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Legislation Considered: First Nations Oil and Gas and Moneys Management Act, S.C. 2005, c.48

PDF Version: Preliminary thoughts on the First Nations Oil and Gas and Moneys Management Act

The First Nations Oil and Gas and Moneys Management Act, S.C. 2005, c.48 (“FNOGMMA“) came into force on April 1, 2006. However, to date no First Nations have elected to “opt into” the Act.

The Act has been promoted as a method whereby a First Nation can take control of its on-reserve oil and gas resources and thus enhance the economic rent from these resources. It is elective in that a First Nation must choose to bring itself under the FNOGMMA legislative regime before the statutory regime applies. The existing Indian Oil and Gas Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-7 will continue to apply to those First Nations that do not “opt into” the FNOGMMA. Left unstated is why Canada under the existing Indian Oil and Gas Act cannot similarly take advantage of “value-added” opportunities and similarly enhance the economic rent accruing to the beneficiary First Nation. (A new Indian Oil and Gas Act was passed on May 14, 2009, but will not be in force until the amendments to the Indian Oil and Gas Regulations, 1995 are complete.)

Another Take on Equality Rights by the Court of Appeal

By Jennifer Koshan

On July 13, 2009

In Aboriginal, Constitutional

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: Another Take on Equality Rights by the Court of Appeal

Case Commented On: Cunningham v Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2009 ABCA 239

In my recent post on Morrow v Zhang, 2009 ABCA 215, Some Questions about the Decision to Reinstate the Cap on Damages for Soft Tissue Injuries, I noted that this case was the first opportunity for the Court of Appeal to apply section 15 of the Charter (the equality rights provision) since the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41. Only a couple of weeks later, a differently constituted Court of Appeal panel decided another section 15 case, and the analysis and outcome of the two cases are quite different. While I have a few quibbles with the Court’s decision in Cunningham v Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), I believe it is a much better example of how section 15 of the Charter should be applied than is Morrow v Zhang.

Rule of Law, Deference and Contempt: Another Chapter in the Black Bear Crossing Dispute

By Jennifer Koshan

On April 30, 2009

In Aboriginal, Constitutional

Case Considered: Tsuu T’ina Nation v. Frasier, 2009 ABCA 140

PDF version: Rule of Law, Deference and Contempt: Another Chapter in the Black Bear Crossing Dispute

The dispute between the three remaining residents of Black Bear Crossing (BBC) and the Tsuu T’ina Nation was back before the courts on April 6, 2009. On that date, the Alberta Court of Appeal (Justices Peter Martin, Frans Slatter and Sal LoVecchio) heard an appeal by the Tsuu T’ina Nation of the finding of contempt made against it on November 7, 2008 by Justice Jo’Ann Strekaf. The contempt order related to the failure of the Tsuu T’ina Nation to comply with earlier orders requiring it to maintain utilities and water service at BBC while the three residents – Fred Frasier, Florence Peshee and Regina Noel – remained there pending the resolution of their claims for band membership (see my earlier post “Litigation by installments”: Further Developments in the Black Bear Crossing Dispute). While the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in eight short paragraphs, its judgment is replete with lofty legal concepts such as the rule of law and deference that call out to be unpacked.

Evidence of Amelioration: What Does Kapp Require of Governments Under s.15(2) of the Charter? What Will Courts Permit?

By Jennifer Koshan

On March 8, 2009

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: Evidence of Amelioration: What Does Kapp Require of Governments Under s.15(2) of the Charter? What Will Courts Permit?

Case Commented On: Cunningham v Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2009 ABCA 53

Jonnette Watson Hamilton and I recently commented on the implications of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 for the proper approach to equality rights under s.15(1) of the Charter (see The End of Law: A New Framework for Analyzing Section 15(1) Charter Challenges). We also noted that Kapp was more clear in terms of the approach to be taken under s.15(2) of the Charter, giving that section “independent status to protect ameliorative laws, programs and activities.” A recent Alberta case deals with a potential new battleground under s.15(2): government attempts to introduce new evidence to establish the ameliorative purpose of their laws on appeal. If a government is successful in this respect, and the court accepts the ameliorative purpose of the law or program in question, this will effectively serve to bar a claim under s.15(1).

Don’t you forget about me: Remembering the rest of administrative law after Dunsmuir

By Alice Woolley

On February 23, 2009

In Aboriginal, Administrative Law

Cases Considered: Bear Hills Charitable Foundation v. Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission 2008 ABQB 766; East Prairie Métis Settlement v. Alberta (Métis Settlements Ombudsman) 2009 ABQB 31.

PDF Version: Don’t you forget about me: Remembering the rest of administrative law after Dunsmuir

In March 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, in which it rearticulated the appropriate approach to identifying and applying the standard for judicial review of administrative decisions. The significance (or not) of this re-articulation has been discussed elsewhere on ABlawg (see here and here). What perhaps needs to be better understood, however, is that in rearticulating the standard of review, the Supreme Court did not change other principles of administrative law. Two recent decisions of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench indicate that there may be some confusion on this point. In one case, the Dunsmuir analysis was used by the Court to consider a question of administrative procedure, even though procedural questions are not properly subject to standard of review analysis. In another case, the Dunsmuir analysis was used by the Court to review a decision properly characterized either as procedural or non-dispositive which, again, makes the use of a Dunsmuir analysis inapt.