment: An Analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in R v Chung

Case Commented On: R v Chung, 2020 SCC 8 (Can LII)

Mindfulness, according to Jon Kabat-Zinn, the founder of MBSR (mindfulness-based stress reduction), is “the psychological process of bringing one’s attention to the internal and external experiences occurring in the present moment, which can be developed through the practice of meditation and other training.” Leaving aside how one can develop mindfulness, this concept of being “in the moment” has received much attention of late. Mindfulness is everywhere. It focuses on how we can bring more awareness to those reflexive and automatic activities we do throughout the day. This emotional and physical awareness allows us to better control the reactions we have to the stressors of life. Mindfulness also has a place in the legal world as seen in the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v Chung, 2020 SCC 8 (Can LII). In that case, the Court, in essence, applies the process of mindfulness to the two issues under consideration; whether the Crown appeal against an acquittal raises a question of law and if so, whether the trial judge erred in applying the incorrect legal test required in assessing the objective mens rea of dangerous driving.

Does the Criminal Law Have the Capacity to Respond to the Intoxicated Automaton?

By: Lisa Silver

PDF Version: Does the Criminal Law Have the Capacity to Respond to the Intoxicated Automaton?

Case Commented On: R v Brown, 220 ABQB 166

I am at the point in my 1L criminal law class where we start talking about capacity issues, namely whether a person by virtue of mental disorder, automatism and/or intoxication has the capacity to commit a criminal offence. This is a complex and controversial area of the law. In discussing these issues, we criss-cross across the lines between legal, medical and policy concerns. We wade through case law stretching back decades that sometimes fundamentally change the common law and at other times hold strictly to it. Although each capacity issue involves detailed legal tests, when these issues arise together, the legal directions become overly complex and downright confusing. This “perfect storm” of capacity issues arise in the recent decision of R v Brown, 220 ABQB 166, challenging our legal conception of capacity and leaving us wondering whether the criminal law has the capacity to adequately respond.

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