Author Archives: Nigel Bankes

About Nigel Bankes

Nigel Bankes is emeritus professor of law at the University of Calgary. Prior to his retirement in June 2021 Nigel held the chair in natural resources law in the Faculty of Law.

Off-Grid Energy for Bitcoin Mines in Alberta: A Problematic Legal Regime

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Off-Grid Energy for Bitcoin Mines in Alberta: A Problematic Legal Regime

Decision Commented On: Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC), Decision 26379-D02-2021, Allegations against Link Global Technologies Inc., Phase 1, August 19, 2021

I don’t know much about Bitcoin operations, but I do know that they need a lot of power to run large computers, and it therefore makes sense for them to locate near cheap sources of power. Over the last several months, there have been a number of stories about Bitcoin operators checking out Alberta locations. For example, Collin Gallant published a nice piece in the Medicine Hat News in April 2021. But this last week (August 25, 2021) the CBC ran with a more detailed story about one of the Bitcoin operators mentioned in Gallant’s piece (Link Global Technologies Inc.) that had co-located close to a shut in gas well to take advantage of cheap fuel to power their gas turbine generators. Continue reading →

A Change of Status and a Request

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: A Change of Status and a Request

With the permission of the editorial leaders of ABlawg, I am using this platform to announce my retirement from the Faculty of Law at the University of Calgary effective June 30, 2021. It seems particularly fitting to borrow ABlawg for this purpose given the number of times I have used it to communicate with the profession and the broader community about law and policy developments here in Alberta – and beyond. And I hope to continue to do so after retirement, if perhaps not as frequently as in the past. Continue reading →

Renewed Interest in Potential Carbon Capture and Storage Projects in Alberta

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Renewed Interest in Potential Carbon Capture and Storage Projects in Alberta

Matter Commented On: Alberta Energy, Information Letter 2021-19, Carbon Sequestration Tenure Management, May 12, 2021

In a recent Information Letter, Alberta’s Department of Energy noted that it “has received a very large number of inquiries related to carbon sequestration tenure (i.e. projects that will undertake dedicated geologic storage [of carbon dioxide captured at industrial facilities within the province], without associated oil or gas recovery)” (at 1). This renewed interest is consistent with developments in the rest of the world, spurred on by the growing commitment to reach net zero carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions by 2050. See, for example, International Energy Agency, Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector (2021). Continue reading →

The Curious Demise of Alberta’s Turn Off the Taps Legislation

By: Nigel Bankes, Andrew Leach and Martin Olszynski

PDF Version: The Curious Demise of Alberta’s Turn Off the Taps Legislation

Matters Commented On: Alberta (Attorney General) v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 84 (CanLII) reversing British Columbia (Attorney General) v Alberta (Attorney General), 2019 FC 1195 (CanLII), and Preserving Canada’s Economic Prosperity Act, SA 2018, c P-21.5

The Turn Off the Taps legislation ((or, more properly, Preserving Canada’s Economic Prosperity Act, SA 2018, c P-21.5) (PCEPA)) was passed under the Notley government in 2018. There have always been serious doubts as to the constitutional validity of the legislation (for discussion of the principal objections to the legislation, see ABlawg here) and it is hardly surprising that the Attorney General of British Columbia (AGBC) commenced actions first in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench and later in the Federal Court seeking to test the validity of the Act. As described by a majority of the Federal Court of Appeal in Alberta (Attorney General) v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 84 (CanLII) [Turn off the Taps IV], the AGBC had two main arguments. The first was that PCEPA is inconsistent with s 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3; the second was that the PCEPA is a law in relation to interprovincial trade that falls outside the protection offered by s 92A(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the so-called ‘resource amendment’ to the Constitution. In particular, the AGBC noted that s 92A only protects laws pertaining to “primary production” as defined in the Sixth Schedule, and yet the PCEPA purported to apply to refined fuels which fell outside that definition. The Sixth Schedule provides as follows: Continue reading →

Important AUC Decision on the Treatment of Customer Contributions: Getting the Price Signals Right

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Important AUC Decision on the Treatment of Customer Contributions: Getting the Price Signals Right

Decision Commented On: AUC Decision 26061-D01-2021, Commission-Directed Examination of Distribution Facility Owner Payments under the Independent System Operator Tariff Customer Contribution Policy (23 April, 2021)

This decision has a long and complicated history arising most immediately out of Decision 22942-D02-2019 dealing with the Alberta Electric System Operator’s (AESO) 2018 tariff (for ABlawg comment on some aspects of that decision see here) as well as the AUC’s subsequent variance decision: Decision 24932-D01-2020.

This decision by the Alberta Utilities Commission (the Commission or the AUC) grapples with what are known in utility parlance as contributions in aid of construction (CIAC). Here is a straightforward example of a CIAC. Suppose that you live on an ordinary city block where the costs to tie in your house for utility service will be approximately the same for your house as would be for any other house on the block. You would not expect to pay extra to be tied in, and that this cost would simply be part of the utility’s general rate base. But suppose that you live on an acreage and some distance from the main distribution lines (gas, electricity, or water). In that case, it is entirely possible that you may be asked for a CIAC representing the actual incremental cost of the tie-in (or perhaps that amount above the cost of a standard tie-in). This is fair to other utility customers since your tie-in costs are more than the average and might not make economic sense to the utility, and it avoids inappropriate cross- subsidization. Since you have covered the capital costs of the tie-in, these costs do not form part of the utility’s rate base on which it is entitled to earn a return even if the utility owns that tie-in. Continue reading →