Author: Robert Hamilton Page 2 of 3

BA (St. Thomas University), JD (University of New Brunswick); LLM (York University); PhD (University of Victoria). Associate Professor.

The IAA Reference: A Missed Opportunity for Guidance on Important Issues Pertaining to Indigenous Peoples

By Robert Hamilton

On October 25, 2023

In Aboriginal, Indigenous, International Law, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Robert Hamilton

Case Commented on: Reference re Impact Assessment Act, 2023 SCC 23 (CanLII)

PDF Version: The IAA Reference: A Missed Opportunity for Guidance on Important Issues Pertaining to Indigenous Peoples

In the Reference re Impact Assessment Act, 2023 SCC 23 (CanLII) (IAA Ref), the Supreme Court of Canada considered the constitutionality of the federal environmental impact assessment regime. For analysis of what precise aspects of the Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c 28, s 1 (IAA) the majority found unconstitutional (and which it held were unproblematic), see the post by my colleagues Martin Olszynski, Nigel Bankes, and David V. Wright here.

Is the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families Constitutional?

By Robert Hamilton

On April 28, 2022

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Indigenous

By: Robert Hamilton

PDF Version: Is the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families Constitutional?

Case Commented On: Reference to the Court of Appeal of Quebec in relation with the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 2022 QCCA 185 (CanLII) [quotations from the unofficial English translation]

Legislation Commented On: Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, SC 2019, c 24

The Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, SC 2019, c 24, [the Act] received royal assent on June 21, 2019, and came into force on January 1, 2020. The Act was developed over two years and through wide-ranging consultations. It is designed to gradually transfer control of child and family services to Indigenous nations and, through this, to ensure that fewer Indigenous children are removed from their families and communities. The intention is to mitigate the effects of the assimilationist policies that have been incredibly harmful to Indigenous children, families, and communities. The Act seeks to accomplish this by establishing national standards for the provision of child and family services and by providing a mechanism through which Indigenous laws – that is, the laws of Indigenous nations themselves – can take priority over inconsistent federal and provincial laws and govern the delivery of child and family services to Indigenous peoples (Reference to the Court of Appeal of Quebec in relation with the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 2022 QCCA 185 (CanLII), paras 4-5 [Reference]). Although it has faced thoughtful and considered criticism, it is clear the Act seeks to substantially change how child and family services are provided and to transition the governance and regulation of those services to Indigenous peoples.

Yahey v British Columbia and the Clarification of the Standard for a Treaty Infringement

By Robert Hamilton

On September 24, 2021

In Aboriginal, Treaty Rights

By: Robert Hamilton & Nick Ettinger

PDF Version: Yahey v British Columbia and the Clarification of the Standard for a Treaty Infringement

Case Commented On: Yahey v British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 1287 (CanLII)

On June 29, 2021, the Supreme Court of British Columbia ruled that the Crown had infringed Treaty 8 by “permitting the cumulative impacts of industrial development to meaningfully diminish [Blueberry River First Nation’s (Blueberry)] exercise of its treaty rights” (Yahey v British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 1287 (CanLII) at para 1884 [Yahey]). This is the first time a court has held that the cumulative effects of multiple projects may form the basis of a treaty infringement. The trial judge’s nuanced articulation of the standard for what constitutes a treaty infringement enabled this groundbreaking development (see paras 445-547). We reviewed the factual and legal findings of the decision in a previous post. This post unpacks the doctrinal aspects of treaty infringement in more detail to contextualize Justice Emily Burke’s navigation of infringement case law and formulation of the “significantly or meaningfully diminished” standard in Yahey (at para 541). While some pundits have interpreted Yahey to be a dramatic lowering of the standard for an infringement, we believe the decision is an insightful clarification and faithful application of Supreme Court precedent.

Blueberry River First Nation and the Piecemeal Infringement of Treaty 8

By Robert Hamilton

On July 20, 2021

In Aboriginal, Treaty Rights

By: Robert Hamilton & Nick Ettinger

PDF Version: Blueberry River First Nation and the Piecemeal Infringement of Treaty 8

Case Commented On: Yahey v British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 1287 (CanLII)

In a highly anticipated decision, the Supreme Court of British Columbia ruled on June 29, 2021 that the Province of British Columbia (BC) unjustifiably infringed the Treaty 8 rights of Blueberry River First Nation (Blueberry) by “permitting the cumulative impacts of industrial development to meaningfully diminish Blueberry’s exercise of its treaty rights” (Yahey v British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 1287 (CanLII) at para 1884 [Yahey]). The Court ordered the Province to consult and negotiate with Blueberry to establish regulatory mechanisms to manage and address the cumulative impacts of industrial development on Blueberry’s treaty rights. If a satisfactory solution is not reached within 6 months, the Province will be prohibited from permitting further industrial activity in Blueberry’s traditional territory (Yahey, para 1894), which overlies the vast natural gas and liquids resource of the Montney Formation in northeast BC. The Montney reserves form the anchor for LNG Canada’s $40 billion liquefied natural gas processing and export facility under construction at Kitimat, BC, which will be serviced by the Coastal GasLink Pipeline, as well as the planned Woodfibre LNG export terminal on the Howe Sound fjord near Squamish, BC.

The Standard of Review and the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Indigenous Peoples: What is the Impact of Vavilov? Part 2

By Robert Hamilton

On November 24, 2020

In Aboriginal, Administrative Law

By: Howard Kislowicz and Robert Hamilton

PDF Version: The Standard of Review and the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Indigenous Peoples: What is the Impact of Vavilov? Part 2

Case Commented On: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII)

In our last post, we laid out some background on how the standard of review applies in cases involving the Crown’s constitutional duty to consult and accommodate (DTCA) Indigenous peoples. We argued that the changes brought by Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII) with respect to statutory appeals – where a statute provides that a government decision may be appealed to a court – might allow legislatures to insulate the decisions of the executive by subjecting them to a “palpable and overriding error” standard of review rather than a reasonableness standard. In this post, we look at the other, more common kind of case that arises in administrative law: judicial scrutiny of government decisions through an application for judicial review. Here, the standard of review analysis differs.

In applications for judicial review, Vavilov establishes a general presumption that the standard of review for an administrative decision will be reasonableness (at paras 23–32). However, it also carves out some exceptions to this presumption, in which the standard of review will be correctness. The relevant exception for this post is for questions regarding “the scope of Aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” (at para 55). Important ambiguities persist about what this means for the DTCA. On one hand, DTCA litigation does not determine Aboriginal rights. The DTCA was designed to apply where the Crown considered an action that could impact an Aboriginal right that had not yet been adjudicated. Though it was later extended to established rights, it remains a procedural duty on the Crown rather than an Aboriginal right per se). If this is the case, this would suggest that the correctness exception does not include DTCA issues. On the other hand, the DTCA is a constitutional obligation understood as a limit on the exercise of sovereignty; it shares much in common with the other issues to which Vavilov applies the correctness standard. We argue that the logic supporting the existence of the constitutional exception in Vavilov also supports the application of the correctness standard to a broader range of DTCA issues than is currently the practice. This post considers how Vavilov may have changed considerations of judicial reviews arising in DTCA contexts.