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Case Considered: Tsuu T’ina Nation v. Frasier, 2009 ABCA 140

PDF version: Rule of Law, Deference and Contempt: Another Chapter in the Black Bear Crossing Dispute

The dispute between the three remaining residents of Black Bear Crossing (BBC) and the Tsuu T’ina Nation was back before the courts on April 6, 2009. On that date, the Alberta Court of Appeal (Justices Peter Martin, Frans Slatter and Sal LoVecchio) heard an appeal by the Tsuu T’ina Nation of the finding of contempt made against it on November 7, 2008 by Justice Jo’Ann Strekaf. The contempt order related to the failure of the Tsuu T’ina Nation to comply with earlier orders requiring it to maintain utilities and water service at BBC while the three residents – Fred Frasier, Florence Peshee and Regina Noel – remained there pending the resolution of their claims for band membership (see my earlier post “Litigation by installments”: Further Developments in the Black Bear Crossing Dispute). While the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in eight short paragraphs, its judgment is replete with lofty legal concepts such as the rule of law and deference that call out to be unpacked.

Evidence of Amelioration: What Does Kapp Require of Governments Under s.15(2) of the Charter? What Will Courts Permit?

By Jennifer Koshan

On March 8, 2009

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Jennifer Koshan

PDF Version: Evidence of Amelioration: What Does Kapp Require of Governments Under s.15(2) of the Charter? What Will Courts Permit?

Case Commented On: Cunningham v Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2009 ABCA 53

Jonnette Watson Hamilton and I recently commented on the implications of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 for the proper approach to equality rights under s.15(1) of the Charter (see The End of Law: A New Framework for Analyzing Section 15(1) Charter Challenges). We also noted that Kapp was more clear in terms of the approach to be taken under s.15(2) of the Charter, giving that section “independent status to protect ameliorative laws, programs and activities.” A recent Alberta case deals with a potential new battleground under s.15(2): government attempts to introduce new evidence to establish the ameliorative purpose of their laws on appeal. If a government is successful in this respect, and the court accepts the ameliorative purpose of the law or program in question, this will effectively serve to bar a claim under s.15(1).

Don’t you forget about me: Remembering the rest of administrative law after Dunsmuir

By Alice Woolley

On February 23, 2009

In Aboriginal, Administrative Law

Cases Considered: Bear Hills Charitable Foundation v. Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission 2008 ABQB 766; East Prairie Métis Settlement v. Alberta (Métis Settlements Ombudsman) 2009 ABQB 31.

PDF Version: Don’t you forget about me: Remembering the rest of administrative law after Dunsmuir

In March 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, in which it rearticulated the appropriate approach to identifying and applying the standard for judicial review of administrative decisions. The significance (or not) of this re-articulation has been discussed elsewhere on ABlawg (see here and here). What perhaps needs to be better understood, however, is that in rearticulating the standard of review, the Supreme Court did not change other principles of administrative law. Two recent decisions of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench indicate that there may be some confusion on this point. In one case, the Dunsmuir analysis was used by the Court to consider a question of administrative procedure, even though procedural questions are not properly subject to standard of review analysis. In another case, the Dunsmuir analysis was used by the Court to review a decision properly characterized either as procedural or non-dispositive which, again, makes the use of a Dunsmuir analysis inapt.

The End of Law: A New Framework for Analyzing Section 15(1) Charter Challenges

By Jonnette Watson Hamilton

On February 20, 2009

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Oil & Gas, Supreme Court of Canada

By: Jennifer Koshan and Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: The End of Law: A New Framework for Analyzing Section 15(1) Charter Challenges

Case Commented On: Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v Canada, 2009 SCC 9

After the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 in June of 2008 there were questions about whether the Court had changed the legal framework for analyzing challenges brought under section 15(1) of the Charter. Kapp had clearly changed the approach to section 15(2), granting it independent status to protect ameliorative laws, programs and activities. However, on the topic of section 15(1), the Court had sent mixed signals about its intended approach. The message sent by the Court’s February 13, 2009 decision in Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v Canada is much clearer; the legal framework for analyzing section 15(1) claims will be very different than it has been for the past decade.

The Crown has neither the power nor the duty to invest Indian monies: The use of legislation to limit trust duties

By Nigel Bankes

On February 20, 2009

In Aboriginal, Constitutional, Oil & Gas, Supreme Court of Canada

Cases Considered: Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, 2009 SCC 9.

PDF Version: The Crown has neither the power nor the duty to invest Indian monies: The use of legislation to limit trust duties

The “money management” part of the long-running Samson\Ermineskin Case has now come to a close. A unanimous seven person panel of the Supreme Court of Canada in a judgement authored by Justice Marshall Rothstein has ruled that the Government of Canada is not liable when it fails to invest First Nation royalty monies and instead deposits those monies to the credit of the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) and pays the First Nations interest on those monies. In fact, the Court has ruled that the Indian Act makes it illegal for the Crown to invest Indian capital monies. The Court also ruled that the provisions of the Act which require this conclusion do not constitute discrimination within the meaning of s.15 of the Charter.